


**IN THE SHADOW  
OF THE SPHINX**



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A HISTORY OF ARMY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

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***In the Shadow of the Sphinx*** traces the history of Army counterintelligence—apprehending enemy saboteurs in World War I, providing support to troops on the front lines of World War II and the Korean War, screening for war criminals during the occupation of Germany and Japan, and rounding up Soviet spies in the Cold War. In the process, this book attempts to give the reader some appreciation of the total contribution counterintelligence has made to the security of the Nation and its Army.

# IN THE SHADOW OF THE SPHINX

## A HISTORY OF ARMY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

*By*

*James L. Gilbert*

*John P. Finnegan*

*Ann Bray*



History Office

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT AND INFORMATION

US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND

FORT BELVOIR, VIRGINIA



### THE SPHINX

Traditionally, the sphinx has been a symbol of strength and the keeping of secrets. It was because of these characteristics that the Institute of Heraldry selected the sphinx in 1923 to represent the new discipline of military intelligence. In 1949, Army counterintelligence began its close association with the sphinx when its image was made part of the Counter Intelligence Corps School crest. In 1953, a gold-painted statue made its appearance in front of CIC headquarters at Fort Holabird. The monument possessed a secret of its own—just when and how it came to exist. The most popular rumor was that counterintelligence agents had originally liberated it from in front of a brothel in France during World War II. After the closure of Fort Holabird, the statue eventually found a home at Fort Huachuca, Arizona—the new location of the US Army Intelligence Center and School. In keeping with the tradition of the sphinx, the men and women of counterintelligence for nearly a century have guarded the secrets of the Nation and its Army from hostile intelligence services.

# FOREWORD

The challenges facing our Nation today in its war against terrorism are reminiscent of the security concerns in the days leading up to World War I. Newspaper headlines told of large explosions in major metropolitan areas, the presence of spy cells inside the country, and the capture of foreign saboteurs crossing our borders. These events would ultimately result in the establishment of a permanent corps of trained counterintelligence specialists within America's Army.

During peacetime and war, counterintelligence has served to protect the Army's most important secrets; its success or failure often spell the difference between victory and defeat on the battlefield. Highlights include the outstanding work performed by Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) detachments in support of our combat forces during World War I and World War II. Later in the Korean War, the Army turned to the CIC to establish and operate a very sophisticated, behind-the-lines network of intelligence collectors. However, counterintelligence's greatest contribution may have occurred in the occupation period following World War II. In Germany and Austria, counterintelligence agents were responsible for the successful denazification program that gave democracy a chance. In Japan, they served as the ears and eyes of the occupation authorities to monitor the steps being taken towards a representative form of government. Agents of the Counter Intelligence Corps were among the first to define and then confront the emerging threat posed by communism bent on derailing the progress toward free societies, and throughout the Cold War, counterintelligence would remain as the Army's principal shield against hostile intelligence services.

The end of the Cold War did not lessen the need for counterintelligence—in fact, just the opposite occurred. The increased deployment of US warfighters in support of regional conflicts posed new challenges in the area of force protection. The coming of the Information Age meant that for the first time foreign intelligence and other hostile elements could assess, steal, and transport a large volume of sensitive material through cyberspace with little signature or latency. And in the war against global terrorism, counterintelligence professionals remain engaged 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Today, counterintelligence is an integral part of the Army's all-source intelligence capabilities, helping to analyze huge amounts of raw data which can be funneled to commanders and law enforcement agencies in near real time.

All facets of counterintelligence have been touched upon, but as a matter of readability, the book is weighted towards counterespionage. Regardless, it is still trusted that the reader will gain some appreciation of the total contribution that counterintelligence has made in support of the Nation and its Army for over 90 years. It is also a story of individual sacrifice and dedication by counterintelligence personnel that should continue to foster *esprit de corps* among future generations of military intelligence professionals.

JOHN F. KIMMONS  
Major General, USA  
Commanding  
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# PREFACE

It seems just the other day that my former colleague, Dr. John P. Finnegan, and I sat discussing the possibility that he undertake the writing of a history on Army counterintelligence. Our talk ended with his successfully persuading me against such a venture, principally because of the lack of easy access to primary sources. When I was later tasked with the current project, I reflected back on my earlier dialogue with Dr. Finnegan and wondered if I should have been more insistent.

In preparing the document, I was given two choices: write around the earlier works of Ann Bray and John Finnegan, which while significant were far from complete, or be inclusive. Since both authors labored under the auspices of military intelligence, I decided to stand on their shoulders and give them full credit for their sizable contributions. By its very nature, counterintelligence history is dependent upon personal accounts. Thus, I opted to supplement the narrative with a generous number of photos and personal stories. Although portions of the counterintelligence history have been told before, this volume is intended to serve as a useful overview linking these fragments. It is my hope that the counterintelligence order of battle will be found useful to other researchers in the future. Regardless of the format, some readers will be disappointed that certain themes were not more fully developed, but I can only trust that an equal number will find the volume a useful primer on the subject.

Major General (later LTG) Keith B. Alexander, then INSCOM Commander, first suggested the idea for this book. His successor, MG John F. Kimmons encouraged the History Office to proceed with publication. Oversight and support to the project were provided by Mr. Daniel Scarfo, Chief, Strategic Management and Information Office. The final product benefited greatly from the reading and comments of Mr. Thomas N. Hauser, staff historian, and from the editorial expertise of Mrs. Karen E. Kovach, writer-editor. Ms. Romana Danysh, Organization Branch, Center of Military History, provided invaluable assistance on the background of Counter Intelligence Corps units. Credit for the design of this publication belongs to James Hubbard, Visual Information Specialist of the INSCOM Public Affairs Office.


The project benefited significantly from the talents of Mr. Robert J. Bills of INSCOM Photo Lab and assistance of the US Army Cryptologic Records Center. Non-INSCOM photos are credited to National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Library of Congress (LC), and US Army Heritage and Education Center (AHEC). Special thanks to the Defense Visual Information Center for their support in obtaining a number of the photos. Finally, several members of the INSCOM staff read the manuscript and offered important insights. However, all errors and omissions are solely the responsibility of the author.

JAMES L. GILBERT  
Command Historian  
US Army Intelligence and Security Command



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*"There is one evil I dread, and that is, their spies. I could wish, therefore, the most attentive watch be kept...I wish a dozen or more of honest, sensible and diligent men, were employed...in order to question, cross-question etc., all such persons as are unknown, and cannot give an account of themselves...I think it a matter of importance to prevent them from obtaining intelligence of our situation."*

General George Washington, 24 March 1776

# CHAPTER ONE


## CORPS OF INTELLIGENCE POLICE

### THE BEGINNINGS

It has been said that intelligence is the art of knowing one's enemies. If that is so, then counterintelligence is the craft of shielding one's own secrets from hostile intelligence agencies. Counterintelligence as an organized discipline is a product of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, but individuals as far back as the Revolutionary War have from time to time engaged in the business of catching enemy spies and protecting secrets. Although fragmented, these beginnings are an essential part of the counterintelligence story.

Drawing upon first-hand experience gained during the French and Indian War as well as knowledge obtained from books of his day, General George Washington, Commander of the Continental Army, became an early advocate and practitioner of military intelligence. Besides establishing and running his own spy nets and deception operations, Washington equally demanded that his own plans be kept utmost secret and routinely instructed his staff to be on guard against enemy spies: "...All that remains for me to add is, that you keep the whole matter as Secret as possible. For upon Secrecy success depends...."

Washington's senior intelligence officer, CPT (later Colonel) Benjamin Tallmadge, was a key player in the most heralded case involving counterintelligence during the Revolutionary War. Learning from his sources that a certain "John Anderson" was expecting the surrender of a major fort being held by the patriots, Tallmadge immediately placed guards on alert. Upon hearing that a suspect by that name had passed through the lines to meet with General Benedict Arnold, commander at West Point on the Hudson River, Tallmadge acted quickly to intercept Anderson, who turned out to be the British spy-chief, MAJ John Andre in disguise. A search revealed incriminating documents concealed inside his boot. Control of the Hudson River was preserved, and America's most infamous traitor—General Benedict Arnold—unmasked. In a follow-up operation, CPT David Gray of Massachusetts, posing as a deserter, became the courier for Andre's successor, MAJ Oliver DeLancey. To add credibility to Gray's cover story, General Washington took the precaution of having Captain Gray listed as a deserter. For 2 years, Gray



*Major John Andre, Adjutant General to the English Army and spy chief, was hanged on 1 October 1780 at the New York headquarters of the Continental Army. (LC)*


successfully penetrated the British Secret Service in New York, obtaining vital information on its spy network.

For nearly a century and a half, the Army would view intelligence and counterintelligence as skills not needed in peacetime. The only emphasis on security was in the area of guarding the army. A manual of the times cited the requirement for a cadre of guards to ward off any surprise attack by the enemy and cited the traditional role of pickets and sentinels. "On the march the security of the army is provided for by advance guards, rear guards, and flanking detachments." Cavalry normally fulfilled these functions. The next real milestone for counterintelligence did not occur until 1861, when the outbreak of the Civil War threatened the Nation's very existence.

Washington, DC, not only served as the capital of the North and the center of its war-planning activities but also as home to many Southern sympathizers, making it fertile ground for Confederate spies. Union COL Charles P. Stone, who served as Inspector General of the District of Columbia, estimated that at the start of the war there were potentially 20,000 citizens of the District who would gladly aid the Southern cause. Consequently, the Confederacy carefully created a number of spy routes along which flowed a steady stream of information from Washington, DC, through southern Maryland and on to the Southern capital of Richmond, Virginia.

Over the course of the war, two men would be entrusted with leading the effort to safeguard the secrets of the Nation's capital. The first was Allan Pinkerton, a Scottish immigrant who had discovered that he possessed investigative skills and had proceeded to turn them into a well-established, money-making enterprise—the Pinkerton National Detective Agency. Based out of Chicago, Pinkerton had come to the attention of railroad executive George M. McClellan, and when McClellan was appointed as a Union commander, Pinkerton came along as head of the general's intelligence-gathering operation.

Following the defeat of the Federals at the Battle of Manassas



*In 1861, famed detective Allan Pinkerton (shown here with President Lincoln) helped to capture several important Confederate spies. (LC)*

on 21 July 1861—a defeat that Union authorities believed to have in part been brought about by timely information furnished by Confederate spies based in Washington, DC—President Abraham Lincoln appointed General McClellan Commander of the Army of the Potomac. With McClellan headquartered temporarily in the District, Pinkerton and his so-called “Secret Service” turned their attention to catching spies for the War Department.

High on Pinkerton’s list of suspects was Rose O’Neal Greenhow, an attractive and charming widow and prominent Washington hostess who had connections with leading figures in government and the military. Pinkerton would later

Allan Pinkerton recalled with some embellishment a night spent performing surveillance outside Rose Greenhow’s residence: “a storm burst upon us in all of its fury. Umbrellas were a useless commodity and, unprotected, we were compelled to breast the elements, which were now warring with terrible violence.” Standing on the shoulders of his assistants, Pinkerton peered inside the house, only to find the room lit but empty. Upon hearing footsteps, the counter-spies quickly hid and watched. A captain assigned to the Office of the Provost Marshal knocked on the door and was greeted by Greenhow herself. Taking up his position again at the window, Pinkerton described what happened next, “he [the officer] took from an inner pocket of his coat a map which, as he held it before the light, I imagined that I could identify a plan of the fortifications in and around Washington. My blood boiled with indignation.”


describe her as a woman with “almost irresistible seductive powers.” To collect evidence and identify her sources of information, Pinkerton and his operatives kept watch on Greenhow’s residence, which was located just two blocks north of the White House and a block west of General McClellan’s headquarters. After observing her in the act of receiving plans from an Army officer, Pinkerton had Rose Greenhow placed under arrest. A follow-up search of her house uncovered incriminating documents and codes.

When McClellan departed Washington, DC, to launch a campaign against Richmond, Pinkerton went along to provide intelligence estimates on the enemy’s strength. The counterintelligence vacuum left behind would soon be filled by a 36-year-old, red-bearded, itinerant mechanic by the name of Lafayette Baker. A native of New York, Baker had journeyed to the gold fields of California where he gained prominence as a leader in the vigilante movement. Once the war broke out, Baker offered his services as a spy for the Union. Following the conclusion of an espionage mission to Richmond, Baker was tapped to head counterintelligence operations within the State Department, largely involving tracking down contraband mail and merchandise. Baker and his so-called “National Detective Police” even performed liaison with the New York City police and sent agents on assignment to Canada.

When Edwin M. Stanton became Secretary of War, he commissioned Baker and gave him the title of “Special Agent.” Over the next 3 years, Colonel Baker and his cadre of 30 agents labored to neutralize the threat of Southern spies by methods that often were viewed as intimidating by those on the receiving end. Upon taking an oath of allegiance to the Union, most of the internees obtained their release from the Old Capital Prison, now site of the Supreme Court Building. Baker also maintained contact with other military departments and local army headquarters. (Although armies for the North and the South used their cavalry and spies to collect information, no equivalent counterintelligence organization is known to have existed in the field.) Baker’s last major assignment consisted of directing the capture of conspirators involved in the assassination of President Lincoln.

### Military Information Division

In the latter part of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the Army began taking steps to modernize. Its recognition of the need for greater professionalism resulted in the creation of a school in 1881 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, for infantry and cavalry officers. The Army also acknowledged the need for more information on military-related developments abroad. This, coupled with pressure on the Army to keep up with the Navy’s new Office of Naval Intelligence, culminated in 1885 in the establishment of a Military Information Division (MID) within The Adjutant General’s



*During much of the war, Colonel Lafayette Baker headed the Union’s counterintelligence effort in Washington, DC. (LC)*

Office. Initially, Army leaders viewed MID as simply a reference library located within the ornate State, War, and Navy Building (now the Eisenhower Executive Office Building) next to the White House. In 1889, Congress approved, for the first time, the dispatching of military attachés to the major European capitals (Paris, Petersburg, London, Berlin, and Vienna) to actively gather information and send reports back to MID at the War Department.

In the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, the principal spokesman for military intelligence was COL Arthur L. Wagner, an instructor at the Fort Leavenworth School. Here, Wagner wrote the book *The Service of Security and Information*, an early primer on the use of intelligence and counterintelligence. When apprehending a suspected spy, Wagner furnished the following guidance: “...he should be carefully searched, his clothes ripped apart, the soles and heels of his shoes cut open, and his buttons examined.” He went on to describe how the spy’s hair, beard, and mouth should be carefully inspected along with all pieces of equipment and weapons. Considered a visionary for his time, Wagner received command of the Military Information Division and, during the Spanish-American War in 1898, oversaw the strengthening of its intelligence-gathering capabilities. In the process, Wagner exposed a

number of young officers to the potential of military intelligence. Among those who fell under Wagner's influence was CPT Ralph H. Van Deman. Although trained as a medical doctor, Van Deman would instead devote his life to the cause of promoting intelligence, and subsequently play an important role in shaping modern counterintelligence.


The conclusion of the Spanish-American War left the United States, for the first time, with major overseas responsibilities in Puerto Rico and the Philippines. Having been liberated from Spanish rule, Filipino patriots quickly turned against their new masters. When conventional warfare failed, the nationalists led by Emilio Aguinaldo resorted to guerrilla tactics. In response, the Army organized a volunteer force consisting of 2-year enlistees for the purpose of fighting what would become a drawn-out campaign.

To aid in identifying and locating the enemy, Army leaders formed an autonomous Military Information Division of the Philippines in 1901. One of its primary purposes was maintaining files on enemy insurgents; at the head of this records section was Captain Van Deman. MID also assembled an invaluable collection of maps on the Philippines and even sent its own undercover agents to gather first-hand information. In the process, MID brought to light a serious counter-intelligence problem—the presence of undercover Japanese agents, some of whom were posing as local businessmen. Whenever Japanese agents were identified, US officials promptly took steps to deport them. In one instance, an officer of the Japanese General Staff was among those killed while fighting alongside Philippine insurgents in southern Luzon.

In 1900, the United States was little more than 100 years old and on the verge of becoming a world power. Unlike European powers which had a long tradition of intelligence gathering, only a handful of Army officers embraced the need for a full-time military intelligence effort. It would take a major international conflict before the Nation and its Army would acknowledge the requirement for permanent organizations dedicated to spying and spy-catching.

## WORLD WAR I

When war broke out among the major European powers in 1914, President Woodrow Wilson fell back upon America's long-standing policy of neutrality. In the past, the Atlantic Ocean had



*Colonel Arthur L. Wagner was an early visionary in the practice of intelligence and security. (NARA)*

shielded the United States from conflicts on the European continent. However, Britain's paper blockade (enforced in part with the employment of mines to prevent goods from reaching Germany), coupled with Germany's introduction of submarine warfare, placed America's goods, passengers, and principles at risk. The most shocking incident was the sinking—without warning—of the British passenger ship *Lusitania* by a German U-boat. The pride of the British merchant marine went down on 7 May 1915 with 1,198 civilians on board, including 128 Americans.

On the home front, the United States' confidence in its policy of neutrality was being shaken by a series of incidents involving sabotage by German agents. Although few lives were lost, the total effect was to heighten tensions and war rhetoric. The most dramatic of these acts occurred on 30 July 1916 in New York Harbor where a pier on Black Tom Island, containing a thousand tons of munitions destined for the Allied powers, exploded with such a force that shrapnel scarred the Statue of Liberty, shattered windows in Times Square, and woke sleeping citizens as far away as the state of Maryland. The other major attack took place at the Navy Yard on Mare Island in San Pablo Bay, California. In the midst of these growing tensions, voices of the "preparedness movement" grew louder for general conscription and training of US soldiers. On the other hand, only one lone voice advocated the strengthening of military intelligence.

Following a 5-year hiatus from Washington, DC, MAJ (soon Colonel) Ralph Van Deman returned in 1915 to find that the Military Information Division had atrophied to the point where the War Department was without any viable intelligence organization. The entire operation consisted of a handful of clerks, routinely filing attaché reports without reading or analyzing them. Sensing that US involvement in the war was imminent, Van Deman argued passionately for establishing a permanent intelligence organization similar to those of European armies, but his “numerous memoranda” to the Army Chief of Staff went unanswered.

In 1917, Germany announced unrestricted submarine warfare against all ships carrying goods to its enemies. The sinking of US ships without warning finally forced President Wilson to ask Congress for a Resolution of War: “The world must be made safe for democracy.” On 6 April 1917, the United States entered the war on the side of the Allies. Nevertheless, General Hugh L. Scott, the Army’s Chief of Staff and a veteran of the Indian wars in the west, remained intransigent against the creation of a viable intelligence organization. If the United States stood in need of intelligence, General Scott reasoned it could be obtained from America’s new allies. Van Deman later wrote, “No amount of talking or argument would change the Chief of Staff’s opinion, and after two or three such

interviews, he became exasperated and ordered me not to approach the Secretary of War.”

Undaunted, Van Deman remained resolved to raise the issue with Secretary of War Newton Baker. Prohibited to go in person, Van Deman utilized personal acquaintances as envoys, including the Chief of Police of the District of Columbia, who regularly breakfasted at a private club with the Secretary. Fortunately, Secretary Baker proved receptive to the idea and in May 1917 issued instructions to establish the Military Intelligence Section within the Army’s War College. For his effort Van Deman would later be called the “Father of Military Intelligence,” but in the interim, he suffered the humiliation of having his promotion to general officer temporarily scuttled by an indignant Chief of Staff.

In his “Final Memoranda,” Van Deman described the inauspicious beginnings of the Military Intelligence Section; “It is unbelievable, but when we entered the war the branch consisted of two officers and two clerks.” Using the British intelligence system as a model, Van Deman’s organization soon ballooned to a staff reaching over 1500 military and civilian members, transforming the Intelligence Section into a separate division—Military Intelligence Division or MID. Van Deman bifurcated his organization into Positive (Intelligence) and Negative



*Prior to the United States entering World War I, German saboteurs successfully destroyed the munitions sheds on Black Tom Island in New York Harbor. (NARA)*



*Colonel Ralph M. Van Deman, later dubbed the “Father of Military Intelligence,” served as first Chief of the War Department’s Military Intelligence Division. (NARA)*



*For most of the war, the Military Intelligence Division worked out of the upper floors of the Hooe Building in the District of Columbia. (LC)*

(Counterintelligence) Branches. Underneath the two major subsections were 14 functional areas that performed such diverse missions as training intelligence officers for duty overseas, supervising military attachés, and testing correspondence for secret inks. After several moves, the MID finally settled into its wartime headquarters at the Hooe Building on 1330 F Street, Northwest, two blocks directly east of the White House.

### **Internal Threat**


Separated by an ocean, the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) in France remained independent from the leadership of the War Department. It soon became apparent that positive collec-

tion of intelligence against Imperial Germany could be better accomplished by the AEF than by a War Department element 3,000 miles to the rear. Consequently, Van Deman would direct much of his attention to the new field of negative intelligence or counterintelligence: "the supervision and control of such a system of military...counterespionage as shall be established...during the continuance of the present war."

When the United States joined the war against Germany in 1917, the country believed itself to be confronted by a substantial threat from within. America was still a nation of immigrants, many of whom had recently arrived from countries in Europe that were now at war. The loyalty of German Americans was naturally questioned, but the War Department was equally unsure of where Irish Americans, Scandinavian Americans, and even African Americans stood. In fact, the Army recruited two African-American undercover agents to travel the country for the sole purpose of ascertaining their racial group's views on the war. Besides the problem posed by unassimilated ethnics, a significant anti-war movement persisted. Finally, early in the war, the politicians, the press, and military leadership exaggerated the scope and power of the German espionage and sabotage organization within the United States. This meant that the threat, real or imagined, demanded action.

Against these perceived menaces in 1917, the United States seemed almost defenseless. The Treasury Department had a Secret Service, but it was confined by law to narrowly circumscribed duties. The Department of Justice maintained a Bureau of Investigation, but its mission before the outbreak of war largely consisted of investigating cases of fraud against the government. Finally, a few major cities had organized police "bomb squads" to deal with the anarchist threat. This lack of civilian resources in the counterintelligence field spurred the Army to launch its own wide-sweeping program.

In June 1917, Van Deman took the first steps toward ensuring that War Department offices had security guards and that all personnel were issued identification cards.



*One of the first security steps taken was the issuing of passes for all War Department employees. (INSCOM)*

He then proceeded to set up a War Department security force of civilian investigators. This "Personnel Improvement Bureau" was first intended as a guard force, but soon began screening military personnel and applicants for government employment. A month later, the Military Intelligence Division opened its first field office in New York City, staffed by 23 former members of the police department's Neutrality and Bomb Squad. Six additional field offices—Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, New Orleans, Hoboken (New Jersey), and San Juan (Puerto Rico)—were eventually set up in major cities and at embarkation points. Of all the field offices, New York City was the busiest. It was responsible for over 400 arrests during the war, including picking up an individual for impersonating an officer, shutting down an anti-war printing operation run by "Reds," and apprehending escaped international criminals and terrorists.

As the necessity for undercover investigations of individuals and organizations grew in the Washington, DC, area, Van Deman sent out a call for a group of individuals with the requisite skills; the majority selected came from the Metropolitan Police of New York City. Upon their arrival in Washington, DC, the recruits were quartered in a private house in the southeast part of the city. Wearing civilian clothes, this squad of elite investigators worked incognito; knowledge of their existence was limited to those within the direct chain of command. A captain, also formerly of the NYPD, assumed the role of leader. Looking back, Van Deman saw this small group as foreshadowing the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) of a later generation.

### Countersubversion

The Military Intelligence Division was particularly concerned about possible subversion from within the ranks of the vast new citizen Army being raised by the draft. The draft act passed by Congress in May 1917 was designed to tap as much of the national manpower pool as possible. Granting few exemptions, the act impartially swept up American citizens and resident foreign nationals, including citizens of enemy countries. Regarding this heterogeneous force as posing a serious threat to national security, Van Deman believed the newly formed National Guard and National Army divisions in particular to be vulnerable to agents of the Central Powers and their sympathizers. A fellow intelligence officer echoed many of these same concerns, "...unless we proceed on an extensive and thorough scale, the enemy with his existing system in the United States, will be stronger than we are right in our own army and we will be helpless."

In October 1917, Van Deman ordered intelligence officers just assigned to the newly activated divisions to come to Washington, DC, under conditions of tight secrecy. Upon reporting, the officers received instruction on how to set up a secret surveillance program within their



*Colonel Dennis E. Nolan, G2 for the AEF, initiated a call for establishment of the Corps of Intelligence Police. (NARA)*

respective units. Van Deman would later extend the program to Regular Army divisions and installations by using guidelines contained in a confidential pamphlet, "Provisional Counter-Espionage Instructions." The counterespionage program conceived by Van Deman's staff was comprehensive. It called for the creation of a clandestine agent network throughout the Army, extending down to company level. Nets in each division would be overseen by an assistant to the intelligence officer and would work through a system of anonymous collection managers. At the bottom of this secret pyramid, two "operatives" mutually unknown to one another would be recruited from each company. As the process worked, these MID observers would submit reports on their fellow soldiers. Eventually, the divisional intelligence officer gathered and relayed them to the military intelligence staff at the War Department. Once this system was fully operational, more than 400 divisional and installation

intelligence officers produced a growing stream of incident reports that drove the relentless expansion of a counterintelligence organization to conduct follow-up investigations. To supplement the efforts of his overextended force of intelligence officers, Van Deman hired civilian detectives and recruited unpaid volunteers; however, he soon found a fresh source of investigative manpower from within the enlisted ranks—the Corps of Intelligence Police.

After his arrival in Europe, Colonel Dennis E. Nolan, intelligence chief for the American Expeditionary Forces, became concerned about the possible security problems faced by American troops operating on foreign soil. In early July 1917, he requested that The Adjutant General furnish him "fifty secret service men who have had training in police work [and] speak French fluently." He added that it was essential they be men of "high character" with "courage and unquestioned probity." This called

for a category of intelligence personnel not previously envisioned by anybody in the War Department. In August, authorization was approved, creating a 50-man Corps of Intelligence Police (CIP) made up of enlisted soldiers who would serve with the "rank, pay, and allowances" of sergeants of infantry.

Tasked with furnishing the appropriate personnel for the AEF, Colonel Van Deman immediately ran into difficulties. Private detective agencies at first seemed a likely source, but when told of the Army's requirement for French-speaking investigators, the head of the Pinkerton Agency quickly dismissed such a preposterous notion, "There ain't no such animal." The War Department was eventually reduced to sending a recruiting officer to New Orleans and New York City where he placed advertisements in local papers. All candidates who could pass the Army physical and answer a few simple questions in French were promptly signed up, shipped off to Fort Jay in

New York Harbor for a month's training as infantry, outfitted with distinctive green-corded campaign hats and collar brass marked "IP" for Intelligence Police, and put on a boat bound for France without civilian clothes or any instruction in intelligence work.

Besides helping to meet the security needs of the AEF, the Corps of Intelligence Police would also help solve the personnel problems of the MID on the home front. The iron broom of the draft had swept highly qualified people into the ranks of the Army; men with backgrounds in law, education, and insurance were especially suited for counterintelligence work. Furthermore, the military strongly believed in the principle that investigations of Army personnel should be carried out by other soldiers. In November 1917, the Military Intelligence Division requested an additional 250 CIP agents to assist its counterintelligence program. One unexpected consequence was that many of the civilians previously em-



Aircraft plants were among the first war-time industries to be covered by new security regulations protecting against sabotage.  
(NARA)

ployed by Van Deman chose to promptly enlist in the Corps of Intelligence Police.

In addition to focusing on the Army, the Military Intelligence Division monitored the activities of those individuals or groups in the civilian population who were suspected of opposing the draft and wishing to hamper war production. The operative premise was that “the misbehavior, disloyalty, or indifference of native Americans is as important a material of military intelligence as any other.”

To conduct its duties in the civilian sector, the Military Intelligence Division found it necessary to maintain an active liaison with a host of other government agencies, especially the Department of Justice, which alone had powers of arrest and prosecution in cases of civilian offenses against the military.

To carry out its mission, MID relied on two civilian auxiliaries for help: the Plant Protective Service and the American Protective League. Major General George O. Squier, the Chief Signal Officer who oversaw Army aviation, created the Plant Protective Service to protect the country’s new aircraft industry from sabotage and labor-related activities that could slow or stop production. Subsequently, the umbrella of the Plant Protection Service began to cover other industrial facilities working under war-time, government contracts. Inevitably, the Plant Protective Service came under the supervisory wing of military intelligence in January 1918.

The American Protective League was larger and less official in character. Estimates of the league’s strength ranged between 60,000 and 200,000, with the organization itself favoring the latter number. The league was an amalgam of several vigilante groups originally tied together to help the Department of Justice uncover spies and saboteurs. Regarding the early independence of the American Protective League, Van Deman expressed grave concern, “This sort of thing was extremely dangerous and it was evident that these must be stopped at once.” Van Deman sought to curb the organization’s excesses while still making use of its thousands of members to keep watch over suspicious activities and help enforce the draft. Van Deman accomplished his goal by issuing guidelines making the American Protective League accountable to MID. As an added measure, Van Deman had the American Protective League’s top leaders commissioned as military intelligence officers. In 1918, Congress debated a bill which would lead to the declaration of “war zones” around military sensitive areas and further extend the power of MID. However, the Department of Justice successfully deflected such a proposal.

Even elements of the Positive Branch within MID supported the counterintelligence mission. For instance, MI-8, which was responsible for breaking codes, had its greatest success against enemy agent communications.

## Military Intelligence Division's Organization 1918

Negative Branch	Positive Branch
<b>MI-3</b> (Counter-Espionage within the Army)	<b>MI-2</b> (Intel Analysis & Reporting)
<b>MI-4</b> (Counter-Espionage outside the Army)	<b>MI-5</b> (Attaché Collection)
<b>MI-10</b> (Censorship)	<b>MI-6</b> (Translation)
<b>MI-11</b> (Passport Control)	<b>MI-7</b> (Graphics Support)
<b>MI-13</b> (Graft & Fraud)	<b>MI-8</b> (Cryptology)
	<b>MI-9</b> (Combat Intel Training)

The Signal Corps maintained a series of monitoring sites along the southwest border with Mexico and in Maine where they copied messages from German intelligence operatives attempting to enter the United States and do harm; the intercept was then forwarded to MI-8 for decoding and translating.

The Army’s most widely heralded case of spy catching in the war involved codebreaking. Byron S. Butcher of the CIP recruited an informant in Mexico City to keep tabs on Luther Witzke, a German Navy lieutenant turned saboteur who was responsible for a number of bombings in the United States. Butcher learned from his source that Witzke was planning a return trip from Mexico where he had been in hiding under the Russian name of Pablo Waberski. Van Deman summarized what followed, giving MI-8 credit for helping to solve the case: “Witzke was detained at the border and placed in jail and the coded message found on his person sent to the ... Code and Cipher Section and decoded during a single night. This led to the trial and conviction of Witzke who was sentenced to death.”

## An Evaluation of the Threat

The threat against the home front to which MID had directed much of its efforts fortunately never materialized and, in fact, never existed. Hyphenated Americans remained loyal, and enemy agents were few in number and largely ineffective. Looking back on these beginnings, MAJ Garland Williams, Chief, Corps of Intelligence Police on the eve of World War II, offered the following scathing commentary: "In the United States the Corps of Intelligence Police was composed of many well-meaning but inexperienced officers, enlisted men, and civilians and their unorganized efforts accomplished practically nothing. It is said that the organization may have caught one spy." Despite such criticism, the screening of American "doughboys" prior to shipment to France ensured that no act of espionage was perpetrated within the ranks of the AEF. Similarly, MID also ensured the loyalty of civilian workers, such as Red Cross and other support personnel, destined for the rear areas of the AEF.

If there were excesses and misdirected energies, they could be blamed in large part on the fact that World War I had no precedent. Starting from scratch, Van Deman and his staff constructed an organization that established a series of basic security safeguards and practices that

would continue in times of peace: industrial security, a personal identification system, and background checks. The Military Intelligence Division also reigned in the potential excesses of such quasi-official groups as the American Protective League. Most important, WWI led to the establishment of a permanent counterintelligence arm within the army—the Corps of Intelligence Police. For the next 50 years, the CIP and its successors would remain one of the two major pillars of military intelligence, the other being signals intelligence.

## Over There

Upon his arrival in France, COL (later Brigadier General) Dennis E. Nolan as the G2 of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) immediately requested assistance from the War Department to address the potential counterintelligence problem. His French and British counterparts had emphasized to him the need to stop enemy agents from entering France and Belgium along the American sector of operations. This prompted Nolan to request from Colonel Van Deman in July that a Corps of Intelligence Police (CIP) be established. The first group of 50 sergeants under the command of 1LT Royden Williamson finally arrived in December. One American officer was quick to label them as "a delegation of 'Cajuns' from Louisiana, a sprinkling of



*Army counterintelligence screened civilians who went to France to work in the rear areas, such as members of the Red Cross. (NARA)*



*Members of CIP in support of the Rear Zone. Sergeant Peter de Pasqua, first agent to be decorated, stands on the last row, far left. Officers and stenographers are in the front row. (INSCOM)*

Sergeant Peter de Pasqua, who served with the Corps of Intelligence Police in the rear area of the American Expeditionary Forces, was a master of several languages giving him the ability to move unnoticed in the disguise of an interpreter for the American Red Cross. He frequented the various eating and drinking establishments of the old French city of Beaune with his ears open to the sentiments expressed by the local clientele. While visiting a local bistro, Pietro, as de Pasqua called himself, quickly befriended a Spaniard by the name of Diaz, who was openly threatening the Americans. Diaz's companions included a second Spaniard who, like Diaz, had been hired as a laborer on building projects undertaken by the American Services of Supply and a third individual who was an invalid French veteran with radical political leanings. Under Diaz's leadership, the three were in the middle of planning various acts of sabotage and were in contact with a German spymaster located in Spain. They brought Pietro into their confidence when he offered to obtain an American mail censorship stamp to aid in their correspondence to Spain. In his role as courier, Pietro was able to learn of the group's plans for destroying a major munitions depot. This information was passed on to French authorities who proceeded to arrest the would-be saboteurs. For his part, de Pasqua was awarded the Citation for Meritorious Service and in the process earned the distinction of being the first member of the Corps of Intelligence Police to be formally decorated.



*Counterintelligence in Action: Belgian and US intelligence officers question a suspected enemy agent. (NARA)*



*Specialists were assigned to the Counter-Espionage Section at GHQ. One function was to search for secret inks that might reveal invisible codes hidden in correspondence. (NARA)*

French Canadians, a number of Europeans, a coterie of Harvard men; and their professional antecedents ran the gamut of occupations.” Following screening by French authorities who rejected many as undesirables, to include a deserter from the French army, those passing final muster were hustled off to Le Havre to receive instruction at the hands of veteran Allied counterintelligence officers.

Although the initial group was not promising, the CIP had set a precedent. It was obvious to the AEF leadership that more counterintelligence personnel were still needed, and in January 1918, General John J. Pershing, Commander of the AEF, requested the CIP quota be increased to 750 and local recruiting be allowed from among units already overseas.

Although this request was approved, CIP agents assigned to the AEF never reached more than 452 by the end of the war. As new recruits to the CIP arrived at General Headquarters (GHQ) at Chaumont, they immediately began to study a series of manuals that outlined the organizational chain of command for the Allies and described the German spy system. Next they went through a practical phase of training either at the ports of Le Havre or Marseille or at one of the US corps headquarters. Eventually, American intelligence officers took over this phase of the orientation from the British.

Approximately one-third of CIP members wound up in what was called the Front Zone where the US was responsible for 100 miles of territory contiguous to the fighting front. Under the command of Colonel L.A. Sigaud, the headquarters for the Front Zone was collocated with GHQ. The Front CIP Zone also had branches with the First Army at Seine-et-Marne, and shortly before the war ended, with the newly established Second Army at Toul.

The American sector north of Toul and facing the St. Mihiel salient was near enough to the region of Lorraine to have a mixed civilian population (speaking both French and German) with equally mixed loyalties. Crossing “No Man’s Land” within the American Zone was rather safe since the country was wooded, the terrain rough, and the front relatively quiet. To reduce the flow of civilian traffic, the CIP set up a system of travel controls that resulted in scores of refugees and line crossers not properly identified being brought in for questioning. On the eve of the St. Mihiel offensive in September 1918, the CIP assembled a large body of its agents for the sole purpose of clearing potential enemy agents from the area of operations. Lieutenant Colonel J.A. Lester noted the CIP work “was done so effectively that the movement of the troops was unknown to the enemy until it was too late.”

The bulk of the CIP agents was in the Rear Zone and was under the command of Colonel Cabot Ward. From their Paris headquarters, Ward along with 8 officers and 15

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*“...after the Armistice, one of the senior intelligence officers of the German Army...said he would like to ask a question...why the 41st Division had never appeared in line?...The fact that the Germans did not learn of that [the 41st had been made a base division] until we told him after the Armistice showed their agents were poor or our system [counter-espionage] was pretty effective.”*

BG Dennis E. Nolan, G2, AEF

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enlisted men operated out of Hotel St. Anne until relocated to more suitable quarters at No.11 Avenue Montaigne. The move was heralded by a large explosion in the nearby street when an 8.26-inch shell used by the German’s so-called “Paris guns” landed from an estimated 75 miles away. The Rear Zone CIP had two sub-headquarters, one at Tours, which was the headquarters to the Services of Supply (SOS), and the other in London; together they fulfilled four major missions—port, frontier, depot, and recreational area security. There were 14 major ports in France, England, and Scotland; 400 miles of frontier of Spain and Italy; and 31 French cities with American supply, service, or training depots. Finally, CIP personnel oversaw the security of seven centers that hosted soldiers on temporary leave from the front.

In one instance, the Military Intelligence Division back at the War Department furnished information that led CIP agents within the AEF to search certain vessels arriving in French ports where they discovered explosives concealed among cargo destined for the front lines. The source of this intelligence may have been Dr. Walter T. Von Scheele, a spy and saboteur who had traveled to Cuba where he was apprehended through the efforts of the local military attaché, CPT Thomas F. Van Natta. Ironically, Von Scheele would later blow himself up while attempting to demonstrate for American intelligence how his incendiary bombs worked.

In the spring of 1918, the War Department issued “Counter Espionage Principles,” which outlined the duties of a counterintelligence officer. Among other things, the instructions defined the relationship between counterespionage and criminal investigations: offenses and crimes “are of interest to Intelligence Officers only when possibly connected with enemy activity...avoid the dissipation of energy in following cases of vice, liquor selling, fraud, draft evasion, and desertion unless these are traceable to

enemy activity.” This proved easier said than done, especially in the rear areas of the AEF. Colonel Ward later testified to conflict of interest, “Particularly during the early months of the service we were called upon, in fact all too frequently, to help the Military Police in running down crimes committed by Americans upon the civil population, investigating drinking places and low-class hotels.”

However, on a number of occasions, these types of investigations did lead to uncovering serious security risks. The CIP established a counterespionage organization at various US aviation camps that served 45 squadrons and maintained 740 airplanes. These efforts revealed an international ring of cocaine traffickers trading drugs for supplies and parts; follow-up undercover work by the CIP brought to light evidence of a conspiracy to use drugs to undermine the will of American soldiers to wage war. Given this evidence, the French authorities proceeded to apprehend those involved.

Besides agents who worked in either the Front or Rear Zones, a handful of CIP specialists were assigned to the

Counter-Espionage Section at GHQ. Here, members of Special Projects helped compile a central card file (eventually numbering 160,000 names and 3,500 open cases), search for invisible codes and inks, disseminate information received from Allied counterparts, and control travel by rail. Special Projects even assigned one agent to General Pershing’s private train. Other experts included an agent who worked exclusively on “labor, socialism, and Bolshevism cases;” another dealt with possible incidents of sabotage at Army construction sites. Agent Walter J. Goedeke, a former State Department employee from Baltimore, Maryland, received a commission as a first lieutenant and was given charge of examining passports for forgery.

As a whole, the AEF’s counterintelligence effort demonstrated itself to be more successful than its home-front counterpart and less controversial. Despite the overwhelming size of its operations area, the Corps of Intelligence Police had justified its existence by making important contributions to the security of US combat forces.



*The Council of Four at the Peace Conference: Lloyd George (Great Britain), Vittorio Orlando (Italy), Georges Clemenceau (France), and Woodrow Wilson (United States). Nearly 60 CIP agents were detached to support the conference. (NARA)*

## The Aftermath

Although the fighting stopped at the 11<sup>th</sup> hour on 11 November 1918, the work of the CIP in Europe continued. As troops moved into evacuated or recaptured towns, agents received “black” and “white” lists. Orders called for apprehended suspects on the black list to “be sent under escort for examination.” Those on the white list filled out questionnaires. A number of these procedures would later be replicated by counterintelligence personnel in World War II.

Soon, Army counterintelligence found itself expending much of its energies confronting an altogether new type of threat—communism. The most visible case involved the well-known American political cartoonist and correspondent by the name of Robert Minor, a key figure in America’s anti-war movement. While traveling in post-war Germany, Minor declared the time “ripe to spread the doctrines of Lenin and Trotsky among the American soldiers...” and proceeded to prepare a number of circulars to that end. These writings resulted in Minor’s arrest, being charged with distributing treasonous propaganda, and his eventual return to the States where he continued to dedicate his life and talents to the Communist cause.

In support of the 1919 Peace Conference held in Paris, the Army detailed 20 MID officers to accompany President Wilson and the American delegation on their trip overseas. The Army also placed 60 CIP agents under the command of Colonel Van Deman to provide security for the United States delegates. One of the CIP sergeants wrote that apart from helping to guard President Wilson, they were mostly employed as “a species of bell boys, ladies maids, and hall men.”

## Peace At Home

On the domestic front, the small counterintelligence element that remained at the end of the war also quickly shifted its efforts from German spies to Bolshevik agents and agitators. In the fall of 1919, an overwrought MID officer warned that the “situation in the United States is one that is verging on revolution....” The summaries issued by the Military Intelligence Division contained weekly reports of “radical activities” and “labor unrest,” and the correspondence of BG Marlborough Churchill, the current Chief of MID, reflected dire warnings of an impending economic and social crisis. Consequently, MID assumed an active role in helping to draft the War Department’s Plan White, which provided for the use of the Army in times of domestic disorder.

The establishment of the Workers’ (later Communist) Party, followed by an intensive propaganda campaign and isolated incidents of violence, resulted in the widespread crackdown of political and labor agitators by the Depart-

ment of Justice. Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer announced his “determination to drive from our midst the agents of Bolshevism,” and promptly deported 249 individuals, including a number of known anarchists. As the crisis subsided, the need for a strong peace-time counterintelligence presence within the Army diminished too. When the Nation retreated into the isolationism of the 1920s, the Army proceeded to discontinue its countersubversive system and recall all regulations on the subject. The Negative Branch of MID, which had supervised the War Department’s counterintelligence work, formally closed its doors in 1921.

## A Sideshow

When the Bolsheviks overthrew the Provisional Government of Russia in the October Revolution of 1917, they proceeded to sign a separate peace treaty with the Germans. In August 1918, the Allies sent forces, including 5,000 US soldiers, to protect northern Russian ports near Archangel from possible German attack and to secure military stores located there. The creation of counter-revolutionary White armies soon placed the Allies on the side of the anti-Bolshevik resistance groups. Unfortunately, the American Expeditionary Forces in northern Russia faced serious morale problems that made them susceptible to the intense barrage of Communist propaganda: the cold and isolation, resentment of being under British command, association with numerous other nationalities, and the natural desire to return to the States with their comrades-in-arms following the end of the war on the Western Front. Intelligence officers quickly identified the source of the words being voiced by the men in their complaints—Bolshevik propaganda leaflets. Over time, the Allies experienced 13 mutinous actions that included the refusal by a company of US infantry to pack their sleds in response to a movement order. To no one’s surprise, the leader of this act of disobedience was a disaffected agitator working for the Soviets.

The American forces at Vladivostok came to eastern Russia from the Philippines as a unified force of 9,000. Four officers and 4 clerks were assigned the task of providing counterintelligence support for the troops. In his final report, the G2 wrote that their effort was an overall success, “Attempts on the part of the Russians to spread Bolshevik propaganda among our troops were promptly discovered...There were a few cases of desertion to the Russian partisan or Bolshevik forces, but in every case the soldiers were found to be Russians who had apparently enlisted in the United States for that purpose.” Besides their normal duties, counterintelligence personnel also collected intelligence on local threats. Eventually, deteriorating international conditions led the United States to withdraw all its troops; first from Archangel in June 1919, and then from Vladivostok a year later in April 1920.

## BETWEEN THE WARS

By 1922, wartime emergency legislation had expired, reducing the peacetime Army to 125,000. On the books, the Army retained positions for 45 Corps of Intelligence Police agents scattered among the various corps areas across the continental United States (a disproportionate number were committed to the Eighth Corps Area along the Mexican Border). In all instances, counterintelligence fell under the control of the local G2. Overseas, the CIP supported Army troops stationed in the Panama, Hawaii, and Philippine Departments. In terms of strategic sites, the security of the Panama Canal was a high priority, leading the Panama Canal Department to request the services of two CIP agents in 1922. Priority notwithstanding, the positions remained vacant for the next 5 years until a highly capable Reserve lieutenant, trained in intelligence work and fluent in four languages, arrived to fill the position of staff sergeant. "Performing several men's work," the new recruit checked with local Panamanian villagers for the presence of strangers and explosives. Despite efforts to expand this one-man operation, the G2's repeated calls for additional resources went unanswered.

Hawaii had only four agents to monitor the local population, a large segment of which was composed of first- and second-generation Japanese. In addition, large numbers of Chinese, Filipinos, and Koreans lived on the islands. In the Philippines, it was not only a problem of insufficient personnel, but capable ones. The Adjutant General of the Philippine Department wrote to the War Department, "Of the five sergeants on this duty only one gives any promise of being a useful man in the capacity for which he is paid by the United States. This man has just arrived and is apparently fitted for the work by race, intelligence and disposition."

### Domestic Intelligence

Because of the Army's need to distance itself from civilian political matters, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2 (as the former Chief, MID had been redesignated) instructed CIP agents not to report on nonmilitary personnel. Absent the authority to conduct investigations, the CIP concentrated on instructing troops in combat intelligence techniques. Behind the scenes, the debate over what role, if any, the Corps of Intelligence Police should have in peacetime continued. Representing one viewpoint



*In response to the global depression, a number of would-be saviors appeared on the scene. (INSCOM)*

was a respected veteran of the AEF leadership in France, MG Johnson Hargood, Commanding General, Seventh Corps Area, who wrote the following objection to a peacetime CIP:

"As Chief of Staff for the Services of Supply in France, the whole organization of counter-espionage in the back areas came under my immediate jurisdiction and I fully realize the importance of this service in time of war....But in my opinion in time of peace in America, radicalism, communism, and efforts to overturn the existing form of government are political questions



*A CIP agent badge. (INSCOM)*

with which the Army should in no wise concern itself...."

On the other side of the debate, the man who established the CIP in the first place, MG Dennis E. Nolan, now Commanding General, Fifth Corps Area, lamented many of the new restrictions on the CIP. For example, he believed that the inability to conduct surveillance might well have negated the very rationale for the corps. "...The restrictions on subversive coverage placed on the CIP in December 1922 make it unnecessary to assign members of the CIP to Corps Area."

In 1922, the issue of domestic intelligence was briefly resurrected when, without consulting his superiors, 1LT W.D. Long, Post Intelligence Officer at Vancouver Barracks, Washington, sent a letter to all County Sheriffs in Oregon, informing them that the intention of the Military Intelligence Division was to conduct surveillance on all radical groups. Among the organizations listed by Long were "World War Veterans, Socialists ...and American Federation of Labor." The contents of Long's letter were soon leaked to the newspapers, and the subsequent outcry from readers led to the dismissal of Lieutenant Long and MID's reiteration for a second time of its ban on surveillance of nonmilitary personnel.



*A handful of CIP agents circulated among the Bonus Army camps in an attempt to determine the intent of the marchers. Eventually, Federal troops were called upon to disperse the mob once rioting broke out. (NARA)*



*The Army War College served briefly as home to the CIP School. (NARA)*

By 1932, the turmoil of the Great Depression caused the ban on surveillance to be lifted on at least one occasion. When World War I veterans gathered in Washington, DC, as a Bonus Army and camped on the doorstep of Congress to press their pension demands, the Army staff called upon the CIP to make a counterintelligence assessment of the situation, “furnishing information which was obtainable in no other way, because of their ability to associate with the veterans on terms of equality.” At the same time, COL Alfred T. Smith, Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, issued secret orders to all G2s to also report on any other veteran disturbances in their respective corps areas. But these actions remained the exception, and by 1934, only 7 years away from America going to war again, the Army had allowed the Corps of Intelligence Police to dwindle to just 16 noncommissioned officers, and a subsequent survey found that most of them were being used as file clerks rather than as investigators.

On the other hand, security concerns did not fully disappear from the Army’s consciousness during the interwar years. A survey of the subject matter crossing the desk of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, War Department, revealed a number of unofficial and official studies on potential foreign intelligence threats and domestic security issues, particularly those involving the Soviet Union and the international communism movement, and Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany were soon added to the list containing topics of high interest.

### **On The Eve Of War**

Acts of aggression by both Germany and Japan provided the justification needed to reinvigorate the

Army’s interest in counterintelligence. The Military Intelligence Division at the War Department established a small Counterintelligence Branch in April 1939 and divided its mission among the following sub-elements: Domestic Intelligence, Investigations, Plant Intelligence, Safeguarding Military Information, Special Assignments, and Corps of Intelligence Police. Domestic Intelligence included such benign functions as conducting liaison with the FBI and furnishing the State Department with information on personnel seeking passports and visas. In the coming summer, growing concerns about foreign espionage encouraged the Army to issue its first regulation dealing with the security of military information. At the same time, representatives of the Army and Navy met to form an Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee with the Federal Bureau of Investigation for the purpose of coordinating the administration of espionage cases. A year later, the three signed the Delimitations Agreement of 1940, which allotted domestic intelligence to the FBI; the World War I scenario in which the Army had assumed responsibility for surveillance of American civil society would not be repeated in the next conflict.

The agreement, however, did give the Army the mission of conducting investigations on those civilians employed by the military in the continental United States and on all civilians in the Canal Zone and the Philippines. To accomplish these tasks, the Corps of Intelligence Police expanded its ranks to around 200 in early 1941. This rapid growth changed the nature of the CIP force. Until then, the appointment of CIP personnel had been centralized at the War Department level, but in January of that year, appointment authority for agents was decentralized to the corps area and overseas department level in an attempt to

obtain more manpower. At the same time, Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, authorized the creation of the Office of Chief, Corps of Intelligence Police, and the establishment of a CIP training school.

In January 1941, the first 50 students of the Investigators Training School filed into a room of the Army War College at what is now Fort Leslie J. McNair, Washington, DC. Because Army counterintelligence identified itself with the FBI, America's principal crime busters and counter spies, it was natural that the CIP should turn to the FBI for its first instructors and early curriculum. (Reflecting the influence of the FBI, the initial courses placed a disproportionate emphasis on subjects related to criminology.) The buildup of the military presence in the Nation's capital soon forced many of the counterintelligence classes to relocate from Fort McNair to nearby office space in the District and Arlington, Virginia.

The makeup of the corps also began to change. The Army approved the detail of officers to the Corps of Intelligence Police for the first time. Initially many did not possess the background needed to perform adequate oversight of some types of counterintelligence missions. To resolve the situation, the Military Intelligence Division assumed a hands-on role in selecting officers. Counterintelligence achieved another milestone when the Army permitted a greater use of specialized investigations, which led to recruitment of African American and Asian American agents—firsts in the organization's history. On the home front, African-Americans would prove irreplaceable in such areas as Harlem; later, they would be deployed overseas in undercover assignments within the Caribbean Command. The growing international crisis would also foster recruitment of a large number of Hispanic Americans for operations in Panama and Puerto Rico.

The expansion of the CIP renewed the debate over the degree to which the recruitment, assignment, and promotion of agents should be centralized and over who should supervise counterintelligence investigations. Traditionally, the G2s of the various corps areas and departments had overseen these responsibilities. But the reserve officer who became the first to hold the position of Chief, Corps of Intelligence Police, MAJ Garland Williams, wanted a centralized organization structured along the lines of the FBI, with its chief assigned directly to the Secretary of War for "detecting and investigating" all matters pertaining to espionage, sabotage, and subversion. He also believed that the decentralized personnel arrangements adversely impacted the quality of his manpower.

These proposals to strengthen the powers of the Chief, Corps of Intelligence Police, were vigorously rebutted by the commanders in the field, and the structure remained unchanged. In vain, Williams protested that he would

now have to deal with "14 different policies, 14 different practices, 14 different methods of work, and, in general, 14 separate and distinct units." The Army soon relieved the unhappy commander of his worries by reassigning him to the Infantry School.

Unfortunately, the lack of adequate central control over operations in the field did create serious problems for the entire investigative effort. The procurement of personnel by the various corps areas led, in the words of The Adjutant General, to the recruitment of "a larger percentage of agents whose character, education, adaptability, and experience in no way qualified them for the duties they would be called to perform." The pressure on some commanders to tackle their escalating investigative workload also resulted in agents being pressed into service without ever having attended basic training. On the eve of World War II, the ranks of the CIP swelled to 513, but one corps area commander communicated that he alone could use half that number to handle his backlog of 2,600 cases.

### The Hawaiian Department

In the Pacific, Army counterintelligence naturally viewed Imperial Japan as its most significant threat. Altogether more than 160,000 Japanese residents were living and working in the Territory of Hawaii. In Hawaii on the eve of the war, the CIP Detachment sprang from a 4-man staff to 12 officers and 18 special agents. Gero Iwai,



*On the eve of World War II, undercover agents Richard Sakakida (right) and Arthur Komori pose aboard a freighter bound for the Philippines. (Komori)*

a veteran undercover agent assigned to the G2 Section within the Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, busied himself creating lists of local Japanese who supported Imperial Japan. Of particular concern were the 5,000 *Kibei*s, citizens of the United States who when children had been sent to Japan to receive their cultural education, many at the hands of nationalistic instructors. Iwai later spoke of the progress made, "...we have compiled background info on Japanese of Hawaii who we thought would be dangerous to the security of our nation in time of war with Japan. This info was taken from newspapers, magazines, surveillances, informants, etc." Both the FBI and the CIP relied heavily upon informants or "listeners" from among the *Nisei* (second generation Japanese Americans).

In March 1941, MAJ Jack Gilbert recruited two Japanese-Americans in their early twenties, Richard Sakakida and Arthur Komori, to undertake a dangerous undercover mission for their country. As their former military instructor at nearby McKinley High School in Honolulu, the officer was fully aware of Sakakida's and Komori's athletic and academic achievements as well as their character and believed them fully capable of pulling off the assignment. Disguised as seamen who jumped ship to avoid the draft, Sakakida and Komori were to learn of any hostile intentions on the part of Japanese citizens living in Manila, capital of the Philippines. For the next 6 months, the two agents met surreptitiously with CPT Nelson Raymond, commander of the local CIP detachment, to pass on information.

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*"By the end of April 1941, Yoshikawa [a Japanese spy] had acquired a number of espionage locations. From a point on Aiea Heights he had an excellent view of Pearl Harbor, while the best look at the submarine base called for a stop on Kamehameha Highway between Aiea and Makalapa. Occasionally he would take a jitney to Honolulu bound for any point beyond Pearl Harbor, get off at Aiea, and prowl about. The cane fields of Aiea gave the best view of all [to view the comings and goings of US Naval ships]. Yoshikawa would dress in laborer's garb and hide amid the cane."*

*At Dawn We Slept* by Gordon W. Prange

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*“Soon 71 Counter Intelligence Corps agents, fresh from warm rooms and soft beds of urban life, were camping with seasoned troopers of the 2<sup>d</sup> Armored and the 3<sup>d</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> Infantry Divisions, and calling the Chief of the Counter Intelligence Corps harder names than the ground they slept on.”*

**LTC Hugh D. Wise, Jr., Chief, CIC**

# CHAPTER TWO

## COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS IN WORLD WAR II

### JOINING THE FIGHT

At 1100 hours on 7 December 1941, Imperial Japan's surprise attack against Pearl Harbor was just an hour old when CIP agents, together with their counterparts from the FBI and Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and the Honolulu Police, made their first arrests. Using the names gathered by Gero Iwai before the war, 200 suspects were quickly in custody. Iwai recalled one such arrest with particular satisfaction, "Yes, I picked up the number one suspect at his home on Nuuanu Avenue with an FBI agent named Polkinghorn."

The next day the United States formally declared war against Japan and its Axis partners of Germany and Italy. The entrance into war would bring about an immediate and total mobilization on the part of the United States and its armed forces.

Within the Territory of Hawaii, authorities immediately imposed martial law and put travel restrictions into effect, particularly between the islands; several months later, Army counterintelligence would officially be made responsible for internal security, except for matters

involving Navy installations and personnel. In Honolulu, the Army activated the "Contact Office" under the Hawaiian Department G2 (later Central Pacific Area) and gave it the authority of search and seizure. As one of its first steps, the Contact Office initiated a series of security lectures to military personnel and civilian employees, instructing them in the handling of classified information and warning of the dangers of enemy spies.

Back in the States, the Corps of Intelligence Police, in partnership with the FBI and New York Police Department, conducted almost daily raids on homes and business places of suspected Nazi sympathizers. These included members of the German-American *Bund*, an association promoting stronger ties between the US with Nazi Germany. Property seized consisted mostly of propaganda such as books, swastika armbands, and uniforms. More important was the confiscation of shortwave radios and weapons. The FBI and the CIP also worked together to round up a secret Nazi organization sending subversive literature into Army camps.

In the District of Columbia, Lieutenant Hugh D. Wise, Executive Officer of the CIP, left the Washington Redskins football game early and turned on the radio to hear news



*The first headquarters of the Chief, CIP, was the War Department Munitions Building located on Constitution Avenue, west of the Washington Monument. (NARA)*

of the attack. Racing to the CIP offices in the War Department Munitions Building on Constitution Avenue, Wise assembled his staff to begin calling in CIP personnel. Many former agents began showing up on their own asking how they could be put to work. One of the first actions taken was to conduct a sweep of the War Department's offices. The findings immediately raised the security consciousness of the Army Staff when large numbers of classified documents were discovered to be unsecured and file cabinets left unlocked.

One agent described the charged atmosphere surrounding the early days of the war as something akin to a silver screen thriller: "urgency, glamour, and informality. The civilian clothes, the impressive credentials describing the agent as a representative of the Office of the Secretary of War, the tacit permission to carry private firearms and blackjacks, the immediate-action, red-bordered, highly classified letters requesting investigation which flooded in with every mail, all created a strong sense of mission in officers and enlisted agents alike. Everyone was on call day and night. Surveillances, raids, and other special assignments frequently kept men in the field into the early hours of the morning." Over the years, it was these types of mental images that would continue to draw recruits to the corps.

As promising as these early steps were, much was still to be done before counterintelligence would become a recognized part of the Army. This is illustrated by a story that made the rounds following Pearl Harbor: When a general officer requested the support of plainclothes personnel from the FBI, Director J. Edgar Hoover purportedly replied, "Why don't you use your own organization?" To which, the requestor expressed with shock, "My God, do we have one?"

### From The Ground Up

Army counterintelligence underwent a series of organizational changes in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor. The Military Intelligence Division created the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) to serve as its operational arm. A newly established Counterintelligence Group within MIS assumed the functions previously performed by the discontinued Counterintelligence Branch. One of the group's most important missions was to provide various studies on major security threats facing US troops at home and abroad.

On 1 January 1942, the War Department redesignated the Corps of Intelligence Police as the Army Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) which better reflected its expanded mission and placed 34-year-old MAJ (later Colonel) Henry G. Sheen in charge. Like its predecessor, the new organization was based in the Nation's capital, but now possessed a more appropriate name and a more centralized organization. Plans called for the CIC to be an

In early 1940, the FBI approached the CIC for assistance. A German network the Bureau was trailing had an army contact: a soldier who regularly met his handler at the Manhattan terminus of the Governor's Island Ferry. Who was the soldier and what was his role? The CIC quickly found out his name and his position—a stenographer in the hospital at Fort Jay.

Although he had a spotless record, the suspect had family connections with the American *Bund*, which was supporting a closer relationship with Nazi Germany. Using his role at the hospital, the soldier had taken advantage of patient records to acquire order-of-battle information. He also subscribed to a number of military-related magazines and was in the process of carefully analyzing their contents for information on equipment, units, and names of key personnel.

elite force, picking its enlisted personnel from the cream of Selective Service inductees. As MG George V. Strong, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, put it, "the personnel of this corps are of officer caliber." The War Department also took over control of all background investigations of prospective counterintelligence agents and centralized the issuance of their credentials.

Originally all CIC enlisted men held the rank of sergeant; now corporals and privates were added to the corps. This permitted functional differentiation. Sergeants served as "Special Agents" with full investigative powers, while corporals and privates occupied subordinate positions as agents and counterintelligence clerks. The new arrangements also allowed some relaxation in the Counter Intelligence Corps' appointment standards. For a period in late 1942 and early 1943, service commands once more were allowed to procure and transfer agents and clerks, while Washington retained full control over special agents and officers. Following suit, the Counter Intelligence Corps School confined its activities to providing advanced courses, thus permitting the service commands to conduct introductory counterintelligence training.

Washington politics would eventually force the Counter Intelligence Corps to relocate its headquarters from the Munitions Building on Constitution Avenue. At the end of 1942, the War Department expressed concern that too many fit young officers were serving in staff assignments and proceeded to stipulate that no more than a third of the officers assigned to any element in the District of Columbia could be below 35 years of age. The "Child Labor Law," as the order was jokingly referred to, literally drove the CIC out of town. In January 1943, LTC

Following Pearl Harbor and the subsequent invasion of the Philippines by the Japanese, agents Richard Sakakida and Arthur Komori dropped their cover and donned Army uniforms to join in the defense of the islands. Eventually, the two found themselves at the island fortress of Corregidor as part of the last stand being made by Allied forces. Here, they used their knowledge of the Japanese language to assist the intercept efforts of the local Army signals intelligence unit. Arthur Komori would be on one of the last planes in April to depart for Australia, where he would help establish the Allied Translator and Interpreter Service to tackle the translation of captured enemy documents. Sakakida opted to relinquish his seat on the plane to another Japanese-American even if it meant capture. On 6 May 1942, Allied forces in the Philippines surrendered, beginning the infamous Bataan Death March. Fortunately, a number of the Filipino CIP agents were able to blend into the jungles and mountains where they helped the local guerrillas. One posed for 3 years as a peddler in Manila, selling fruit to Japanese soldiers and gleaning information to be passed on to resistance fighters. However, because of his ethnic background, Sakakida was immediately thrown into the infamous Bilibid prison where he underwent torture. Over time he was able to gain the confidence of his captives by convincing them he had been a reluctant recruit. Later in the employment of a Japanese officer, Sakakida fed important bits of information to nearby Filipino guerrillas. Altogether, nine members of the original CIC Detachment would die in captivity including MAJ Nelson Raymond, the commander who perished on a prison ship which sank on its way to Japan.

Hugh D. Wise, Jr., Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, and his staff shoved off for office space at 2327 North Charles Street in nearby Baltimore.

### Schooling

The need for more room at the CIC Training School led authorities to relocate the school away from Washington, DC, to Chicago. The lease of the Tower Town Club at 820 North Michigan Avenue proved ideal. Besides adequate classroom space, the move in January 1942 furnished students access to the police laboratory of the City of Chicago, the criminal laboratory of nearby Northwestern University, and a place to study sabotage at the huge Underwriters' Laboratory. Conveniently, the first officer candidate school for military intelligence personnel was located at the nearby facilities of the former Illinois Women's Athletic Club. Among the new subjects added at the CIC School was a course on how to pick locks and crack safes. Unfortunately, what many of the early recruits most needed was basic training, which had been bypassed so as to quickly fill CIC quotas.

To maintain a low profile, the school's administrators did not publicize its location or very existence. They also took the precaution of issuing a small badge in the shape of a four-leaf clover to all new recruits. However, as one attendee was quick to report, this fooled no one. When he and his fellow students, all in plain clothes, descended on a local hotel for food and drink following a day of classes, the waitress serving them quickly spotted the badges and announced, "Well I see we have a new group of students at the CIC School here."



*Early in the war, the CIC School moved to Chicago, Illinois, and settled into the Tower Town Club on Michigan Avenue. (Copyright, Chicago Historical Society)*

## Investigations

Within the continental United States (CONUS), the vast majority of the work took place in the traditional Army Corps Areas, which underwent a series of name changes to include Corps Area Service Command and Service Command. Population-wise, the largest of these military regions was the Second Corps Area that comprised the states of Delaware, New Jersey, and New York, encompassing 20 million people. The Second Corps also had the largest city, the largest shipping port, and the largest entry point for immigrants. At the outbreak of the war, the area had only 47 agents; 2 years later the number climbed to a more respectable 460. Transportation was a major problem. As late as January 1942, the Second Service Command found itself with only one automobile. Agents normally used their own vehicles, often without compensation. By October 1942, the number had risen to 40 plus two enlisted mechanics to maintain the fleet.

*"The ordnance officer had been asked to provide a civilian-type sedan, not painted olive drab, in an effort to make the car as inconspicuous as possible for surveillance work. The car turned up painted coal black from top to bottom except for the glass. There was not a speck of chrome or trim. That car was as 'inconspicuous as an Italian funeral carriage.' It was promptly dubbed 'The Black Maria.'"*

## History of the Second Service Command

The overall efficiency of the CIC investigations was enhanced by its inter-service relationship with the Navy. Throughout the war, the CIC maintained a close relationship with the Office of Naval Intelligence. The same could be said for the FBI with only a couple of exceptions. The FBI did not share entire report files with the CIC and only answered specific questions. The FBI agents viewed themselves "as professionals in the field" and tended to look upon "Counter Intelligence men as dilettantes."

The relationship between the CIC and the Air Force was an evolving one. When World War II broke out, the Army Air Corps did not possess an investigative arm. On paper, the G2s of the various Service Commands were responsible for Army Air Corps facilities in their jurisdiction.

A scarcity of qualified personnel eventually led to a directive making the Air Corps commanders temporarily in charge of their own security. In March 1942, the Army Air Corps became the Army Air Force with an enlarged intelligence staff and capabilities, but a year later, the Air Force still had only 4 officers and 11 enlisted men devoted to its counterintelligence mission. In November 1943, a breakthrough occurred when Chief, CIC, relinquished control of all CIC elements attached to Air Force units to the Chief, CIC Army Air Force. Specialized schooling was initiated for Air Force agents to provide them the technical knowledge required to handle such cases as aircraft sabotage. By June 1944, 12 detachments were finally in place to support the major Air Force Commands.

## Countersubversion

The scope of the CIC's responsibilities vastly increased in March 1942 when the Army expanded its existing countersubversive program and gave it new guidelines. Just as in World War I, the countersubversive operation latticed the Nation's military establishment with "an elaborate and fine network of secret agents." Intelligence officers secretly recruited informants within each unit on an average ratio of one informant to every 30 men, resulting in a program of enormous proportions. By the summer of 1943, just one of the nine service commands in the continental United States reported having 53,000 operatives; over 150,000 reports were filed monthly once the system became fully operational. Although the countersubversive program was administered by unit and installation commanders, not by the Counter Intelligence Corps, it was the latter's agents that became involved in following up reports of potential subversive activity. At the War Department level, the Counterintelligence Group of the Military Intelligence Service monitored the entire process.

The Counter Intelligence Corps began to label cases in which subversion was not apparent as "Disaffection." For example, members of radical organizations that did not desire to overthrow the United States Government but would, for instance, slow down wartime production to accomplish certain political or anti-war goals fell into this category. In these cases, the CIC continued to monitor the subjects' activities, but often chose to take little or no action. In the early stages of the war, this new category made up 40 percent of the case load.

Inevitably, the number of countersubversive cases resulted in the expansion of the counterintelligence workload, which in turn generated the need for more agents, and new personnel meant still more investigations. Half of the CIC's man-hours were spent investigating its own applicants. Individuals who were assigned to the Army's most secret code-breaking effort and other sensitive missions within military intelligence made up the other half. By July 1943, the corps showed an authorized



*North Africa would be the first test for both the US Army and the CIC. (NARA)*

strength of 543 officers (95 of whom held the rank of major and above) and 4,431 enlisted personnel.

### North Africa

It was now 9 months into the war, and little thought had been given to deployment of CIC personnel with combat elements. Outside the Office of the Chief, CIC, no one was even talking about the possibility that "agents might do their investigating under combat situations with pistols strapped to their belts." The Counter Intelligence Corps' early focus had been exclusively on establishing a headquarters staff and recruiting qualified personnel to

carry out counterintelligence duties on the home front. In August 1942, Major General George V. Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, dropped the challenge on the desk of Major Hugh D. Wise, Jr., Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, to come up with 100 agents and prepare them for combat duty. The former proved to be the easier assignment. Drawing from the various Corps Service Commands, Wise quickly assembled 13 officers and 71 enlisted men to support the Western Task Force of Operation TORCH, due for launching within 3 months. The main objective of the North African campaign was to wrestle the Mediterranean from the Axis and use Africa as a spring board to Europe. A secondary goal was to gain

Ordered to search for documents at El Hafey Bordj (Tunisia) Lieutenant Leonard Bessman entered the area on 3 April 1943 in advance of armored reconnaissance. Instead of having vacated their position, the enemy was well entrenched with machine guns, armor, and artillery. Lieutenant Bessman immediately sent his driver back to warn advancing friendly troops. Although wounded, he continued to engage the enemy with rifle fire for nearly 2 hours before being captured. Ernie Pyle, the famous combat journalist, described Bessman as a personal friend and termed his duties as being "up front with our advance troops, for that was his job." For his act of heroism, Lieutenant Bessman was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. Bessman was eventually relocated to a prisoner-of-war camp in Italy. Upon learning they were soon to be transferred into German hands, Lieutenant Bessman and a fellow prisoner managed to escape and, while hiding in caves with the help of locals, make their way back to Allied lines.

control over what remained of the French forces in Algeria and French Morocco.

Some CIC personnel had never been through a day of basic training, and as far as physical exercise was concerned, "their longest hike had been from the bus stop back to the office." Making them combat-ready soldiers proved a challenge. Although the conditioning program, including full field road marches, went well, an orientation class held in Washington, DC, that included a colonel urging the recruits to "kill, kill, kill!" was deemed less effective. And the introduction of the CIC contingent to the rest of the Western Task Force at Camp A.P. Hill, Virginia, proved a disaster. For instance, when the subject of pyramidal tents came up, one of the CIC soldiers incredulously asked, "What shall we do with these?" In retrospect, one observer summed up these inauspicious beginnings: "That they became excellent soldiers never erased the Gilbert and Sullivan operatic classification initially given this group."

The exact mission of this first combat counterintelligence venture was anything but clear. The CIC hastily put together a field manual but failed to get it approved until after Operation TORCH was under way. The CIC staff formulated an interim operations plan only 40 hours before embarkation. For doctrine on how to organize troops, the CIC drew upon the experiences of the Field Security Police of the British and Canadian Armies: "In the British forces this is cared for by Field Security Sections consisting of one officer and 13 other ranks. One section is usually attached to each divisional headquarters or higher formation and a varying number of sections to GHQ according to circumstances."

The CIC was not the only American counterintelligence organization going to war. In support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of Strategic Services provided both intelligence and counterintelligence support down to corps echelon, except for the Southwest Pacific Area where General Douglas MacArthur barred the organiza-



*A group of CIC agents pose in Oran, Algeria. Agents primarily dressed in plain clothes for the purpose of collecting human intelligence. (AHEC)*

tion. Especially in the early days of the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, the relationship between the OSS and CIC organizations was strained, and personnel often worked at cross purposes. Much of this was because the OSS promoted an attitude of independence, but over time and with a little experience, the two sides resolved most issues for the sake of winning the war.

On board the ships headed towards North Africa, the CIC personnel began to ply their trade by assisting in the enforcement of security restrictions. Steps included dismantling privately owned radios and confiscating other illegal electronic devices. They also took advantage of the free time to learn more about the threats and local conditions awaiting them, since much of this type of information had been kept from them for security reasons. There was even sufficient time to assemble an index system consisting of approximately 5,000 cards listing names of subversive suspects, arrest targets, and friendly informants.

Meanwhile, the other half of Operation TORCH—the Central Task Force consisting of British and American troops—was preparing to sail from England for Algeria. Drawing upon Counter Intelligence Corps personnel already in London and diverting others en route to support troops in Iceland, US authorities hastily threw together a small CIC element. Reminiscent of the first Army counterintelligence group that deployed to France in World War I, the Central Task Force CIC detachment proved itself to have a very diverse membership: a former Paris journalist, an immigration inspector, an auto salesman, an instructor at the Sorbonne, a Swiss auto racer, and a Rhodes Scholar. Seven spoke French fluently; others demonstrated a smattering of Italian, German, Danish, Dutch, Spanish, and Norwegian.

On 8 November 1942, the Western Task Force conducted landings at three sites in French Morocco: Safi, Fedala, and Mehdia; the major objective was the eventual control of Casablanca. The French met the invasion with a heavy bombardment from shore batteries, but once US forces came ashore, resistance quickly collapsed. Illustrative of the close support to combat forces in the early going, CIC soldiers received four Silver Stars, three Legions of Merit, and one battlefield commission, all in the first 3 days of the fighting.

Counter Intelligence Corps personnel enjoyed a number of early successes: At Fedala, just north of Casablanca, agents seized documents of Hitler's Armistice Commission—the primary counterintelligence target in Operation TORCH—along with Commission members. The Armistice Commission from its headquarters at the Miramar Hotel had organized the Moroccan industry for delivery of goods to the German war machine. Commission documents depicted transportation links and factories that might be targets of stay-behind German saboteurs. More importantly, the papers contained lists of

names and aliases of members of the French Intelligence Service along with those of collaborators. The capture of the commission's documents and personnel "saved the American Army a great deal of work." The CIC personnel also discovered and neutralized a monitoring board installed by enemy agents to listen in on the American Headquarters at Fedala.

In response to the security threat posed by French Morocco's many ports, long border, and population of uncertain loyalty, CIC officers dispersed their soldiers among the towns of Casablanca, Marrakech, Safi, Rabat, Port Lyautey, Souk el Arba, and Petijean. At Casablanca, agents obtained names of their French counterparts, allowing for the substitution of CIC persons unknown to the enemy. The Counter Intelligence Corps dispatched these undercover agents directly from Washington, DC, so that they could "be on their own" and have no outward ties with local Army authorities.

The Central and Eastern Task Forces enjoyed less success with their landings in Algeria, but in the end accomplished their objectives. Near Oran, CIC agents apprehended a German official who possessed maps showing all the Vichy French minefields in North Africa; the find not only saved lives but quickened the Allied advance. Unfortunately, neither the experiences of Morocco nor Algeria prepared US forces for what they were to face next—veteran German and Italian forces in Tunisia and much more hostile terrain. It would take 6 months of hard fighting and recovery from a number of costly losses at Kasserine Pass and Fondouk el Aouareb before victory could be declared.

During the Tunisian operations, Agent Crosby Lewis, who was fluent in French, dressed himself in Arab garb, and riding a horse, traveled on his own initiative through the Faid Pass as part of a caravan. Lewis returned with information on enemy positions in and behind the pass. He also arranged to make the Caid of Sidi Bou Zid responsible for the loyalty and movement of local Arabs in the no-man's land between the passes. For these actions, Lewis received the Silver Star.

In a hospital at Tunis, a routine search by the CIC of German POW quarters led to the arrest of a US soldier who while convalescing had become involved in a black market trade between locals and German prisoners. The private was caught in the act of passing weapons to enemy inmates planning an escape. At the Casablanca Conference, which took place between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill in mid-January 1943, the Allies handed the responsibility for planning and executing the security arrangements to the CIC. Dressed in plain clothes, counterintelligence agents worked alongside the Secret Service to secure the immediate area.

In the end, the Allies expelled Axis forces from North Africa and took a giant step toward victory in the Mediter-



*From the beginning, CIC agents played an important role in the search for documents that could be exploited for order-of-battle information and the identification of spies. (NARA)*

ranean Theater of Operations. American forces learned a number of important lessons that would impact their assault against Hitler's Europe. Major General George S. Patton, Jr. was elevated to command II Corps, and Major General Omar N. Bradley was selected as his deputy.

But many of the commanders still lacked appreciation for the contributions of their organic intelligence and security staffs; this, coupled with the absence of coordination within and among intelligence organizations, created an environment that one senior officer termed "utter confusion." The Counter Intelligence Corps profited from their own lessons learned in North Africa that would soon reverse these early negative perceptions. In the future, plans called for CIC personnel to be well forward and among the first troops to enter towns and villages.

The need for better combat training for counterintelligence specialists was apparent. Consequently, the Allies opened the Field Security School at Ain el Turk in Algeria for the sole purpose of providing arriving

agents with a 20-day course in both basic infantry and counterintelligence skills. The Counter Intelligence Corps also redesigned its elements in the field into uniformed, cellular structures: "A Divisional section was defined as one officer and five enlisted men; a Corps section, two officers and 11 enlisted men; and an Army section, five officers and 45 enlisted men." At each echelon, detachments remained under the control of their respective G2.

Despite their shortcomings, CIC personnel had demonstrated the potential for becoming a cadre of highly competent professionals. Besides counterintelligence, CIC agents were called upon to play a variety of important roles, from serving as civil affairs officers—such as the acting mayor of a captured village—to collectors of human intelligence, a function that in North Africa often required agents to don plain clothes. The Allied leadership desired to know what locals in occupied and friendly territories were thinking politically. In French Morocco, members of the CIC also found themselves performing censorship responsibilities.

## Sicily

The campaign for Sicily (Operation HUSKY) began on 9 July 1943 when Patton's newly activated Seventh Army landed on the southwestern corner of the island. Again, CIC personnel were among the first waves of assault troops. Sicily would be important because it established procedures for counterintelligence operations that would continue for the remainder of the war in Europe. Each division had its own assigned counterintelligence detachments plus attached agents from corps to move forward with the assault troops. When towns were secure, tactical counterintelligence detachments continued to advance with fighting elements while corps-level agents remained behind to carry out a variety of duties.

A top priority in Sicily that remained constant was policing mail and severing lines of communications to enemy territory. Although a tedious job, reading impounded mail bore fruit with the identification and arrest of a number of spies. While awaiting the arrival of either civil affairs types or members of the Allied Military Government, CIC officers often assumed control of local governments. Acting in its civil affairs capacity, the local CIC element frequently called upon city officials, partisans, church officials, and firemen for assistance; issued proclamations imposing restrictions on political and community life; and on occasion, employed military force to put down local disturbances such as food riots.

In these captured towns, the CIC would make its most significant contribution of the Sicilian campaign. By 25 September, the Counter Intelligence Corps had accounted for more than 700 political prisoners, including leaders of various pro-Fascist quasi-military organizations (*Opera Volunatria Repressioni Anti-Fascismo* and *Squadra DiAzione*), 24 enemy agents, and 7 saboteurs. Captured documents revealed locations of roads and land mines as well as information on enemy order of battle and troop morale. Using informants, agents were even able to glean the locations of most prisoner of war camps holding political captives and Allied soldiers. By the time the fighting drew to a close in Sicily, it had become evident that the G2s were beginning to rely heavily on the Counter Intelligence Corps and to validate its combat role.

## RETREAT ON THE HOME FRONT

In mid-1943, the Army was at last beginning to deploy a sizable portion of its strength overseas. This in turn gave the Counter Intelligence Corps a whole new reason to exist. The CIC School in Chicago put its students in uniform for the first time and placed a new emphasis on counterintelligence operations under battle conditions. Making counterintelligence personnel combat-ready led to the creation of a Counter Intelligence Corps Staging Area in the summer of 1943 to better prepare units about to go



*As a stop-gap measure to give agents much needed language training, the CIC turned to the highly respected Berlitz Language School. (INSCOM)*

overseas. The staging area, initially located at Logan Field in Baltimore, Maryland, soon moved to nearby Camp Holabird, which signaled the beginning of a long association of the post, affectionately known as "The Bird," with military intelligence.

Having agents with foreign language skills was no longer a luxury, it had now become essential. Although many Americans possessed a second language, they often didn't meet the strict security criteria prerequisites for the CIC. Consequently, the corps had to equip its own with the necessary skills. To do so, the CIC turned to the highly respected Berlitz Language Schools to host a series of intensive 13-week courses in four major cities (Chicago, Baltimore, New York and San Francisco). Approximately 150 agents underwent the one-time training offered in German, Italian, French, Dutch, and Spanish.

By the fall of 1943, the Counter Intelligence Corps appeared to have solved its initial problems and had become an established part of the Army. Agents increasingly served in uniform with the troops rather than working as anonymous "spooks" on the fringes of the military establishment. The War Department had also begun to transfer reassignment authority for CIC personnel from the Military Intelligence Service at the Pentagon to the field commands, again bringing the CIC into conformity with the rest of the military establishment. Finally, the CIC had at last approved an organizational manual.

### Shortcomings

Despite these advances, the activities of the Counter Intelligence Corps still managed to generate enough criticism to place its very existence in jeopardy. From the viewpoint of the wartime military, the CIC absorbed a disproportionate percentage of high-quality personnel and used them to accomplish what many regarded as a marginal mission. Tradition-minded Army officers disliked the whole business of counterintelligence, especially when it involved enlisted personnel, acting as investigating officers. The CIC's investigations of individuals with membership in leftist groups were not universally popular with a number of politicians, particularly since the War Department's Counterintelligence Group often used the findings to exclude some well-connected young men from officer candidate school.

Moreover, investigations on occasion were conducted with more zeal than prudence. In early 1943, CIC agents installed listening devices in a hotel room being occupied by an Army Air Force sergeant with suspected connections to groups with Communist ties. The individual under surveillance just happened to be a personal friend of First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, who herself had recently occupied a nearby suite in the same hotel. When word


was leaked to the White House that the CIC had recorded a sexual liaison between the suspect and Mrs. Roosevelt, there was an immediate call for heads to roll. In actuality, the whole episode merely involved the sergeant and a lady acquaintance who would become his wife.

Accumulated resentments eventually found official expression, leading to the temporary eclipse of the Counter Intelligence Corps. In July 1943, LTG Joseph T. McNarney, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, ordered Major General Virgil L. Peterson, The Inspector General, to launch an investigation of the corps.

On 5 November 1943, the Army ordered all CIC agents out of Washington, DC, and a day later, the Army Inspector General submitted a devastating critique of the corps' operations and organization, charging that many CIC investigations were "superficial, and unproductive of positive results except in rare instances." The Inspector General found that the only thorough investigations being conducted were those of applicants for the CIC or of military and civilian personnel suspected of subversion, and many of these investigations were viewed as being excessively thorough, since they dragged on after all immediate allegations had been resolved. Moreover, when officers were under investigation, CIC procedures failed to protect against indiscriminate dissemination of reports containing unverified derogatory information "based on hearsay, gossip, and innuendo."

The countersubversive program that generated much of the CIC's workload also faced heavy criticisms, since the 1,000,000 reports submitted in the first part of 1943 had identified only 600 suspects; and it was possible that just one individual was the subject of many of these reports. The Inspector General's report was equally critical of the organizational concepts that underpinned Counter Intelligence Corps operations in CONUS. In the security field, the team's members found that the activities of the CIC at least partially duplicated the work of criminal investigators assigned to the Provost Marshal General's Office. Finally, the existing counterintelligence system undermined the concept of command responsibility, since the G2s in the service commands had to answer both to their commanding generals and to the Counterintelligence Group of the Military Intelligence Service, the operational arm of MID.

The Inspector General's damning report became the justification for an immediate unraveling of the Counter Intelligence Corps. The countersubversive program was terminated, and most CIC agents in the continental United States merged with the criminal investigators of the Provost Marshal's Office to form a new Security Intelligence Corps that operated under the control of the service commands. (Over 950 CIC agents and almost an equal number of Criminal Investigation Division (CID)



*At the Military Intelligence Training Center, Fort Ritchie, Maryland, instructors teach CIC agents to recognize Japanese Army insignia. (NARA)*

investigators flowed into the new organization.) Although CIC detachments continued to serve with the Army Air Forces, the Manhattan Project, and tactical units, the presence of the Counter Intelligence Corps on the home front had for all intents and purposes been eliminated. The CIC School was transferred to the Provost Marshal General, its staging area closed, and the position of Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, abolished in early February 1944. The departing chief, Colonel Harold R. Kibler, blamed the fall of his command on the enmity of the White House, specifically "Harry Hopkins and the Secret Service." (Hopkins was President Franklin Roosevelt's personal advisor.) A short time later, the Army took the final step by eliminating the Counterintelligence Group within the Military Intelligence Service.

In reality, many of the old practices in CONUS died slowly. For example, at the Security Intelligence Corps field office located in New York City at 50 Broadway, former CIC agents remained separate from the CID specialists; each group continued to work those investigations demanding their respective area of expertise.

The restructuring of counterintelligence in CONUS did not do away with the requirement to train agents for overseas duties; an advanced course of instruction was still crucial. Following a 7-month delay brought about by the reorganization, the Military Intelligence Training Center (MITC) at Camp Ritchie, Maryland, finally held its first counterintelligence classes in September 1944, but the bulk of Camp Ritchie's curriculum remained focused on training combat military intelligence specialists in such areas as order of battle and photo interpretation. Isolated in the mountains of central Maryland, the school lacked a laboratory and was not in close proximity to a major metropolitan area, which was needed for counterintelligence surveillance and search problems. In response to the campaign for the Rhineland and the desperate need for language-qualified agents, the War Department directed that 250 agents attend a 2-week course in German at the University of Pennsylvania. By the time MITC finally did produce a useful curriculum of courses to meet requirements of counterintelligence in Europe, the direction of the war had shifted towards the Pacific in anticipation of a final battle for Japan's home islands.

## **Manhattan Project**

Apart from the CIC, the Army ran a small counterintelligence organization in support of the most secret Manhattan Project, which had been assigned the mission of developing the atomic bomb. In the spring of 1942, MG George V. Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, established a cover element within the Pentagon under the name of the Investigation Review Branch and placed MAJ (later Colonel) John Lansdale, a lawyer in civilian life, in charge.

By the summer of 1943, the Manhattan Project had moved from the research and development phase into plant construction and production. At the same time the headquarters relocated from New York to Oak Ridge, Tennessee. A major security problem emerged for the Manhattan Project that remained throughout the war—the possible loss of classified documents and material during transit. Army counterintelligence helped to establish security procedures and continuously monitored the system. Over the last 13 months of the war alone, 18 couriers logged 832,000 miles, and convoys of trucks bearing classified materiel traveled 300,000 miles—all without loss or incident.

When it appeared in late 1943 that the Counter Intelligence Corps would soon disappear on the home front,

General Strong acted quickly to preserve Lansdale's unit. General Strong authorized the resubordination of Lansdale and his detachment to the control of the Manhattan Project. Lansdale himself remained in Washington, DC, to keep the Manhattan Director, MG Leslie R. Groves, apprised of security issues. Another officer took charge of the new Intelligence and Security Division within the Manhattan Engineering District, which performed the administrative functions needed to support the project. The Chief of the Intelligence and Security Division also assumed oversight of the daily activities of a subordinate detachment.

The goal of this unique counterintelligence effort was to ensure the security of military and civilian personnel assigned to the project along with those associated with related military installations and munitions industries. Among the countermeasures undertaken was the scanning of 370 newspapers and 70 magazines on a regular basis to determine if any information on the project had leaked out. But guaranteeing security of a large work force drawn mostly from the academic and scientific communities that had enjoyed unrestricted freedoms would not prove to be easy.

Investigations remained the major means of protecting the secrets of the atomic project from possible enemy



*Robert J. Oppenheimer is being recognized for his leading the successful development of the atomic bomb. (LC)*



*Detachment of CIC agents stationed in Santa Fe, New Mexico, helped to secure the secrets of the atomic bomb. (INSCOM)*

agents. At one level, CIC agents conducted investigations that uncovered leaks caused by carelessness, such as loose talk or mishandling of classified documents. Over a 2-year period, agents worked approximately 1,500 such cases. Agents also conducted follow-on investigations of the initial background checks on employees. For instance, information occasionally surfaced that a certain scientist or technician had traveled to Germany or Italy prior to the United States' entry into the war. The most highly publicized of these cases involved J. Robert Oppenheimer, the head of the Los Alamos Laboratory. Along with family members and friends, Oppenheimer had had a long association with Communist-front organizations. (In fact, his wife and brother were former Communists.) Because of the compelling national need for Oppenheimer and others like him, authorities decided to simply issue a strong warning. At the same time, the Army assigned Oppenheimer two bodyguards for his "protection" against foreign threats. It just so happened the guards were specially trained counterintelligence agents.

The final type of investigations performed by the CIC concerned serious breeches of security. In 1943, when the Manhattan Project entered its growth phase,

the number of these types of cases significantly increased. If warranted, the CIC set up special agents in offices, plants, and laboratories to conduct surreptitious surveillance; implant listening devices; perform photo surveillance; and on occasion, go undercover disguised as hotel clerks, electricians, and even gamblers. Only approximately 100 of all such cases were deemed serious. The War Department proceeded to remove violators from the project and induct them into the Army, giving them nonsensitive assignments where they could be watched. Throughout the war, the Army adopted the practice of dealing with suspected but unproven acts of security breeches by assigning individuals to special holding units located in remote parts of the country.

Ironically, the greatest threat to the project did not come from the enemy, but from a wartime ally, the Soviet Union. The stage was set for security lapses when the Roosevelt White House adopted a policy of treating the Soviet Union as any other ally and chose to ignore the presence of Soviet sympathizers within its wartime administration, some of whom held positions of high trust. In early 1943, evidence emerged that the Soviet embassy in Washington, DC, had given money to a West Coast Communist leader for the purposes of spying. Subsequently, Russian-born LTC Boris T. Pash from Army

***“Several inquiries have been received concerning a heavy explosion which occurred on the Alamogordo Air Base Reservation [New Mexico] this morning. A remotely located ammunition magazine containing a considerable amount of high explosives and pyrotechnics exploded. There was no loss of life or injury to anyone, and the property damage outside of the explosives magazine itself was negligible.”***

**Cover story issued by the Commanding Officer of the Alamogordo Army Air Base on 16 July 1945 following the first atomic test.**

counterintelligence helped to uncover Soviet espionage efforts directed at America's atomic secrets. The CIC learned that Communists and Communist sympathizers were working at the Radiation Laboratory in Berkeley, California, where they were routinely passing information to the Soviet Vice Consul in San Francisco. But the most serious phase of Soviet espionage, the transfer of technology on the atomic bomb itself, would not take place until late 1944 and early 1945 when over 280 highly classified documents found their way into the hands of a Soviet spy ring. Unfortunately, these leaks would not be brought to light until after the war.

### Special Projects

Besides the Manhattan Project, the CIC provided a number of agents to other special projects. Based in Miami, Florida, the American Intelligence Command (AIC) had the mission of countering the threat of Axis penetration and subversion in the Southern Hemisphere. Working out of the former Harvey S. Firestone mansion, which had been turned over to the Government, CIC personnel



*Counterintelligence investigators were called upon to investigate any type of suspicious war-munitions explosions or accidents. (INSCOM)*

debriefed returnees from the Southern Hemisphere and maintained identification cards on travelers within the Americas.

The Counter Intelligence Corps also contributed a detachment to the Transportation Corps. During the war, more than 7 million military personnel and almost 127 million tons passed through Army controlled ports. Much of CIC's port security efforts focused on the 171,000 individuals employed on site and the potential threat of sabotage to ammunition and materiel in transit. Finally, during the North African campaign, the Air Transport Command delivered aircraft via a route that passed through Puerto Rico, Brazil, Ascension Island, and the Gold Coast of Africa. To ensure that men, planes, and materiel were not lost through acts of sabotage, CIC agents worked undercover as mechanics at the various stops. Unfortunately, lack of technical experience on the part of the agents and complications in administrating the undercover program placed the whole operation at risk.

## FOOTHOLD IN EUROPE

The fall of Sicily precipitated the collapse of Mussolini's Government in July 1943 and the transfer of power to Italian leaders who were anxious for peace; but by establishing a firm grip on the rest of Italy, German forces dispersed the Italian forces and for all intents and purposes nullified the surrender. The series of campaigns for the Italian peninsula that followed would witness some of the toughest fighting of the war. In September, the Allies landed at Messina, the toe of Italy's boot; this was followed by Salerno, the shin, and finally at Taranto and Brindisi, the heel. The Germans reacted to each of these offensive thrusts far more quickly than the Allies anticipated. After capturing Naples in October, the Allied advance slowed to "inching," progressing only 70 miles over the next 4 months. By November 1943, the Germans remained firmly in control of the so-called Winter Line,

*"I am in receipt of a recent letter from the Allied Armies in Italy that points out how effective the Allied security measures have been and consequently how little the enemy knew of our actual strength prior to our attack on 11 May. ...a good share of the credit for effective security of the Corps belongs to you and the other members of your detachment [202<sup>d</sup> CIC Det]."*

**MG Geoffrey Keyes, Commander, II Corps**

which ran 100 miles across the narrowest part of the peninsula from Garigliano River at its western end to south of Pescara on the east coast.

Unlike the North African landings when the Counter Intelligence Corps had been kept totally in the dark, the Fifth Army gave its 305<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment responsibility up-front for pre-invasion counterintelligence planning; 5 officers and 22 enlisted men accompanied the Fifth Army to Italy, leaving behind fellow agents to continue border control work in North Africa. During the campaign for southern Italy, the Counter Intelligence Corps would achieve new milestones. In Naples, the largest city to date, the CIC secured documents taken from German agents and arrested several Italian generals who had gone into hiding. These successes would cause the 305<sup>th</sup> to adopt the policy of assuming the initial responsibility for counterintelligence within large population centers throughout the Peninsula Campaign rather than delegating the task to divisional detachments. In Europe, the CIC quickly abandoned the use of the armband marked "CIC" as it drew unwanted attention. The CIC personnel also began to wear their United States insignia in place of their rank for the purposes of enhancing dialogue with more senior officers during their interrogations.

In December 1943, the 305th CIC Detachment assumed control of an Italian counterespionage organization, *Sicurezza Informazione Militare, Contro-Spionaggio (SIM CS)*. Personnel of the SIM CS proved invaluable in the conduct of undercover counterintelligence missions that would have been practically impossible for non-native personnel to accomplish. Others deployed to assist regular CIC elements at both corps and division. Because large portions of the population were pro-Allies, agents often recruited local Italians to infiltrate enemy lines for the purpose of obtaining information on the military situation. To improve the operations of such nets, the CIC established the General Investigative Squad for the purpose of checking the information provided by one informant against that of another.

To handle the unique challenges of Rome, the Allies assembled a thousand-man intelligence and counterintelligence force, called the "S" Force ("S" for Security). The Fifth Army furnished 50 CIC agents to the "S" Force operation, which entered Rome on 4 June 1944 with the first combat troops and assumed custody of high-interest targets. Members of the force seized numerous documents and apprehended known enemy agents. Aided by information gained from telephone taps, Allied counterintelligence followed up with a series of coordinated raids. A report by LTC J.W. Pumpelly, Commander "D" Group, testified to CIC's accomplishments, "The CIC was excellent. The men were everywhere, into everything, and provided most of the reliable data coming into my headquarters." For their outstanding work, members of the combined intelligence team were officially commended.



*Italian partisans such as these surrounding an OSS officer provided invaluable support to the CIC. (NARA)*



*Counterintelligence agents examine cans of explosives hidden in Rome. (NARA)*



*Boat used by three captured German agents dressed in British uniforms. Their foiled plot was to have been the assassination of General Mark Clark. (INSCOM)*

### **Highway of Spies**

In preparation for making a stand 160 miles to the north along the Gothic Line, the German command launched a massive assault of espionage and sabotage agents. Infiltrators parachuted behind the lines; others arrived by boat along a 300-mile coastline; but the majority simply walked through the war zone. Major Stephen Spingarn, Commander, 305<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, reported that a major lesson was quickly learned during this period: "It is the stranger rather than the local resident who is most likely to be an enemy agent, that systems of control for screening strangers must therefore be devised and perfected."

To counter these various threats, the CIC implemented a control system with road blocks and roving patrols along what became known as the "Highway of Spies." Simultaneously, the Counter Intelligence Corps detachments launched an aggressive security education campaign: "Be wary of everyone in your area. Remember this is not Brooklyn, or Topeka, or Oakland, but a foreign country where espionage, intrigue and deception are ingrained in the people...." The 305<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment also published a "Patterns Report" that communicated to agents in the field the current *modus operandi* being utilized by the German Intelligence Service. In one issue, the report described a suit material given German agents as a Christmas gift. Fifteen days after the holiday, a spy by the name of Ferdinando Camaiori walked into a local

CIC office wearing a suit of the cloth described in the report. When confronted, he quickly confessed.

Over the course of 6 months, the 305<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment was credited with having "captured over 200 German espionage and sabotage agents and German Intelligence Service officials...seized large numbers of clandestine radio transmitters...dug up numerous caches of enemy sabotage explosives, and arrested and interned hundreds of subversive Italians." Illustrative of the overall success enjoyed by the CIC, a German spy master and head of *Abwehr Kommando 190* revealed after the war that none

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***"Urgent security situation here: ten sabotage agents captured within past four days. Three hundred more reported en route or soon to come. Several caches of enemy sabotage explosives discovered...security situation most serious since beginning of Italian operation...additional agents urgently needed."***

**Message from MAJ Stephen Spingarn,  
Commander, 305<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment**

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*German intelligence used radio transmitters to receive information from stay-behind agents. (INSCOM)*

of his agents deployed within the Fifth Army area ever returned.

The need to screen persons seeking employment at the various Allied locations as well as those desiring food rations and identification cards soon became a distraction to the performance of regular counterintelligence duties. To solve the problem, counterintelligence established an Allied Identification Center to cover the area surrounding Leghorn on the west coast; here, a handful of agents screened an average of 200 people daily, thus freeing up their fellow agents to focus on higher priority missions.

### Invasion of France

Secrets of Allied plans for the invasion of France were entrusted to the practitioners of deception and to counterintelligence. Deception took the form of rubber tanks and landing crafts, phantom Army Divisions, controlled leaks of misinformation, and masked communications. Because the United Kingdom served as the jumping off point, British military and civilian agencies naturally handled the bulk of the counterintelligence work. The Counter Intelligence Corps confined its dealings to United States military personnel and rarely interfaced with British counterparts. Although the numbers would eventually grow to 800 agents and 100 officers by May 1944, the leadership of the CIC continued to argue that still more personnel were needed to support the fighting force of 1.5 million.

In the weeks leading up to the invasion of Hitler's Europe, the Counter Intelligence Corps busied themselves

conducting security lectures and providing 24-hour-a-day coverage of service clubs and restaurants both in and out of uniform. The rumor quickly spread that the person setting at the bar next to you might actually be a CIC agent, and this possibility in itself served as a powerful deterrent. Agents also mingled with personnel in the port areas and gave security briefings to incoming crews. In the end, the CIC concluded there was more danger of information being leaked by merchant marines and civilian technicians assigned to work on aircraft than by the troops themselves. Finally, the Counter Intelligence Corps assumed the responsibility for securing the marshalling areas as troops prepared to jump off for the invasion.

In his book, *A Soldier's Story*, General Omar Bradley wrote, "Although our commands were carefully seeded with CIC agents who rifled desks nightly and rattled safes in search of security violations, only one serious breach was uncovered during the life of the 'Big Secret.'" General Bradley referred to the well-publicized story of the major general who, at a cocktail and dinner party late in April 1944, talked too freely about the date of the invasion. Reduced in rank, the newly demoted colonel disappeared from the theater within 24 hours, and all those who had heard his indiscreet remarks, in General Bradley's words, "were visited by CIC agents and cautioned to forget the conversation. The prompting was probably unnecessary; by that time all of them had been badly frightened." Elsewhere, security personnel intercepted a packet of classified papers erroneously mailed to the States and then proceeded to track down the soldier involved. Then there was the case of the carpenter who



*Not only did Colonel H. Gordon Sheen serve as an early head of CIC, but he later helped to direct the effort in Europe.*  
*(NARA)*

by accident wandered into a room full of maps on the wall and immediately found himself sequestered.

## Retooling

The experiences of CIC elements in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy would greatly influence what lay ahead in western Europe. Many in leadership positions had already seen action; at the top of the CIC pyramid, Colonel Sheen, himself the one-time head of the CIC, had recently returned from North Africa to London to become the Chief, CI Branch (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces [SHAEF]). Other examples included Major Horace Miner, Commander, 301<sup>st</sup> CIC Detachment. General Bradley in *A Soldier's Story* described Minor as a "quiet pipe-smoking professor of anthropology from Ann Arbor, Michigan, who had trekked across the Sahara from a native hut in Timbuktu to get into the war." Miner had served with the new G2 of First US Army in Tunisia and Sicily.

Previous exposure to combat conditions proved useful in defining Counter Intelligence Corps doctrine (SHAEF Directive No. 7, dated 5 February 1944) for the upcoming campaign: "Whether at Army, Corps, or Division level, all CIC detachments are responsive to the appropriate G2. Their mission is to combat espionage, sabotage, and subversion; to prevent leakage of information to the enemy; and to deliver security lectures to troops. Close liaison and cooperation is to be maintained with all counterintelligence agencies, Civil Affairs, and the Provost Marshal. In addition to normal counterintelligence duties, they are to perform such tactical functions as search of enemy command posts and questioning of



*Agents maintained a careful watch over deployment areas for D-Day, such as this one at Brixham, England. (NARA)*

civilians, informers, and agents in occupied territory.” As practiced in the Italian campaign, agents at corps and army would accompany division detachments. In this manner, detachments could continue to push forward with their supported divisions while handing off the remaining counterintelligence duties smoothly to agents at corps.

At the time of the invasion, the Army implemented a global numbering system for CIC detachments. Those units serving with infantry and airborne divisions were given the numbers corresponding with their divisional organization: the 200’s were reserved for detachments serving with corps; the 300’s for those attached to field armies; the 400’s to those assigned at theater; 500’s for armored divisions; and 600’s and 700’s for CIC elements in support of the Army Air Force.

### Normandy

Before dawn on D-Day, 6 June 1944, six CIC detachments had already landed by parachute or glider in Normandy; among them were officers and agents as-

When a captured safe proved too difficult to open, the CIC was often called in. In one instance, the CIC agent, a new arrival to the combat zone, used five pounds of dynamite which not only demolished the container and scattered its contents of monies and documents over the Normandy countryside, but destroyed the house it was in. The blast even caused a local battalion to go on alert, fearing that the Germans had launched a counteroffensive.

signed to the 101<sup>st</sup> and 82<sup>d</sup> Airborne Divisions. Among eight members of the 101<sup>st</sup> CIC Detachment, three were killed, another severely injured, and a fifth wounded and captured, all on the first day. In each new town or village, Counter Intelligence Corps agents rushed to secure their number one target—control of communications centers to



*Information could come from any source, such as this elderly French gentleman. (NARA)*

The 35<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment no more than hung up a sign announcing it was open for business in St Lo when an elderly, disheveled Frenchman stumbled in and offered to exchange information for a pair of shoes. Skeptical at first but eventually agreeing to the bargain, the CIC agent watched with amazement as the source proceeded to produce a fountain pen that he then took apart revealing a piece of tissue paper a foot long and 4 inches wide. On it were listed the positions of German units 200 miles inland along with the locations of various mine fields, road blocks, observation posts, and radio stations. The source had even taken time to jot down the size and location of resistance groups and the presence of air strips.

Sometimes, CIC agents resorted to subterfuge to accomplish their objective. In September, the dock workers in Marseilles, who were a vital link in the supply chain, announced a Communist-inspired strike. On their own initiative, two agents met with members of the French Foreign Legion, bivouacked not far from the city, and convinced the commander that a “Celebration of Victory in Southern France Day” might be in order. The festivities proved a great success with cheering crowds lining the streets, various dignitaries giving speeches, and of course, soldiers marching with their fixed bayonets. Afterwards the French Foreign Legion conveniently remained in the city for several days, thus undercutting any motivation for a strike.

ensure all telephone, telegraph, and radio communications were stopped, the mail impounded, and printing presses shut down. In Normandy, arrests of those on the CIC’s “Black List” were made easier by the presence of resistance groups who had proceeded to detain all collaborators who had not retreated with the Germans.

By far, the biggest contribution the CIC made during the first few days was collecting information that tactical commanders could put to immediate use. For example, agents from the 82<sup>d</sup> CIC Detachment were credited with finding a document on the body of a German officer that revealed the enemy’s order of battle. In the city of Cherbourg, CIC soldiers seized a huge number of captured documents that were turned over to the VII Corps Order of Battle team. Agents from still another detachment obtained from French Resistance the location of an ammunition dump, names of other resistance members within the area, and disposition of enemy troops in the vicinity of Bergny. During a search of the former German headquarters at Ste. Mere-Eglise, two agents discovered construction plans for various defensive measures and supply dumps on the Cotentin Peninsula.

Initiative and improvisation became the hallmark of Army counterintelligence in combat conditions during World War II. Upon learning that the widow of a French underground leader possessed valuable information but risked capture by the enemy, members of the 101<sup>st</sup> CIC Detachment commandeered a truck belonging to a local French citizen. Within full view of German soldiers, CIC agents and a French guide traveled behind the lines to reach the villa where the lady was hiding. Not only did the mission end in the rescue of the woman, but she brought with her numerous notebooks containing many of the names and addresses of personalities on the CIC’s detention list.

Routine duties also played an important role in the life of a typical CIC unit. The handling of civilians proved an ongoing issue that required close and constant coordination with civil affairs, military police, and military intelligence. Many cases involved individuals who had fraternized with the enemy or were caught up in the black market. These were turned over to the French authorities. The growing number of cases involving looting by

American soldiers had an adverse impact upon the counterintelligence mission, both by undermining the overall good cooperation with French citizens and by distracting the CIC from more important investigations.

Security lectures continued to be given to tactical units, emphasizing among other things the need for troops to be on the alert for flashing lights and parachuting agents. For example, instructors informed soldiers that an enemy agent who had recently dropped from the plane might still show telltale signs of welts under his arms caused by the parachute’s straps. The side benefit of this type of orientation was to reduce the numbers of false reports, thus freeing counterintelligence specialists to pursue more important assignments.

By the end of July, CIC teams associated with the Advance Section Communications Zone (ASCZ) began operating in the First Army’s rear area, taking over from CIC detachments that continued to advance with the combat commands. Two hundred and fifty personnel were drawn from 400-numbered units and refigured as 18 “lettered” detachments; their field offices covering some 31 towns. Their primary mission was to protect headquarters staff against possible spies and saboteurs. To accomplish this, the detachments performed a wide range of traditional functions; travel control—involved check points and screening of personnel—consumed most of their energies. The use of such detachments in the rear areas would be repeated as Allied Armies advanced across Europe.

## ADVANCE TOWARD GERMANY

The campaign for Northern France began with Operation COBRA in July 1944. On 31 July, Allied forces broke out at Avranches and drove 90 miles to the east unopposed. When the Third Army’s direction of attack abruptly turned southward, it left many of its CIC agents operating in towns of the First Army’s area of responsibility. Conversely, agents assigned to the First Army found themselves within the Third Army’s area of operations. The fast-pace movement necessitated an exchange of operational plans as well as overnight reassignment of CIC personnel between the two armies. The campaign



*In the European Theater, prisoners, not documents, proved the more frequent source of timely information. (NARA)*

ended on 14 September—three days after the Seventh Army, coming up from the south, established liaison with elements of Patton's Third Army near Dijon in central France.

For those involved in counterintelligence, the sweep across France was very frustrating in terms of fulfilling their duties; CIC soldiers were often called upon to act as traffic coordinators, temporary town officials, and virtual “father confessors.” On several occasions the would-be spy catchers even turned into peace makers. Second Lieutenant Charles W. Colgan recalled having to cross a river near Orleans under a white flag to try and negotiate a surrender of 14,000 German troops. The rapid pace of the war also forced agents to frequently leave investigations only partially completed and to entrust them to others in the rear areas. During this phase, the wisdom of having two agents from the corps CIC detachments assigned to each of the tactical detachments to facilitate the hand-off was validated over and over again. The quick advance of the Allies did have one side benefit; it convinced many enemy sleeper cells to abandon their plans of spying and sabotage.

Lack of communication facilities often made liaison with other Allied intelligence agencies and even with other CIC detachments impossible. The quality of support

Army counterintelligence could expect from local French resistance also deteriorated the further the Allied Forces advanced into the center of the country. Then there was the lack of French linguists. At first, counterintelligence employed soldiers from Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams, but soon began using French citizens. A son of a French diplomat and a former officer in the Free French Forces were typical of those employed.

Entries in the 79<sup>th</sup> CIC Journal for August 2 reflected just how busy one day could be: “While in the coastal city of Granville, screened and released 260 civilians; turned over to Third Army the locations where Germans were reported to be hiding and signaling to aircraft; also provided a list of collaborationists; informed authorities of location of ammunition dumps; reported burial sites of four US soldiers; identified hiding places of 20 personnel sent on an infiltration mission; and captured one alleged spy.”

During the campaign, CIC agents successfully rounded up a number of high level enemy spies. In one instance the individual was in the process of making a reconnaissance of US Army military positions. Dressed in civilian clothes, the operative carried a document that authorized him to pass through German lines. Taken to the First Army Interrogation Center for questioning, the enemy

agent eventually faced trial by the US Military Commission and death by hanging.

Based on the favorable experience of the "S" Force mission in Rome, Allied planners launched a similar effort to carry out "seizing, safeguarding, and exploiting important intelligence and counterintelligence targets in the larger cities" of western Europe. Paris would become the first objective for "T" (Target) Force, whose 1,800 personnel were divided between an administrative element of 200; a tactical contingent of 1,050 to remove mines, guard targets, etc.; and a 550-man intelligence and security element. The CIC, to include members of its anti-sabotage teams, contributed 115 men—the largest single portion of the intelligence contingent. After Paris, the 418<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment in support of the 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group became the primary source of agent support for future "T" Forces.

### Southern France

For 6 months prior to the Allied invasion of Southern France, the CIC worked in Italy helping to keep planning for the campaign a secret. A detachment was specifically established to guard the activities of Task Force 163, and

after the task force dissolved itself in March 1944, CIC agents remained busy circulating among the troops and local populace to learn of any leaks of the pending operation. They also turned all apprehended enemy agents over to the OSS to be "doubled" so the would-be spies could be used to transmit disinformation back to their handlers. Finally, the CIC set up a school in Naples to acquaint its agents with the security environment that would await them in France.

The Seventh Army entered France (Operation ANVIL) in mid-August through the German Mediterranean defenses. Many of the detachments that served with the Seventh Army had already been tested in the campaigns of North Africa, Sicily, and southern Italy; however, Seventh Army counterintelligence found itself confronted with counterintelligence problems not previously experienced by the First and Third US Armies in western France. Local French did not greet the liberators with the same open arms. Instead, the CIC agents discovered a population with a higher number of enemy sympathizers or employees of the *Abwehr*—German intelligence. The *Abwehr* didn't have spies as members, but rather enlisted civilians for the purposes of espionage and sabotage. One successful recruitment method frequently employed



*At a US interrogation center, a captured German radio agent displays his equipment. (NARA)*

In counterintelligence, verifying the absence of a security problem can consume as much time as dealing with a real one. On the evening of 5 February 1945, a team from the 28<sup>th</sup> Signal Company Message Center moved from Kayserburg to Colmar, France, as part of the relocation of its division headquarters. Arriving at their new billets, they proceeded to park their 2½-ton truck for the night, only to awaken the next morning to find that not only was the truck missing, but much more importantly, its cargo was gone—a cipher machine, nicknamed SIGABA. The SIGABA was an electro-mechanical converter used to encipher messages containing the Allies' operational plans at division echelon and above. Panicked by the thought that an enemy agent was behind the theft, US authorities immediately reassigned 15 CIC agents to the case and placed COL David G. Erskine, the CIC Chief of the Sixth Army Group, in charge of the massive search. Erskine's discreet inquiries with French officials eventually bore fruit and resulted in finding the perpetrator, a local Frenchman who, himself having had a truck stolen, decided to do the same. But when the thief discovered the two safes each weighing 550 pounds, plus a field safe, he sensed immediately that the cargo was too hot and proceeded to dump it into the nearby Geissen River. By 9 March, the level of the river had dropped enough for divers to locate the larger safes 100 yards down stream, but still no evidence of the third safe. Colonel Erskine's only alternative was to begin planning for the diversion of the river so that a more thorough inspection could take place. One last search by CIC agents along the banks bore fruit when the sun reflected off the container's exposed metal some 600 yards from the bridge.



by the *Abwehr* was to gain control over a person by drawing him or her into the black market.

Following the Southern D-Day, the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, dispatched CIC soldiers at Marseilles to the Franco-Spanish frontier for border control work of apprehending would-be saboteurs and enemy agents. Having performed similar duties in North Africa along the border separating French and Spanish Morocco, the element assumed the title of the Pyrenees Border Control Group. Here, CIC agents dealt with a population that had literally been cut off from news of the war; many Spanish Republican troops had been in hiding and were just waiting the chance to resume civil war against Dictator Francisco Franco. A similar operation was created to monitor the ill-defined boundary running from the Mediterranean coast to the Swiss frontier and dividing Southern France from Northern Italy.

September was a difficult month for Seventh US Army counterintelligence. The rapid advance opened a vast area of operations to the north, covering roughly 30,000 square miles. Because CIC's French counterpart, the *Securite Militaire*, could not begin to handle its share of the task, the Seventh Army committed 70 of its counterintelligence officers and enlisted men. Although relations between the CIC and the French *Securite Militaire* were often strained, an integrated approach was eventually adopted for the course of the campaign. At each corps and division, attached French counterintelligence specialists helped to facilitate liaison with local government agencies.

General Charles DeGaulle commanded the French Forces of the Interior, whose primary mission was to carry out operations to hamper German troops in Southern France: blowing bridges, cutting communications,

destroying railroads, etc. In the course of the campaign, the CIC detachments maintained close contact with these partisans who not only served as invaluable sources of information but helped with rounding up collaborators and would-be spies. Unfortunately, the French Forces of the Interior soon evolved into a revenging army. One CIC report read, "A truck with Germans in civilian clothes was captured. The French Forces of the Interior shot 19 of them as Gestapo Agents." Ironically, this allowed the CIC agents to assume the role of "good cop" and made their job easier since the French population soon preferred the Americans to handle security-related matters.

### The Stall

By early September, counterintelligence found its job much easier on the front lines. The various detachments began to witness the presence of a lower class of enemy agents: those recruited as a result of their black-market activities, those open to blackmail, and those simply freed from jail. The trained eyes of an experienced agent easily recognized the newly made suitcases carried by these

inexperienced operatives and the sequentially-numbered bills being sported about.

The G2, First US Army reflected the optimism of the moment: "...The German Intelligence Service left a network of stay-behind agents along the so-called Atlantic Wall. This network has been a complete and miserable failure in the First Army area as three of these agents are now working as double agents for the US Army and are feeding the Germans false information. Some agents have surrendered; some have tried to remain unknown, ...never working or sending reports to the German Intelligence Service."

By the end of the month, the Allied drive had lost steam in Northern France, allowing for the Germans to regroup. Relations with the French also began to change. Previously, the Counter Intelligence Corps had worked with the local French authorities following liberation of occupied territory. The French viewed the initial intervention and backing of the CIC as beneficial but desired less American involvement once the rear areas had been freed of German influence. Following the reorganization of the



*A prisoner is brought in for interrogation by counterintelligence agents. (NARA)*



A CIC agent attached to the 94<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division interrogates the Dutch engineer who installed Hitler's electronic security system at Berchtesgaden. (NARA)

French Government, the Counter Intelligence Corps found its duties and powers becoming more and more restricted to cases involving Army personnel. However, small pockets still remained in German hands, separated from the rest of the country by narrow areas of operations under the Army's jurisdiction.

In late September, the US VII Corps quickly breached the main defenses of the Siegfried Line and entered Germany south of Aachen. The US First Army eventually encircled Aachen, and following tough house-to-house fighting by the 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division, the city fell. The 205<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment earned the distinction of being the first of its kind to enter Germany, helping to take the nearby town of Rotgen on 14 September. When military intelligence discovered that no technical intelligence (TECHINT) specialists were available, the 205<sup>th</sup> assumed responsibility for running down information and personnel associated with the Prym Enterprises, which served as the source of a new type of turbine blades being used in German jet aircraft.

By October the CIC detachments assigned to the First and Third United States Armies began to face, for the first time in the war, large numbers of refugees, evacuees, and forced laborers released by the enemy so that they would float back through the front lines, causing congestion. Among them were German soldiers who had donned civilian clothing when they found themselves cut off from their retreating army. More importantly, stay-behind agents had joined the migration for the purpose of obtaining information. As the First and Third United States Armies advanced closer to Germany, the problem grew increasingly serious. As a result, 14 holding camps were set up, and from there, agents screened detainees to determine their category.

### The Low Countries

When Counter Intelligence Corps personnel began operations in Holland, they were quick to make use of resistance groups. The first was the *Orde Dienst* that

came into existence after the arrival of the Allied Armies and tended to represent the more mainstream part of society. The second was the *Koninklijke Patrouille*, which had engaged in acts of sabotage during the German occupation. Once liberated, Dutch civilians, like the French before them, falsely believed all travel restrictions were automatically lifted. In response to the need to check proper identification of travelers, the CIC deployed approximately 360 members of the resistance organizations to man stationary checkpoints and roving patrols.

Resistance groups in Luxembourg were quite active during the war, and with the departure of the Germans, these groups united to temporarily form a police force which operated road control posts and performed routine police duties. After its liberation the Hadir Steel Works of Differdange, Luxembourg—the largest European producer of 100-foot "I" beams—

began to supply the Allies with the essential material needed for bridge building. The CIC assumed oversight responsibility for security at the plant and in the process implemented a number of changes.

Raising carrier pigeons was a popular pastime in Luxembourg and Belgium, but when captured German agents revealed that pigeons, not radio-transmitters, were the chosen means of communicating with higher headquarters, pigeon flights were prohibited. Later when troops entered Germany, the CIC gave orders to destroy all such birds.

Belgium posed the greatest challenge to security because its location made the people equally wary of both the French and Germans. Belgian society reflected these divisions politically and culturally. People did not trust CIC agents, which in turn made their investigations more time-consuming. Even the resistance movement itself was divided. Upon liberation by the Allies, resistance

groups in certain areas proceeded to make wholesale arrests including many innocent civilians; still others displayed reluctance to give up their weapons, posing even more problems for the CIC. Communists exploited the situation for the purpose of creating an armed force that, for a brief time, threatened the overthrow of the Belgian National Government.

### Skorzeny

In late 1944, the Germans made a surprise counteroffensive through the Ardennes and the Alsace region of France, the so-called Battle of the Bulge. This proved a last desperate attempt to reverse the tide of war on the western front, and counterintelligence would face one of its greatest tests on a battlefield. On 16 December, German forces aided by surprise and wintry weather attacked the



*Lieutenant Colonel Otto Skorzeny orchestrated the training of 150 German soldiers to use the latest American slang and then outfitted them with US uniforms. (INSCOM)*

lightly held sector of the First Army. Success depended in part on the so-called 150<sup>th</sup> Panzer Brigade, organized by the German Intelligence Service. Dressed in US uniforms and equipped with captured weapons and jeeps, enemy soldiers of the *Einheit Stielau* were to perform intelligence collection, commit acts of sabotage, and sow confusion. To give the plan a chance at success, German leaders selected English-speaking soldiers for participation and provided them an intense orientation to American culture to include watching newsreels and movies, learning current slang words, and practicing American mannerisms, such as the handling of cigarettes.

The architect of this campaign of deceit was LTC Otto Skorzeny, a man with many talents who before the war had been an engineer, racing car driver, and business executive. He had attained a reputation among the German High Command for his daring rescue of Mussolini in November 1943.

A series of events would conspire to undermine the full impact of Skorzeny's plan. For several months leading up to the Battle of the Bulge, US troops were fully aware of isolated cases of German soldiers posing in US uniforms and on occasion using stolen jeeps. For instance, the CIC within the Ninth Army area of operations apprehended 31 Germans in civilian clothing in the first 15 days of December. These captured Germans revealed they had been instructed to remain behind Allied lines to tap into US communications. But the clinching bit of information came from one prisoner who told of having seen the secret order laying out Skorzeny's plans. (Everything proved

Borrowing the expertise and equipment of a local radio intelligence unit, the 426<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment detected a strong, unidentified signal coming from the area surrounding the Piazza San Pantaleo in Rome—6 months after the retreat of the Germans from the city. A week later, an enemy agent who dropped by parachute surrendered to CIC agents and proceeded to reveal to them that he had monies and radio crystals for a pair of fellow spies who had been providing timely intelligence from Italy's capital. Under the surveillance of CIC personnel, the would-be espionage agent was allowed to make contact with his comrades. This, in turn, led to their arrest. Their apartment on the top floor was perfectly situated to maximize transmissions and observe troop movements. An antenna wire was strung from their terrace and cleverly disguised in between clothes lines.

correct except for the location.) Later, an order taken from the body of a dead German officer confirmed the prisoner's story. Based on this information, Allied counterintelligence flashed the word on the day of the attack to alert American troops about the enemy's plan of deception.

US troops immediately took steps to re-mark vehicles and to implement new identification procedures. Counterintelligence forces deployed to meet the situation, even in areas not affected by the German advance. Military police and guards checked identifications at bridges, reinforced security at vital sites, and posted control points to screen refugees. They questioned suspicious persons beyond merely asking for the traditional password: "What staging area did you pass through in the States? What is the price of an air mail stamp? A V-mail stamp? What is Sinatra's first name?" Say "wreath." Germans apparently found it difficult to pronounce "th." In one instance, Germans gave themselves away when they claimed they were trained at Fort Hood, but then stated they had never been in Texas. On the other hand, having to name both baseball teams in St. Louis—the Cardinals and the Browns—proved difficult even for some American soldiers.

On 18 December—the second day of the counteroffensive—CIC efforts yielded results. Failing to give the correct password, three members of a Skorzeny team were apprehended wearing US uniforms and possessing a jeep and sabotage devices. Rushed by agents to the First Army's Interrogation Center, the Germans revealed the size of their brigade and that it possessed 150 English linguists. The next day an alert MP with the assistance of a CIC agent unmasked another group when they appeared just "too damn polite;" this time the captives served up the unsettling news that a possible plot was underway to assassinate the Supreme Allied Commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, and other high ranking officers. Eventually, it became evident that no such operation was underway. Of all the teams he sent out, Skorzeny would later claim that two returned but only one brought "information."

## Progress in Italy

In a pamphlet entitled "Po Valley," Thomas A. Popa summarized the campaign for Italy as follows: "...Allied armies in Italy had battled north over 1,000 miles of mountainous terrain, through inclement weather, against a capable and determined enemy." The Fifth Army would earn the distinction of being the only US field army of the war in continuous combat for over 600 days. In the end, superior manpower and supplies coupled with tacit determination on the part of the Allies resulted in victory, but the cost was high. Nearly 32,000 Allied soldiers were killed in action; of these over 19,000 were Americans.

Army counterintelligence counted seven of its soldiers among those who made the supreme sacrifice.

From 10 October to 31 December 1944, elements of Fifth Army arrested 110 espionage and sabotage agents; 75 of these by CIC soldiers. Then a cold winter stalemate set in, allowing local Fascists to spread rumors. Inscriptions in crayon and coal began appearing on walls of the various towns: “*Roosevelt, I tre etti di pane*” or “Roosevelt, where are the three hundred grams of bread.” But apart from promoting unrest and distracting the CIC from more

Sometimes, fact imitated fiction. In March, VII Corps agents operating from Cologne took into custody a “better-looking than average Belgian girl, in her twenties, medium height, blonde hair, and an interesting figure.” She had been pulled from the Rhine when her boat had collapsed. CIC agents quickly dismissed Heloise Bouconville’s cover story and confronted her with her true identity—Sybille Delcourt, the mistress of Werner Kramer, chief of a storm-trooper spy network within the region. Unmasked, Delcourt revealed that she had worked for the Gestapo for more than 4 years and was presently on a mission to assassinate an informer and to free Gestapo personnel who had been picked up by the Allies. Fluent in French, German, Flemish, and Dutch, Sybille quickly decided it would be in her best interest to become a double-agent for the CIC. In the coming weeks, she worked alongside disguised CIC agents to compromise locations of Gestapo “Drop Houses” and to identify individuals the Gestapo had marked for assassination. She was also present while other internees were being interrogated. Once CIC captors left the room, uncooperative prisoners were often quick to reveal their real identity to a fellow captive such as Sybille. All told, Delcourt would compromise some 150 people associated with the Gestapo. Yet, she still lied to conceal the name of one arrestee—her former lover, Werner Kramer. Sentenced to death by Belgian authorities, Delcourt ultimately had her sentence commuted; thanks in part to CIC personnel who recommended mercy for the girl with a “rather appealing face.”

important duties, the whisper campaign accomplished little.

The months leading up to V-E Day (May 8) continued to remain extremely productive ones for the Allied security force. For example, the 305<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment participated in the “S” Force in the city of Bologna, captured more than 20 enemy espionage and sabotage agents of the German Intelligence Service, four clandestine radio transmitters, and various valuable documents. In Genoa, newly assigned Special Agent Henry Feldmen personally rounded up 30 stay-behind agents in one month and obtained their confessions.

The Counter Intelligence Corps picked up a number of well-known personalities such as Ezra Pound, the prominent American poet-turned expatriate and profascist. Although partisans executed Mussolini before the CIC could arrest him, agents were able to collect important correspondence and place his daughter and her children in custody. Finally, as the German threat faded, the Allied Military Government discovered itself facing an unexpected new one—communism. The presence and influence of Communists were so widespread the CIC took immediate steps to establish a reliable informant net that targeted groups planning to undermine the authority of the Military Government.

## INVASION OF GERMANY

Following the German counteroffensive into Ardennes-Alsace, General Eisenhower laid plans involving concentric attacks for the enemy’s final defeat on the battlefield. At his disposal were 90 full-strength divisions, including 25 armored and 5 airborne, stretching 450 miles along the Rhine. During the campaign, Eisenhower had to make a number of adjustments, but he continued to resist British pressure to take the capital city of Berlin. By doing so, he honored the agreement previously negotiated among the Allies to halt along the east bank of the Elbe and Mulde Rivers where they would make contact with the Soviet forces moving west.

As US forces prepared to enter Germany, the call went out for more German linguists. The 208<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment was typical; of its 5 officers and 14 enlisted men, only 2 spoke German. Borrowing members of the Army’s interrogation teams proved unsatisfactory as these types eventually had to return to their own units and mission. The prospect of using local German civilians was equally unsatisfactory as they could not travel with a detachment as it moved forward. To obtain language qualified agents, Army leaders approved a change in security standards to allow for wider recruitment of foreign-born personnel.



*Counterintelligence took action to prevent the efforts of German so-called “river fighters” to sabotage bridges. (NARA)*

### The Enemy's Homeland

In early 1945, the Allies launched Operation GISBOMB, a series of bombing raids on spy schools in order to reduce the number of agents being released by the German Intelligence Service. Interrogations of captured spies and saboteurs provided locations of the training facilities that were then passed on to the Ninth US Air Force. Sites included the radio school and station at Hundsbach; the headquarters for sabotage units at Leitstelle II West; guerrilla training facility at Kloster Tiefenthal; and the training center for long-term agents at the Waldburg Radio School. Aerial damage assessments following the raids revealed significant destruction to the enemy's facilities. In addition, there was the unseen and unknown impact of the bombings, such as the psychological effect upon the morale and resolve of would-be spies.

Learning that enemy saboteur swimmers might attempt to destroy pontoon bridges at Remagen, the CIC recruited Army engineers to devise underwater nets made of barbed wire entanglements; guards were also instructed to fire at all floating objects. These countermeasures were successful in turning back an attempt by German frogmen, so-called *Flusskaempfer* or “River Fighters.” Later at the bridge crossing in the vicinity of Oppenheim, a number of these would-be saboteurs were captured and turned over to counterintelligence for interrogation.

Once in Germany, the CIC treated the German populace with a conqueror's hand. Already prepared psychologically to obey those in control, the Germans responded well to orders, but saw requests as being a sign of



*These young members of the Wehrwolf organization were responsible for cutting communications lines. (NARA)*

weakness. Cooperation of German informants varied significantly. The further from the fighting, the more cooperative they became. Also, individuals tended to be responsive once they saw that their cooperation netted results, i.e., witnessing a highly visible Nazi official being arrested. Not unsurprising, people were inclined to refer to themselves in terms of their political and cultural identity before the rise of Nazism. Former Communists, in particular, proved helpful; but over time, they would become the chief critics of the new Military Government, especially when any former leader within the community was put back into power. In Germany counterintelligence did not enjoy the benefit of resistance groups. The CIC did discover the presence of the *Edelweiss Piraten*, a small youth organization that harassed members of the Hitler *Jugend* or Youth, but nothing of substance came from trying to run down its leadership.

### New Threats

Army counterintelligence faced a series of new threats in Germany. In early 1945, Nazi Party leaders responsible

for security or the *Reichssicherheits-Hauptamt* issued instructions to various Gestapo (*Geheime Staatspolizei*) headquarters to launch the *Wehrwolf* movement, which would usher in the “coming freedom movement” (*Kommende Freiheitsbewegung*). By enlisting members of the party and other volunteers, the *Wehrwolf* set about to “destroy the enemy wherever we find him after he has entered Germany,” to terrorize Germans inclined to assist the Allies, and to sabotage Allied installations and communications. Fortunately, the *Wehrwolf* proved largely ineffective because of the lack of planning. One captured member of the organization told interrogators that his band had been given no equipment and no instructions and had been told simply “to do what we could.”

The CIC also faced a small but real threat from the Hitler Youth. During an interrogation, one 12-year-old expressed the ultra nationalism that was at the heart of the movement: “I hate you Americans. I wish I had a pistol to kill all of you. I shall never betray my Führer as long as I breathe.” Then there were the organizations that proved



*The end of Richard Jarczyk, a stay-behind spy. Such executions were highly publicized to deter others. (NARA)*



*Seventh Army counterintelligence arrested staff members of the Dachau Concentration Camp. The man with the clasped hands was the camp executioner. (INSCOM)*

more rumor than fact, such as the *Sonderkommando Bienenstock*, an airborne saboteur group sponsored by the *Luftwaffe* for behind-the-line action. Their mission called for them to land German planes behind Allied lines and proceed to carry out acts of sabotage. New types of sabotage and terrorist devices would surface in Germany, such as a cigarette lighter with a poison pellet that when lit would give off a deadly gas; poison aspirin tablets, chocolate bars, and sugar; and a so-called "butter mould" antipersonnel bomb.

### Routine Missions

As the Allies advanced across Germany's homeland, the mission of counterintelligence on paper remained much as it had been before: "protection of Allied interests from espionage, sabotage, and subversion activity; the collection and study of information relative to underground movements; the liquidation of the German Intelligence

Service (and related organizations); and the arrest and investigation of those whose activities pose a threat to Allied security." In addition, the CIC assisted the Military Government in investigating applicants for public office and for service with the German police. Because divisions would daily move as much as 20 to 30 miles, Counter Intelligence Corps detachments focused on neutralizing communications coming from enemy territory, arresting persons considered an immediate threat to Allied operations, and sealing buildings that might contain records of value to the Military Government.

The screening of various peoples (displaced persons, German soldiers in civilian clothes, and German POW's) constituted a major effort. In March-April 1945, the 29<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division alone oversaw camps in the rear area that housed approximately 80,000 displaced persons, 40,000 freed Allied prisoners, and 1,000 German soldiers. Under such conditions, the best the CIC could hope to

accomplish was a quick search for personnel fitting a profile. Those falling into the displaced category presented the greatest challenge. For example, a survey of one town revealed all men of military age consisted of 215 Germans, 100 Russians, 80 Serbians, 30 Poles, 25 Italians, and 5 Frenchmen.

The impact of screening persons was such as to create personnel shortfalls. One solution was for the Counter Intelligence Corps to stop being responsible for every town and adopt a broader approach involving areas of operations. Another time-saving measure was the placing of individuals under house arrest and recording their detention on Military Government registration slips. This allowed agents to reopen their investigations when given sufficient time.

The CIC continued to make policing documents a priority. Special Agent George J. Novak was involved in what turned out to be one of the more important finds. The S2 directed Novak to lead a column of jeeps to search a castle belonging to the former German Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop. Arriving at the castle concealed in the evergreen forests of the Harz Mountains, the searchers were greeted by Baron Witilo Von Griesheim, who had prudently chosen to disobey orders from Berlin to destroy the German Foreign Ministry Files from 1871 to 1944 and had instead burned newspapers for appearance sake. Among other things, the documents contained the official exchanges between Berlin and British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, the German-Russian negotiations in 1939, and a letter from French General Marshal Petain to



*A would-be saboteur leads CIC agents to the location of his buried explosives. (NARA)*

Before the war Agent Ib Melchior, a Dane by birth, had traveled extensively throughout Europe as a member of an acting troupe. In his book, *Case by Case*, Melchior recalls how on one occasion, he had to put all his skills to the test. Sent behind the enemy lines to bring back a scientist associated with Germany's atomic program, Melchior attempted to allay the scientist's fear of being caught defecting. To solve the dilemma, Melchior proposed a ruse. He tied his "captive's" hands and struck him on the back of the head, not to inflict injury, but to induce bleeding. This way, if they should fall into German hands, the scientist could claim he was a reluctant prisoner. Melchior and his companion did not travel far before they ran into a road block. Melchior described what happened next; "I ripped off my woolen cap, tore the officer's SS cap from the scientist's head, slapped it on my own, and hissed to my petrified passenger, 'Don't move!' ... 'May I—,' the German guard began. I cut him off at once. 'What the devil is going on here, Sergeant?' I barked. 'I am Sturmbannfuehrer von Stuelp, Gestapo. Get that damned roadblock out of the way!' [After a lengthy exchange, the German soldier remained adamant to check the vehicle; Melchior was down to his last card—the *Wehrmacht* map, which he now produced as a writing pad.] Imperiously I stuck out my hand toward the man. 'Your pencil,' I demanded curtly, 'I shall want your name, your service number for the record.' I smiled maliciously, 'The *Reichsfuehrer SS* will wish to know exactly who delayed a mission in which he is vitally interested.' The MP stared at me, chalk-faced." With this last bit of acting, Melchior won passage to the front behind a German convoy.

Hitler begging the Führer to declare Paris an open city and save it from destruction.

As the Allied armies grew nearer, the Germans attempted to destroy the paper trail of the Third *Reich*, especially the personnel files of the Nazi Party. Acting upon a tip, Agent Francesco S. Quaranta investigated a local paper mill in the village of Freimann where he discovered all the Nazi Party membership cards with identification photos on the back along with documents of various high-level Gestapo figures and court officials. But not all documents came in such neat packages. An agent overheard the *Hitler Jugend* anthem coming from a German police lieutenant's home in Konigshofen. Suspicious, he ordered a search of the house. Here, agents found personal papers from the Luftwaffe High Command. In addition, the man's wife, an engineer, produced technical drawings that she had made of an antiaircraft device and its timing mechanism that allowed it to explode at any altitude.

On occasion, the CIC discovered more than documents. Counterintelligence also came across caches of hidden treasure, such as art, jewelry, watches, precious coins, and banknotes, including US currency. In western Austria, a German pastor approached local counterintelligence with information that he knew the hiding place of gold bullion, but with one reservation, he desired the US and not the French to take possession of it. There was a small problem—the location of the treasure was in the French area of operations and the building was presently being occupied by the French military. Going by himself,

Special Agent Victor de Guinzboug, who was fluent in the language, convinced the French to vacate the premises, and then immediately radioed for the convoy of military police to rapidly proceed to the location and retrieve the gold bars hidden under a pile of coal in the cellar. The caravan along with the gold was out of sight before anyone was the wiser. The pastor then led the Americans to a nearby farm house where the process was repeated. Agents recovered all totaled, 8 tons of gold from these two snatch operations alone.

Army counterintelligence frequently served as investigating officers in atrocity cases. When only four members of a nine-man bomber crew could be confirmed dead or captured, counterintelligence detailed 1LT Lynn E. Neunehwander and Special Agent Sam D. Beall to track down the fate of the missing flyers. By pursuing various leads, they quickly determined that following the airmen's capture and turnover to local police, the five American flyers had been taken to a nearby farm in the vicinity of Hohenhauser-Eichholz and executed. Not only did the agents identify the grave sites, but they obtained photos and descriptions of the perpetrators that eventually led to their apprehension. On a much larger scale, members of the 307<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment were among the first to arrive at the Dachau concentration camp. Counterintelligence agents assumed responsibility for locating the camp's administrators and apprehending 57 prisoners who had perpetrated crimes against fellow inmates, among them was the executioner in charge of mass murder—the so-called "Butcher of Dachau."

Not all activities of the CIC could be said to be either profitable or even mission related. The weekly summary of the 218<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment reflected the frustrations of its commander: "A day spent carrying women through the street who have fainted from starvation (three days locked up in a school building without food or water); helping midwife a cow (the farm labor was interred and the droves of fine stock left untended); doctoring a young girl who had lacerations on her face from our shelling; settling the problems of sorting and shipping 78 Poles, Dutch, Italians, and French, while at the same time finding white bread for a dying diabetic; putting out fires; chasing drunken GI's out of the Headquarters; and finding details to bury dead Germans...is far from the intelligence, systematic search for the dissident elements whom we have come here to find...."

Although the fighting eventually ground to a halt, major distractions continued to confront counterintelligence. When the VII Corps CIC entered Leipzig, they faced the assignment of determining the nature and intent of an anti-Nazi group called the *National Komitee Freies Deutschland*. In existence since 1935, the organization had remained dormant throughout the war. Apparently sincerely motivated, they were volunteering their services to keep the Nazis from power, but soon their "get-even" attitude caused difficulties when they falsely accused individuals of being members of the Gestapo or *Schutz Staffeln (SS)*; such accusations were a distraction to a counterintelligence effort already spread thin. The presence of so many displaced Russians further compounded the problem as did the issue of protecting informers. Cooperative citizens often awoke the next



Throughout the Pacific, CIC agents checked travel papers of arriving passengers. (AHEC)



*While conducting security surveys of various islands, CIC agents made contact with Allied coast watchers. (NARA)*

morning to find on their doors the following message: “*Auch fuer Dich, Du USA Soeldling, wird die Stunde der Vergeltung Kommen!*” “For you too, USA hireling, will come the day of vengeance soon.”

Despite the surrender, CIC agents remained vigilant for spies. For example, Army agents became suspicious when an individual soon to be appointed mayor of a small town persisted in his requests for travel permits. Follow-up interrogation revealed he had been trained to sabotage Allied materiel, kill US soldiers, and report on troop movements. Posters were widely distributed throughout the Seventh Army area depicting his execution coupled with a warning in German that others would suffer a similar fate. Counterintelligence also regularly checked for members of the Gestapo and SS who may have found their way into POW holding cages. By VE-Day, the number of key Nazi personnel taken into custody grew as they simply ran out of places to hide. Also for the first time, agents added war criminals to their arrest lists.

## THE PACIFIC

Within a year of going to war, the Counter Intelligence Corps in Hawaii (initially referred to as the Contact Office)

reached 81 agents, or 80 percent of its peak strength. Besides its headquarters on Oahu, the Contact Office maintained a handful of agents on each of the other main islands: Hawaii, Maui, and Kauai. Throughout the war, training remained a problem for the counterintelligence program in Hawaii. As circumstances permitted, the CIC sent personnel to attend its school in Chicago, but this arrangement could not accommodate the numbers of untrained agents arriving. As a quick fix, the Contact Office established a one-time school in Honolulu to train the remainder of the detachment; this make-shift arrangement was repeated on two more occasions.

With the assistance of the CIC, the Army Air Force established a detachment for the purpose of monitoring inter-Hawaiian travel; the Navy’s Trans-Pacific Travel Control Bureau performed a similar role for trips to and from the islands. As the war increased in scope in the Pacific, the need to screen incoming personnel grew proportionately. Army counterintelligence eventually established offices in San Francisco and Seattle to process the 3,500 persons a month moving between these ports and Honolulu.

The Hawaiian Islands faced their share of unique threats. A survey of alien-owned corporations revealed

that more than half were owned wholly or in part by residents of Axis countries. The same investigation found a number of former members of the German Storm Troopers to be in the employment of those with defense contracts. As a precaution, the CIC arrested these individuals and arranged for their transfer to the States. The Contact Office also placed high priority on monitoring a variety of local fraternal and cultural organizations whose purposes remained unclear. Counterintelligence successfully recruited informants as a means of keeping tabs on membership, meetings, and agenda of suspect groups.

At the end of the war, CIC in Hawaii proudly pointed out that “no known espionage, nor single case of enemy-inspired sabotage, occurred there during the war.” Leading up to the end of martial law in October 1944, 1,579 persons were apprehended. Of these, 1,466 were Japanese; the remainder Germans and Italians. Almost half (617) were released or paroled by the hearing board; 313 relocated to internment camps on the mainland; and 79 repatriated, leaving nearly 500 still in custody on Sand Island in Honolulu Harbor at the war’s end.

The first CIC combat detachment to arrive in Hawaii belonged to the 6<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division. Only four-persons strong, the detachment was quickly taken under the wing of the Contact Office to gain hands-on experience in dealing with local Japanese. Altogether, five combat detachments would eventually benefit from similar training. Hawaii would serve as the jumping off point for Counter Intelligence Corps operations on Saipan, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa.

### South Pacific

From its beginnings in June 1942, the United States Armed Forces in the South Pacific Area (USAFISPA), later South Pacific Base Command, functioned primarily—as its name suggests—in the capacity of a huge marshalling area for millions of tons of equipment along with troops destined for the Southwest Theater of Operation; the South Pacific covered New Zealand, New Caledonia, Fiji Islands, New Hebrides, and Guadalcanal. In September 1942, the Army dispatched the first of six counterintelligence agents to the USAFISPA Headquarters at Noumea, the capital city and chief port of New Caledonia.

Undaunted by the mission assigned to the newly formed South Pacific Provisional CIC Detachment, Lieutenant Marvin C. Goff, Jr. immediately made plans to cover an area that encompassed 7,000 square miles. In addition to their personal observations and reportings, Goff and his team depended upon close coordination with the theater G2 to learn of any suspicious events or persons located on the various islands. Surrounded by water, Counter Intelligence Corps personnel constantly responded to reports and rumors of submarine sightings and possible enemy landing parties. Counterintelligence

A former anthropologist turned CIC agent was sent to deal with local bushmen in New Guinea. His mission was to convince them that Japanese spies and American airmen who landed in their area were better alive than dead. The agent knew the natives’ fascination with objects so he presented a brightly enameled sunflower, emblazoned “Vote for Landon,” (a presidential campaign button for the Republican candidate in 1936 who hailed from the sunflower state of Kansas) as a reward for each captive turned over to authorities.

also expended much time searching for the presence of illegal radio transmitters, and during one period, even utilized a direction-finding team from a nearby Signal Corps unit to help in the effort.

Each set of islands had its unique challenge: On New Caledonia, significant attention was paid to the Japanese minority who made up an important segment of the local business community. For similar reasons, agents viewed the presence of Europeans with added suspicion and monitored the propaganda efforts of the local Communist Party. On Fiji, tensions existed between the natives and Indian immigrants. The Indians upset the local economy when they abandoned work on sugar plantations for more profitable laundry and souvenir businesses and later provided alcohol and women in exchange for the GI’s money.

To cover the New Hebrides Group, Agents James W. Franklin and Edgar M. Lucas set off with a small crew on a 50-foot fishing vessel to the remoter islands of the 250-island chain. Born in Tahiti, Lucas had prior experience in helping recruit native laborers in the area before the war. Over a 10-day period, the two exchanged gifts of twists of tobacco, canned milk, soap, etc. while meeting with native chieftains, missionaries, Allied coast watchers, plantation owners, and cannibals in hopes of neutralizing any enemy coast watchers. French planters sympathetic to the Vichy Government were thought to pose the greatest threat.

Priorities in other theaters delayed the deployment of additional agents to the South Pacific, but by 1943, significant changes began to take place. In April, MAJ Arthur Turner arrived in theater to take command of the South Pacific Provisional Detachment. Twenty enlisted men accompanied him, allowing for personnel to be permanently assigned to New Zealand, which had become a rest and recuperation area for troops fresh from the front. Besides the usual tavern brawls, military authorities were confronted with soldiers who found they had had enough of war or discovered local love interests and had gone into hiding. (Interesting enough, their flights from

***"Attention all troops! This is Military Intelligence speaking. Enemy agents are operating in this area. They operate in every role from newsboys to kindly old ladies. They may be wearing GIs', officers' uniforms, or Australian Army issue. Not all spies are blonde and beautiful nor will they ask you the details of secret plans....Don't Talk! No matter who starts discussing military information, from officers down to shoeshine boys, from motherly welfare workers to cute little country girls. Be smart! Dummy up! Change the subject. Don't be ashamed to say, 'I don't know.'"***

**Security broadcast at various train platforms in Australia**

service were often supported by a sympathetic population.) “Loose talk” posed a security risk, and especially doctors, nurses, and bartenders found themselves the unwanted recipients of restricted information. Counterintelligence’s principal means of dealing with such leaks consisted of lectures to local hospital staffs and assignment of undercover agents to monitor barroom banter.

During 1943, the CIC teamed up with the Navy and the Censorship Office to establish the Allied Security Office for the purpose of providing port security and ensuring a constant flow of goods and personnel to the front lines. Eventually, branches were set up in all the major ports from New Zealand to the New Hebrides. The Security Office also created a “Critical Cargo Branch” to monitor items frequently being pilfered, such as whiskey and radios. New guidelines on the handling and guarding of such types of cargo quickly reduced the losses.

### **Southwest Pacific**

Army counterintelligence in the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) experienced its own unique growing pangs. Lack of trained personnel, absence of doctrine, and nonexistent tactical CIC detachments delayed the development of an effective organization by at least a year and a half. In early 1942, the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2,

Headquarters, United States Army Forces in Australia (USAFIA) acted as the initial counterintelligence agency with a nucleus of only 14 soldiers who had undergone a 3-week, make-shift course.

Besides the lack of a formal school, counterintelligence had to compete with the local officer candidate school for qualified recruits. To join the Counter Intelligence Corps, a recruit not only had to be Officer Candidate School material but possess an investigative background, such as that of a lawyer or newspaper man. The high standards demanded of the early “G2 investigators” resulted in the selection of only a handful of soldiers (14 out of 1,500 applicants). Those who did finally pass muster were immediately assigned to the commander of one of the five base areas into which large numbers of troops would eventually flow.

The initial mission of the CIC was limited in scope since the Australian Security Service assumed leadership in anti-espionage work in country. The Counter Intelligence Corps focused its attention on assuring the security of all personnel and materials in the various base areas, conducting investigations of civilians working for US Army agencies, and indoctrinating troops in security matters. An intense campaign was launched to educate the troops on the danger of loose talk and the need to adopt strong security practices. Menu folders and playing cards were distributed with appropriate reminders, and local Australian businessmen enthusiastically joined in a campaign to display security posters within their establishments.

Allied Headquarters launched an early counteroffensive against the Japanese thrust towards Australia. Operations to the north of the Australian mainland kicked off in October 1942 at Port Moresby, New Guinea, which was designated as the Advance Base. The Allies proceeded to expel the Japanese from Milne Bay and establish a Sub-Advance Base there. For the first time in the war in the Southwest Pacific, the possibility of enemy spies and saboteurs within friendly lines could not be ruled out; as a consequence, a handful of counterintelligence officers were dispatched to man the Port Moresby office.

### **1943**

The year 1943 would be the defining one for counterintelligence in SWPA. It opened with the arrival of MAJ Albert L. Vreeland and 20 agents from Washington, DC, thus allowing the separation of the CIC from the G2 staff. To symbolize their operational and administrative independence, the CIC moved to a new location at 144 Bowen Terrace in Brisbane. The driving force behind many of the changes was BG Elliott R. Thorpe. One of the few officers with intelligence experience, Thorpe was serving as a military observer in the Dutch East Indies when war broke

out. Given responsibility for the Counter Intelligence Corps, US Army in the Far East (USAFFE), Thorpe worked to ensure close cooperation and coordination between staffs of the G2 and the CIC.

In March, the War Department, upon request of the theater G2, relieved all CIC agents from their unit assignments and reassigned them directly to Headquarters, United States Army in the Far East. The next month, authorities proceeded to create the 5227<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment (Provisional) as the theater command detachment. (Four months later, the 441<sup>st</sup> CIC Detachment under the command of now Colonel Vreeland was established in its place.) During its first year of existence, the energized 441<sup>st</sup> CIC Detachment completed more than 11,000 investigations.

In April the first counterintelligence combat personnel—5 officers and 39 agents—reached the SWPA Theater, followed 3 months later by a counterintelligence detachment assigned to the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division. Next, a permanent CIC training school was organized in July, supplemented by instructors from various Australian intelligence agencies. Located in a 100-year-old mansion in Brisbane, the school shaped its curriculum to reflect anticipated combat-required skills ranging from map reading to jungle warfare. The curriculum also stressed native languages such as those found in Dutch East Indies and Malaya along with traditional counterintelligence subjects—handling POWs and captured documents. The school's staff viewed the Army's issuance of Technical Manual 30-215, "Counter Intelligence Corps" as a godsend. A number of agents were also exposed to



*General Elliot R. Thorpe, who oversaw the CIC in the Southwest Pacific Theater, is shown pinning the bronze star on an agent. (INSCOM)*

3 months of additional hands-on training with military elements conducting patrols in areas of New Guinea that had recently been under Japanese control. The practical experience gained from dealing with local natives proved invaluable for the campaigns that lay ahead. Finally,



*A scene repeated over and over: a CIC agent conducts a security lecture. (AHEC)*

besides a school, the CIC established its own chemical and photographic laboratories to work special problems.

In 1943, there was a growing consensus that the Japanese were receiving militarily valuable information being leaked from Australia. Counterintelligence personnel launched an aggressive security campaign; loudspeakers at railroad stations intermittently broadcasted reminders to troops within earshot. In Melbourne's Little Italy, Sergeant Frank Colucci successfully assumed the disguise of a deserter and became a member of an Axis spy-ring. Agents also began to systematically board ships arriving in Australia and New Guinea to examine the papers of seamen and search for possible enemy agents. To supplement the initial checks being done by the military police on airplane crews and passengers, the CIC established control points at airports in Australia and, as the war progressed, at air traffic centers in New Guinea such as Milne Bay, Hollandia, and Biak Island. In one year's time, the CIC checked out over 12,000 planes.

### The Long March to Tokyo

By the middle of 1943, the Allies had checked the Japanese advance with the naval battles of the Coral Sea and Midway and by hard-fought victories for the Territory of Papua, southeastern portion of New Guinea, and for Guadalcanal, a part of the Solomon Island chain. The

growing strength of General Douglas MacArthur's forces in the Southwest Pacific coupled with those of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz in the Central Pacific allowed for the Allies to go on the offensive. In early 1944, the Joint Chief of Staffs blessed a two-fold strategy that would converge at the Japanese homeland—a compromise between Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur's proposals. Using Army ground forces, land-based air power, and a fleet of old battleships, MacArthur would move along the northern coast of New Guinea toward the Philippines. Nimitz would use carrier-based aircraft and Marine and Army ground forces to island-hop across the Central Pacific.

Initially many tactical commanders in SWPA confused the CIC with the CID (Criminal Investigation Division) or FBI; others inappropriately utilized them in nonofficial roles ranging from "spies on our side" to orderlies. As a result of the Kiriwina-Woodlark Operation, a transformation began to take place within the chain of command that would allow counterintelligence personnel to begin performing the combat support role they were trained to do. Two makeshift CIC detachments were among elements of the Sixth Army's Alamo Task Force (specifically created for long-range reconnaissance) that seized Kiriwina and Woodlark Islands, located between New Guinea and the Solomons. No resistance was met, and for the remainder of July, agents accompanied patrols in search of docu-



Nisei or second-generation Japanese Americans assisted CIC teams as translators and interpreters. (NARA)



*When the war started, the CIC was not well known by the American public. Its image began to rise after 1943 when stories on the corps began to appear in popular magazines. Here is the last installment of a serial run in Terry and the Pirates.*

(Terry and the Pirates®+©2005 Tribune Media Services, Inc.)

ments and made contact with local natives. As requested, CIC personnel gathered enough information to complete a survey of the island and its inhabitants.

On 29 February 1944, an agent by the name of Barney Strachan from the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division took part in a reconnaissance of Los Negros, the largest of the Admiralty Islands. Working alongside a member of the Allied Translator and Interpreter Service (ATIS) responsible for document exploitation and assisting in interrogations, he helped gather several hundred pounds of documents that revealed important order of battle information. For instance, the knowledge that only a small number of enemy soldiers occupied nearby Manus Island was critical in the decision to capture the island. By late March the Japanese resistance that at times had been heavy, ended. This resulted in the CIC's collection of still more valuable documents.

During the campaign for the Admiralty Islands, counterintelligence personnel created several useful intelligence gathering tools. For instance, they assembled a display of desired captured enemy equipment as a training aid, and circulated the popular exhibit among the various units. Local agents also developed what they liked to call a "grab bag" to encourage soldiers to turn in their war trophies, any one of which might prove to be a valuable piece of information. Soldiers who submitted

materiel and documents could exchange them for any comparable item that intelligence personnel had already deemed to be of no use.

Following the capture of the Admiralty Islands, the Allies targeted Hollandia and Aitape, which lay on the north side of New Guinea. Supported by aircraft carriers, the troops of LTG Robert L. Eichelberger's I Corps launched a two-prong attack. The 32<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division deployed east of Aitape; over 100 miles to the west in Netherlands New Guinea, the 24<sup>th</sup> and 41<sup>st</sup> Infantry Divisions landed near Hollandia. A great deal of planning went into the Hollandia-Aitape operations to ensure success, including emphasis placed on security. All agents underwent physical training, orientation to enemy sabotage techniques, and a familiarization with the Malayan language. Twenty-six members of the Netherlands East Indies Army also accompanied CIC teams as interpreters.

By the end of the first week of fighting, it was evident to all that the intense preparation had paid off. Agents had managed to seize 26 boxes of enemy documents hidden in caves. These contained the detailed diaries and records of the Japanese 36<sup>th</sup> Division showing strength, disposition, and fortifications of enemy units at Biak and other Japanese-held islands in the Pacific. Agents also uncovered maps, code-books, and casualty reports. At



*Filipinos undergo counterintelligence training in Australia pending the invasion of their homeland. (AHEC)*

Aitape, agents, without adequate transportation, still managed to gather up 5 tons of paper to include four priceless Japanese code books, pinpointed supply dumps for follow up by technical intelligence specialists, and even secured intact aircraft.

Counterintelligence agents worked alongside Dutch authorities to debrief the recently liberated native population. The CIC paid local natives a half guilder (26 cents) for each enlisted Japanese soldier turned in, and more for officers. (Over 100 were rounded up this way in the month of May alone.) The CIC detachment assigned to the 24<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division effectively used local youths to assist with interrogations, to perform liaison with local villages,

and to participate in an informant network. Counterintelligence personnel were also responsible for arresting a Dutch schoolmaster who directed the activities of six native tribes on behalf of the Japanese. On the island of Morotai, the last stepping stone to the Philippines, agents helped to capture a radar site with its engineers and technicians; the equipment alone was valued at more than a half-million dollars.

Throughout the Pacific campaign, counterintelligence personnel frequently came under small arms, artillery, and mortar fire, especially while accompanying front line troops. On 17 May, CIC soldiers participated in seizing Wakde, a group of small islands off of Netherlands New

The highly skilled individuals who made up the corps performed a variety of unique assignments. When a damaged runway necessitated repair in the Philippines, the Commander, 801<sup>st</sup> CIC Detachment volunteered Agent Charles C. Deubel, who was reared in China as a son of missionaries, to recruit a local group of Chinese immigrants as laborers. To Deubel's pleasant surprise, the Chinese not only readily agreed to the task but insisted on doing the job for free to show their patriotism. To express his appreciation, Deubel arranged for a modest ceremony with both American and Chinese flags and a couple of speeches; both parties seemed more than satisfied with the end results. (As Japanese forces retreated, local CIC elements would be called upon again and again to oversee similar recruitments of local laborers to reconstruct bridges, roads, and other civil works.)

Guinea. The landing cost the corps its first fatality in theater when Sergeant Woodrow G. Hunter was killed in action on the Insoemoar Island beach at D-plus-1.

### The Philippines

The Counter Intelligence Corps would undergo more pre-invasion training for the Philippines than for any other campaign. In July, 1944, a school was established at the Palmarosa House in Brisbane specifically for that purpose, and individuals knowledgeable of the Philippines were invited to serve as guest lecturers. Agents received instruction in language as well as an orientation on local customs, geographical place names, local laws, and various secret societies. They also studied an enemy order of battle and a "who's who" of the islands. At the same time, 50 members of the 2<sup>d</sup> Filipino Battalion received training in basic counterintelligence techniques.

The CIC required Army personnel, upon receiving departure orders, to sign a statement acknowledging their security responsibilities. Agents monitored all unit publications and bulletin boards, ensured that soldiers turned in all personal papers and diaries, and conducted a search of all bivouac areas. They even checked to see if the markings on clothing and equipment had been removed as directed.

By September, the counterintelligence organization in theater had grown to 39 combat, regional, and area units (450 officers and enlisted men), but was still approximately 20 percent under authorized strength. The same month, General MacArthur moved his headquarters to Hollandia, New Guinea, followed soon thereafter by the 441<sup>st</sup> CIC Detachment and the CIC Training School; all of this in anticipation of the upcoming campaign directed at retaking the Philippines.

### Leyte

On 20 October 1944, Allied forces under General MacArthur returned to the Philippines by invading Leyte. More than 70 Counter Intelligence Corps officers, agents, and attached Filipinos made the initial landings in support of elements of the Sixth Army and X Corps (1<sup>st</sup> Cav Division and 24<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division). The 7<sup>th</sup> and 96<sup>th</sup> Infantry Divisions entered the island under the XXIV Corps from the Central Pacific Theater. In total, eight CIC detachments of the Sixth Army Task Force landed on the Leyte beachhead within the first 4 days. The Sixth Army's 306<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment would direct counterintelligence operations within the combat zone, but the 441<sup>st</sup> CIC Detachment, situated back in Hollandia, continued to coordinate all Army counterintelligence activities within theater.

The Army assigned combat detachments to each army, corps, division, and separate task force. At the division level, the normal strength consisted of 2 officers and 10

enlisted plus 5 soldiers from the 2<sup>d</sup> Filipino Battalion whose contributions as linguists, fighters, and undercover agents proved invaluable. Counter Intelligence Corps detachments further broke themselves into teams, some of them going forward with regiments, some remaining with command posts, and still others setting up headquarters in towns and villages. The 400-numbered detachments assigned to theater were given responsibility to cover specific areas. Here, they supplemented the work of the tactical counterintelligence effort, and once the combat phase was over, remained in place to complete any residual mission.

The 224<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment was among the first detachments ashore, landing 20 miles south of Tacloban on the Leyte Gulf. During the first days, agents interrogated persons of interest who had been rounded up and placed in a compound. Other teams contacted prominent individuals living in the area, especially pre-war municipal officials, to obtain a list of names of pro-Japanese civilians to be questioned as well as names of loyal Filipinos who could help with the establishment of informant nets. Agents searched out the headquarters of the *Dulag* branch of *Kempei Tai* (Japanese equivalent of the German Gestapo) where they found a considerable amount of information on its organization. Other targets included records of the Japanese-dominated Bureau of Constabulary, local police, and Japanese "trading" organizations that fronted for espionage. Elsewhere agents made a systematic search of buildings in Tacloban where they discovered several hundred pounds of documents for turnover to members of the Allied Translator and Interpreter Service.

As the campaign for Leyte progressed, the Counter Intelligence Corps found itself more and more involved in dealing with the various guerrilla movements. This consisted mainly in locating the guerrillas and debriefing



*Japanese soldiers sometimes attempted to blend into the local population by donning civilian clothes. (INSCOM)*



*In Manila, CIC agents examine the contents of the desk of the Japanese puppet President, Jose Laurel. (INSCOM)*

them on a wide range of subjects to include enemy psychological warfare and propaganda techniques, economic and political conditions, and the location of possible military targets. From these exchanges, agents assembled for the first time an accurate picture of the workings of the Japanese *Kempei Tai* and similar groups. One such element, the *Ju Tai*, consisted of youths who served as the ears and eyes of the Japanese Military Police to alert them to the presence of guerrillas.

The Counter Intelligence Corps detachments often became overwhelmed by reports from guerrillas and local citizens anxious to denounce "spies" and "collaborators." This would hold true throughout the Philippine Campaign. To ensure justice, the Counter Intelligence Corps initiated a Legal Board of Review, which depended on a network of such persons as priests, school teachers, etc., for invaluable insights on how to evaluate certain types of suspects; however, the Army left the punishment of all collaborators to the Philippine Government.

Upon entering a town, CIC agents called upon the mayor, police, and other civil officers. After conducting an on-the-spot check of their loyalty, counterintelligence elements instructed the officials to call a meeting where information could be distributed to allay the public's fears. Agents also found themselves arranging for the distribution of food, medical aid, and shelter to the civilian population until civil affairs personnel arrived. In Palo, nearly a hundred stay-behind Japanese soldiers attacked the local CIC office, but quick reaction by the agents repulsed the assault.

In retrospect, it was fortunate for the counterintelligence effort that Leyte came first. Because of its large population, Leyte represented a type of challenge not previously faced by the CIC in the Pacific. Experience gained in keeping up-to-date files of reports on suspects and informants and learning to hand off these responsi-

bilities to the next echelon proved invaluable because even larger population bases, to include greater numbers of Japanese civilians, awaited counterintelligence agents on Luzon.

### Luzon

The largest deployment of the CIC in the Pacific came during the Luzon Campaign: 29 detachments, including 16 combat units. As had been the case during the early stages of the Leyte campaign, counterintelligence operations fell under the control of the 306<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, attached to the Sixth Army. The first Counter Intelligence Corps personnel in Luzon landed on Lingayen Gulf on 9 January 1945, within an hour after the initial assault troops forged a beachhead along the coast of Pangasinan Province. Three days later nine CIC detachments with a total of 22 officers and more than 100 agents were on the ground and fully operational. Agent MSG Lorenzo Alvarado, who had spent the last 3 years posing as a flower peddler, was there to greet them. After removing his shoe to reveal his credentials, he simultaneously produced a map of enemy troop positions.



*Lieutenant Colonel Lowell L. Bradford, Commander, 493<sup>d</sup> CIC Detachment, conducts a prisoner to the Bilibid Prison in Manila. (INSCOM)*

As they were on Leyte, the guerrillas became a major distraction, and to further complicate matters, there were opportunists who pretended to be guerrillas. Partisans were divided between the 7,000 strong *Hukbalahap*—a Communist-inspired group—and an Allied-sponsored group. The Huks—as they were called—were being led

***"The prison [Bilibid] covers an area of several square blocks, and the prison barracks radiate out like spokes in a wheel from a chapel at the center. A high, thick wall surrounds the prison area and divides it in half through the chapel. Various wooden towers and buildings are on or adjoining the outside walls. Bilibid will be the base of operations for the CIC detachment. We are to live in the prison buildings. Prisoners interned by the CIC will also be here. There is little to eat. No water or electricity is available. Bedding and clothing found there is piled high and burned in the yard."***

**William B. Simpson, Special Agent in the Pacific, WWII**

by Luis Taruc, who had been schooled in Moscow. Both groups were anti-Japanese but had opposing political objectives. As the fighting waned, the Hukbalahap guerrillas continued to wage a campaign for power through the use of atrocities, raids, and kidnappings. A counterattack upon the Huks' headquarters netted lists of



***Member of Spanish consulate being debriefed in Manila. (INSCOM)***

targets for assassination that included among them the names of CIC agents. Documents also revealed that a local informant for counterintelligence had been turned and was actually now spying on his handlers.

All of what counterintelligence had done in the Philippines was a prelude to its role in the capture and occupation of the capital city of Manila. The 801<sup>st</sup> CIC Detachment established operations at Santo Thomas University, which had been the wartime home to Allied internees. Within days, BG Elliott Thorpe and his staff arrived on the scene to take personal charge. The 214<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment established its headquarters at the infamous Bilibid Prison, where members of the corps set about determining the fate of those accused of collaborating with the enemy, clearing individuals to hold public office, and searching for any remaining espionage agents. The security problem in Manila was further compounded by the presence of large numbers of German, Italian, and Spanish spies. The Spanish *Falangist* movement had gained many Filipino followers; Manila even had its own active Nazi Party. By the end of March, agents had taken into custody some 1,216 collaborators, puppet officials, enemy nationals, and *Kempei Tai* agents. The city also yielded tons of documents describing the activities of the Japanese front organizations.

Manila Bay was the scene of one of CIC's most unusual operations. When General MacArthur departed the Philippines in 1942, he had directed that pay-master bags containing silver coinage be sunk in the bay. Among the liberating army in 1945, there were a number of individuals who were aware of the dumping and were determined to retrieve the monies for themselves. While in a bar, an agent from the 801<sup>st</sup> CIC Detachment overheard the plot. Offering his assistance, he was on hand when divers retrieved the US property. By removing his shirt, he signaled other counterintelligence agents to move in and make the arrests.

### **Unique Missions**

In the Philippines, counterintelligence faced its share of one-of-a-kind distractions. To handle thousands of persons who passed through the American lines daily, agents established screening points. Japanese soldiers easily blended into the local population and even dressed in women's clothing to gain passage. The Japanese also deployed gangs of arsonists of all ages and both sexes. Small children received 350 pesos to toss grenades into buildings. Guerrilla groups often mistook Chinese aliens for Japanese, leading to numerous wrong arrests that were time-consuming; this was corrected by the issuance of identification cards for the Chinese. At the request of the American consul, Army counterintelligence became involved in a very unpopular assignment that won them no friends: the screening of 8,500 American civilian internees anxiously awaiting repatriation.



*On Okinawa, the CIC quickly gained the cooperation of locals. (INSCOM)*

The many islands that made up the Philippines created still other challenges. A Western Visayan Task Force consisting of two regiments and a CIC detachment landed in late December 1944 on the southern island of Mindoro and proceeded to capture its major city of San Jose. Within months, other islands of the Central Philippines also fell to US forces. Here, counterintelligence established sub-offices. Mindanao and the Visayas Islands, however, remained in the hands of guerrillas. Eventually a "CIC Navy" was created, using three boats to move from island to island to search for collaborators. Agents also facilitated contact with guerrillas and picked up Japanese soldiers cut off and left behind. On the island of Mindanao, Army counterintelligence dealt with the unpredictable Moro tribesmen.

Early July marked the transition into the mopping up phase of the war. The Eighth Army replaced the Sixth Army, and in a like manner, the 308<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment assumed the mission from the 306<sup>th</sup>. The establishment of the Philippine Government required agents to redirect their priorities to conducting 5,000 background checks for potential office holders—all within a 45-day period.

### **The Final Advance**

The Ryukyu Islands are a chain of Japanese islands running southwest from the home island of Kyushu toward Taiwan. By March 1945, the Japanese had

assembled a force of over 77,000 Imperial troops and 20,000 Home Guardsmen to defend Okinawa, the largest within the island group. From 2 to 16 miles wide and 60 miles in length, the island with its rugged terrain of hills, ravines, and caves offered ideal topography for the defenders. On 1 April, two US infantry divisions and two marine divisions landed virtually unopposed. Drawing upon lessons learned on Saipan, the Japanese forces, under the command of General Mitsuru Ushijima, were determined to meet the enemy upon more advantageous terms.

As the Tenth Army moved inland, military police and military government personnel rounded up hundreds of civilians for temporary internment in hastily erected stockades. Counterintelligence personnel helped to establish security measures at the various compounds and followed up with spot checks on operating procedures. They also formed interrogation teams to screen for bits of information. Because Okinawans had historically been isolated and treated as inferior by the Japanese, CIC personnel quickly won their support by working through the local *Hancho* or village chief. Agents recruited "CIC Aides" among the natives who demonstrated themselves to be of great value in assisting with interrogations. In the latter stages of the campaign, Army counterintelligence sought help from local informants to identify where Japanese soldiers and officials were hiding.



*Native Okinawans served as interpreters for Army counterintelligence agents, some of whom were attached to the Marines. (INSCOM)*

In the battle for Okinawa, US forces experienced some of the fiercest fighting of the war in the Pacific, suffering nearly 50,000 casualties including over 12,000 killed in action. Seven CIC soldiers lost their lives during the campaign. Fortunately, Okinawa would not serve as a prelude for an even greater struggle to conquer the Japanese homeland.

## CIC WORLDWIDE

The China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater of Operations under the command of LTG "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell was considered a side-show to the Pacific Theater and because of their pre-war presence in India and Burma, the British took the initial lead. The United States Army Forces, CBI was organized in March 1942 with headquarters in Chungking, China. The headquarters later transferred to New Delhi, India, where the British headquarters was also located, leaving Chungking as the forward base. The primary mission of US forces was to assist the Chinese in the prosecution of the war against the Japa-

nese, thus draining resources from the enemy. That mission grew in 1943 to include the "exploitation of the development of overland communications to China" for the purpose of breaking the Japanese blockade and assisting the Chinese Army and Air Force. The Allies

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*"[Fill in name] is engaged in counter-intelligence activities with the United States Army. He is authorized to be in any place, any dress, at all time, in the execution of his duty. He is authorized to travel in any manner. He is authorized to bear arms at all times."*

**China-Burma-India CIC Identification Card**

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*A US convoy negotiates the 21 curves linking Chen-Yi and Kweiyang, China. The CIC helped to secure the Burma Road that carried supplies to our Chinese allies. (NARA)*

made plans to build a road through North Burma, paralleled by an oil pipeline to supply Chinese forces and B-29 bases. Completion would make it possible to ship 85,000 tons of general supplies and 54,000 tons of petroleum products each month.

Major D. MacKenzie of the Counter Intelligence Corps arrived in India in September 1943 and proceeded to conduct a security survey of the Service of Supply base areas which revealed significant shortcomings. The most fundamental safeguards were lacking, and there was a widely held belief that Japanese agents were everywhere and knew everything. Fortunately, Major MacKenzie found the threat highly exaggerated, "No evidence was ever obtained that the Japanese actually exploited the information passing over the phone lines even though every opportunity was given them to get it."

In December, the first CIC element consisting of five enlisted and one officer arrived in Calcutta, India. A second group—one hundred strong—left Hill Field, Ogden, Utah, and proceeded east to Hampton Roads, Virginia, where they embarked upon a journey through North Africa, finally setting foot in Bombay in April 1944. Unfortunately, many of these initial arrivals had undergone training suitable for combat duty in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations and had received little exposure to the unique cultural, geographic, and combat environment awaiting them in CBI. A 2-week course at the British Field Security School at Karachi served as a general introduction; a conditioning course and an additional set of instructions were held at the British Jungle Warfare School at Budni. Just as in other theaters, agents quickly found themselves educating those in

command on the reason that the Counter Intelligence Corps existed.

In August 1944, the War Department issued an order creating 12 CIC detachments within the CBI Theater: the 405<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment was designated as Theater Headquarters, with the additional duty of covering the New Delhi area; other detachments were located at Karachi, Bombay, Calcutta, Chabua (2), and Ledo (Assam); three more were destined for China; and the final two assigned to the Tenth Air Force and the XX Bomber Force, then at Kharagpur, India. The counterintelligence mission in CBI required continuous shifting of resources to meet higher priorities. For example, three of the India detachments transferred to upper Burma in the vicinity of the Stilwell Road for the purposes of assisting the work in Assam. Elements of the 405<sup>th</sup> then assumed the vacated missions in Karachi, Bombay, and Calcutta.

The mission in the China, Burma, India Theater was far more complex than simply apprehending spies and saboteurs. US forces found themselves in the middle of a political cauldron of anti-colonial, pro-nationalistic groups. For instance, the Hindu and Burmese nationalists held a long-time hatred against the British authorities. Naturally, some of these ill-feelings aimed at the British were also soon directed at the Americans. In addition, local Communists actively worked at exploiting political unrest. In short, the political situation complicated the duties of counterintelligence. The question always had to be asked: Was an act of sabotage at a factory producing war materiel the work of an enemy agent, the act of an anti-British worker, or that of a local Communist?

In Burma, CIC's Team #1, consisting of four corporals, handled several interesting cases; most notable was the capture of the leaders of a bandit gang which had captured and tortured a number of Allied soldiers. Besides atrocities, the gang was guilty of spying on Chinese forces and reporting their movements. In all, 26 arrests were made, resulting in three death sentences, four life imprisonment sentences, and two sentences of shorter duration.

At Delhi, the mission was primarily one of education in security. Because actual combat seemed distant, loose talk was extremely prevalent. A five-man team designed security posters, used "spots" on the Army Radio Service, gave lectures, and showed films to the troops. As part of a security awareness campaign, a ten-dollar War Bond was given to anyone recognizing the face of a CIC plant appearing on a dummy wanted poster. In Bombay, the increased volume of military traffic and materiel led the local detachment to incrementally redirect much of its attention to safeguarding the port authority. Agents boarded all ships entering the harbor to inspect the crew's papers and to seek out information of value to the war effort. In the process, agents helped to screen a large number of Americans passing through the port of Bombay on way to the United States; many of whom were labeled



*In Northern Burma, CIC teams utilized many modes of transportation to reach distant villages and apprehend individuals on their "wanted" list. (NARA)*

as undesirables and “considered to be corrupt—dealing in narcotics, stolen Army property and espionage.”

In CBI, pilferage often took the form of sabotage, such as when locals uncoupled the pipeline for the purpose of stealing gasoline—an extremely valuable commodity for barter on the local economy. To counter this on-going problem that existed from Bengal to the Chinese Border, agents helped to organize a 24-hour guard force and investigated all incidents. Furthermore, agents posted warnings in various languages and informed villages that they would be held accountable for damages to communications lines within their respective areas. In February 1945, Agent Edwin W. Simpson traveled the entire 1,120 miles of the newly completed Stilwell Road, from Doom Doma in India to Kumming, China. Simpson, who was fluent in Hindustani, prepared a most useful after-action report on security conditions by interviewing Indian soldiers and locals.

### Burma

In North Burma, the counterintelligence effort was composed of detachments specifically tailored to work in the region and those awaiting their departure for China. All operated as one unit in support of the Northern Combat Area Command and under the supervision of its G2 who outlined the CIC mission as follows: “to install an effective and rapid system for classifying the native population into ‘black’ and ‘white’ categories; to appre-

hend known enemy agents, collaborators and saboteurs; to maintain security between the front lines and rear areas; and to effect close liaison with the British Civil Affairs Service.” Most CIC agents were divided into interrogation teams—a structure unique to the theater. Teams consisted of 2 to 3 agents, plus native interpreters from the OSS Detachment 101. Traveling by jeep, elephant, boat, and foot, the five teams journeyed throughout the jungle area of North Burma, making contact with local villages. They discovered a world filled with gangs, feuding tribes, and secret societies who reflected a wide range of political positions: pro-Japanese, anti-Japanese; pro-British, anti-British. Their major mission was to bring in individuals on the “black list.”

To this end, subterfuge was sometimes required. Staff Sergeant Edmund Fong traveled for 2 weeks using all modes of transportation before he reached Kansi Village in search of an individual wanted for the murder of Allied soldiers. When locals appeared reticent to turn over the suspect, Fong gained their cooperation by telling them the person was wanted so he could provide the Allies with a better understanding of Japanese tactics. The teams also came in contact with Chinese troops and faced the challenge of making them understand CIC’s mission and convincing them not to destroy captured Japanese documents. In the process of carrying out their functions, counterintelligence personnel were not immune from the adverse effects of the jungle environment where fatigue and malaria were constant companions.



*A member of the OSS arrests Gestapo leader and secretary of the German consulate in Canton, China. The CIC and OSS cooperated most closely in the CBI Theater. (INSCOM)*

With the retreat of the Japanese from the Malay Peninsula, many American prisoners of war were released from camps in Java, Singapore, Burma, Thailand, and French Indo-China. Authorities in theater arranged for the former prisoners to be transported to Calcutta for medical treatment before their repatriation to the United States. The Calcutta CIC element assumed responsibility for debriefing the former POWs to obtain information for possible use in any future war crimes trials. As hostilities in Southeast Asia drew to a close, a number of the CIC units finally found themselves on their way to China.

## China

In October 1944, the strained relationship between the Allies and Chiang Kai-Shek, leader of China's Nationalist forces, precipitated splitting the China-Burma-India Theater of Operations in two. General Albert C. Wedemeyer was placed at the head of United States forces in the China Theater where he commanded a diverse group of tactical assets; the most important being the Fourteenth Air Force under MG Claire L. Chennault. As a result of Wedemeyer's orders, CIC elements began to redeploy from the India-Burma Theater into China. All totaled, there were only 6 officers and 32 enlisted men. Their ranks had been depleted while in India and Burma awaiting reassignment to China.

A Theater CIC Detachment was created for the purpose of coordinating the counterintelligence detachment that supported the Services of Supply (SOS) and two other detachments that were assigned to Headquarters, China. This arrangement followed a geographic pattern: the northern portion, roughly that part north of the Yangtze River, would be handled by CIC agents attached to Theater Headquarters at Chunking; the area south of the Yangtze would be handled by counterintelligence personnel assigned to the SOS. However, it soon became evident that counterintelligence personnel could not operate effectively under such an arrangement. On 28 March, the theater G2 assumed direct control and abolished the arbitrary dividing line.

Dealing with the Chinese was from the start difficult for Army counterintelligence. Apart from the Air Force, the US role in China was as an adviser, or as someone aptly put it, a "gigantic military liaison mission." Rivalries between internal Chinese groups and agencies made matters worse, and agents found themselves too often caught in the middle. Because their role was principally diplomatic in nature, counterintelligence personnel enjoyed a freedom of movement not duplicated in any other theater. This was reflected in the wording of their credentials: "...to travel in any manner, and their freedom of movement when on assigned missions will not be hindered at any time of day or night by the military police or other military agency. CIC credentials and badges will be honored at all times." Agents were furthermore

authorized to wear the uniform prescribed for civilians and to operate without rank. And if that wasn't enough, all personnel coming in contact with these CIC agents were warned of the necessity of maintaining the secrecy of their identity and methods of operation.

Nowhere was the tension and lack of cooperation between counterintelligence personnel and the Chinese greater than in issuing background clearances for Chinese civilians employed by the US Army, especially in Services of Supply installations where they often had access to classified information. Each civilian was required to fill out a personal history statement that had to be checked with Chinese agencies. The need to provide clearances for Chinese workers required resident offices be established in the following locations: Chengtu, Hsian, Paoshan, Yunnanyi, Chanyi, Kweiyang, and Peishii. Filled by sergeants or corporals, these positions "will lend assistance to all US Army organizations and installations located within their areas of jurisdiction. They are authorized to receive and act upon requests for their services without prior reference to this headquarters," and "will have sole authority in assigning priority to these requests." Local military commanders were ordered to provide quarters, rations, office space, and vehicular maintenance. Over time, the relationship between the agents and the Chinese improved, and in the end, the work of these resident offices became the most important mission performed by the CIC in the China Theater. Besides security clearances, they conducted espionage and sabotage investigations, provided security education, and collected information. Unfortunately, whatever modicum of cooperation and good will the CIC and

In Brazil, an undercover CIC agent, who in real life was a language professor, kept tabs on local Japanese and German businessmen. When he received word of a pending riot directed against local Axis businesses because of the sinking of Brazilian ships, he and a fellow agent readied themselves. In the aftermath of the vandalism, they entered the wrecked office of a Japanese agent posing as a businessman to search for lists of Axis agents and their contacts. The whole operation almost went awry when a large Japanese man suddenly appeared on the scene and lunged toward one of the agents. Fortunately, his partner was able to bring the butt of his revolver against the back of the assailant's head, which allowed for a hasty getaway along with the sought-after documents.



*The Big Three (Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill) gathered at the Tehran Conference where a CIC agent posed as President Roosevelt during the ride back to the airport. (NARA)*

Chinese authorities achieved would quickly disappear when the war against a common enemy ceased; at that moment infighting between Chinese factions began afresh.

Eventually, all agents in China were consolidated into one organization, the 415<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment. Just before the end of hostilities, CIC teams deployed in support of combat operations to gather intelligence and perform counterintelligence duties. For example, in Southeast China, the Counter Intelligence Corps worked jointly with the Office of Strategic Services to collect and analyze information that would be of value to US forces as they advanced on Canton and other ports in Kwantung Province. Once the US Army finally arrived, agents helped to screen for individuals on the black list.

### **The Global War**


World War II witnessed the stationing of US forces around the globe; Army counterintelligence, in a similar manner, had an international reach. Many of these areas were far from the scene of major fighting but still had security issues. Agents carried out tedious, routine duties, often in isolation, over a large area of operations with limited linguistic support and inadequate administra-

tion. In Newfoundland, an undercover agent found employment with base contractors as a truck driver while his partner worked as a shipping expert. The truck driver soon discovered that his job kept him too busy to do his counterintelligence assignment whereas the so-called shipping expert didn't have enough responsibilities to maintain cover. Writing to his superior, Agent Joseph P. Gilbert expressed his frustrations: "...there don't seem to be any leads on anything and I'll be darned if I can dig any up. Jack and I both feel we are wasting our time."

In Iceland, just the opposite proved true. Two agents followed up a tip about three suspicious strangers located in a remote region of the country. After a boat trip up a raging river and an exhausting mountain climb through heavy snows, the agents were able to apprehend the suspects. The three turned out to be trained espionage agents who had recently come ashore from a German submarine; their mission was to report by radio on military and naval installations as well as the comings and goings of ship convoys. Follow-up interrogations yielded valuable information on German spy schools to include their methods and intended targets.

In the Caribbean Basin, three CIC detachments (469<sup>th</sup>, 470<sup>th</sup>, and 472<sup>d</sup>) helped to secure the Panama Canal. In one

In 1943, Rudolph Hamburger, who carried a Nicaraguan passport, offered an American officer a large amount of monies to gain information on the Persian Gulf Command. The contact was reported to the CIC who placed Hamburger under surveillance as a suspected German agent. Using a fake shipping list of war materiel as bait, CIC agents lured Hamburger in; only to discover that the would-be spy was actually working for their ally—the Soviet Union. After informing all commands in the area that Hamburger was *persona non grata*, the CIC handed him over to the British, who in turn released him to the Soviets, who proceeded to have him shot for failing his mission.



instance, agents apprehended a Hungarian spy who divulged a German plan to make a small runway concealed by the jungle canopy. This would allow a plane to take off, and after bombing the locks, the pilot would ditch the aircraft in the Atlantic and escape by U-Boat. Counterintelligence also collected a significant amount of human intelligence by debriefing crews and passengers passing through the isthmus.

Continuing around the globe, in Accra, Ghana, British counterintelligence homed in on a transmitter being used by an anti-British dentist to transmit messages to German U-boats sitting off the Gold Coast of West Africa. Their prey was shipping vessels carrying cargos of manganese to US steel factories, critical in the manufacturing of aircraft and armaments. An undercover agent disguised as a patient with a toothache was sent to the dentist-spy to feed him false shipping news—news so good that he would rush out to transmit it. Counterintelligence then moved in for the arrest and to police up the codes that were turned over to the Allied navy for use in entrapping U-boats. In Eritrea, northeast Africa, Counter Intelligence Corps agents found evidence of saboteurs in local US-run workshops engaged in building aircraft for the war effort. A counterintelligence agent posed as an Italian-American proprietor of a local hotel near the airbase and openly boasted of his Fascist leanings; microphones hidden in all the rooms quickly identified which guests were would-be saboteurs.

The Middle East was the scene of a number of significant cases. The first involved the rounding up of five members of the German Gestapo who flew from Athens, Greece, and parachuted into Palestine, landing near Jericho. The team's mission was to sabotage Allied installations and lead local Arabs in a revolt. In Iran, with the British taking the lead, Allied counterintelligence

cornered and captured the most dangerous enemy spy in the theater of operations—Franz Mayer. Confiscated documents tipped off authorities to his plans to sabotage railroad tunnels in Iran; Mayer's whereabouts were uncovered when counterintelligence personnel followed the trail of a parachuted agent to his headquarters. Along with the spy chief, Allied counterintelligence rounded up 130 Iranian collaborators and ended a major threat to the lend-lease program that conveyed goods to the Soviet Union.

The Army also used the CIC to carry out a number of one-time missions to include protection for Allied conferences held in the Middle East. In November and December 1943, CIC personnel joined forces with their Allied counterparts to cover the meetings of Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt and their discussions with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek regarding the war in the Far East. Later, at the Tehran conference, which involved Prime Minister Churchill, President Roosevelt, and Premier Joseph Stalin, Agent Robert Ebaugh, who resembled the president, posed as FDR during the drive back from the Soviet embassy while the real chief executive rode in a nondescript olive-green Army sedan, several cars behind.

### A Look Back

As in World War I, Army counterintelligence had a mixed report card. On the down side, a part of the Inspector General's critique of the Counter Intelligence Corps that led to its dissolution on the home front was valid. Chief among the criticisms was the drain of highly qualified personnel for the purpose of investigating marginal threats. These emanated from the counterespionage system established to ensure a loyal army when no evidence existed that the recruits flowing into the Armed



*American and Allied servicemen view the surrender ceremony held on the deck of the USS MISSOURI in Tokyo Bay.*

Forces were anything but. Then there were isolated incidents involving individual agents who had not wisely used their investigative powers and had brought unwanted attention on the corps and its mission. Writing in 1946, two experienced intelligence officers made the following sweeping judgment: "the Counter Intelligence Corps in World War II was in many ways a peculiar organization, whose personnel (chosen hurriedly and for their educational rather than military qualifications) frequently got in everybody's hair."

Initially, personnel assigned to the Counter Intelligence Corps had been controlled from Washington as part of the Military Intelligence Service. Although the rationale for this arrangement was Washington's fear that highly specialized counterintelligence assets might otherwise be misused, efforts at trans-oceanic administration created enormous problems. For instance, the arrangement slowed promotion in the field, and the CIC came to be nicknamed the "Corps of Indignant Corporals." The attempt to run the corps from offices in Washington also

hampered local efforts to make timely adjustments in organization and doctrine based on field experience. Ultimately, these problems were resolved as CIC personnel overseas were transferred to local control. The corps also failed to create a training system that produced agents with all the requisite skills: from linguist to interrogator to combat soldier.


But in total, the contributions of the 241 CIC detachments consisting of 3,000 officers and enlisted men who served in overseas theaters far outweighed any shortcomings on the home front. Army counterintelligence gave the tactical commander an invaluable resource of talented, highly motivated personnel able to carry out a variety of difficult assignments that someone had to do and do well. A primary reason for the success that the Counter Intelligence Corps enjoyed was the caliber of personnel who filled its ranks. The corps had among its ranks the likes of future Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (84<sup>th</sup> CIC Det) and the author of the American classic *Catcher in the Rye*, J.D. Salinger (4<sup>th</sup> CIC Det).

The CIC detachments in the field provided a security shield against a very real and present danger of enemy spies and saboteurs. Take, for example, the record of the 92<sup>d</sup> CIC Detachment, which was typical. During the Italian campaign, this single element recorded 23,000 interrogations, 17,000 of which dealt with line crossers. From this effort, it uncovered and convicted 102 enemy agents. But agents did so much more than serve as spy catchers. In the field, their duties as civil affairs administrators and collectors of human intelligence were equally valued by the tactical commander; and to top it off, counterintelligence operations grew increasingly efficient over time. The improvement could be partly attributed to having resolved various organizational problems. In January 1944, a new organizational table restructured Counter Intelligence Corps detachments along cellular lines, allowed units to be tailored to meet the requirements at each echelon of command. By the end of the war, overseas commanders' biggest complaint regarding Army counterintelligence agents was "There simply weren't enough of them."





During World War II, more than 60 Counter Intelligence Corps soldiers would make the supreme sacrifice. (NARA)

# World War II: German Coal Bomb; CIC Armband in Europe; Premier Tojo's Suicide Pistol.



# **Cold War: CIC Matchbox Camera used in Austria; Soviet Espionage Roll-Over Camera Disguised as Book; Key and Wax Impression of East European Consulate; Knife Disguised as a Pen and Used by Filipino Communists.**





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*“The CIC has more adventure stories buried in its secret files than a month’s output of blood and thunder comic books.”*

The New York Herald Tribune, 1947

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## **CHAPTER THREE**


# **COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DURING THE OCCUPATION**

### **RETURN TO NORMALCY**

The end of World War II left the United States with overseas responsibilities. In Europe, these involved the zones of occupation in Germany and Austria. In the Far East, the United States took the lead in Japan and also administered the southern half of the Korean Peninsula. It soon became apparent, however, that the United States' war-time ally—the Soviet Union—had embarked upon a policy of subverting free nations. This would bring communism in conflict with the West and mark the beginning of the Cold War. In response, Western Europe and the United States formed a regional military alliance

against Soviet aggression—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). New national security realities led the United States to establish a Department of Defense, a separate Air Force, and a Central Intelligence. For the first time, the United States would make intelligence a priority during peacetime.

By the summer of 1945, it became apparent that the evisceration of the Counter Intelligence Corps on the home front was depriving the Army of essential support just when it was needed the most. The Army's role in the occupation of a defeated Germany was placing new demands on the depleted CIC detachments in the European theater, while in the Pacific the pending expansion of



*Training new agents. (INSCOM)*

military operations to the Japanese mainland threatened to overwhelm the available CIC resources. But the Army had left itself in the untenable position of lacking any effective mechanism either to procure new counterintelligence specialists or to redeploy the ones it already had.

Although the Military Intelligence Training Center was responsible for training counterintelligence personnel, the school's limited curriculum continued to emphasize combat intelligence. Moreover, no rotation base existed for the Army's counterintelligence personnel being shipped back to the United States; instead, they were placed in the Army's general replacement pool, resulting in the loss of their specialty. To address these concerns, COL H.R. Kibler, the former Chief, CIC, and now the Executive Officer to the Director of Intelligence, signed a memorandum that set into motion a study recommending the reestablishment of the position of Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps. The War Department was quick to approve these initiatives, and on 13 July, COL Kibler picked up where he had left off as the head of a revitalized CIC.

### A New Center

The first order of business was the establishment of a new CIC Center and School at Fort Meade, Maryland

under the control of the Intelligence Division of the Army Service Forces. The center and school no more than unpacked when lack of adequate housing and classroom space forced them to pick up and relocate 25 miles further north to Fort Holabird, Maryland. Fort Warren, Wyoming was also favorably considered but its distance from Washington, DC, precluded selection. Fort Holabird, a traditional signal and transportation post, was located in Dundalk, an industrial suburb of Baltimore and near the city's harbor—an ideal location for practicing certain counterintelligence problems such as shadowing would-be suspects. That same month, the Army transferred all agents from the discontinued Security and Intelligence Command to the CIC, removing the last traces of the 1944 effort to decentralize counterintelligence.

In May 1946, the War Department underwent a massive reorganization; the Army Service Forces was abolished, and the Counter Intelligence Corps was once again resubordinated to the Intelligence Division of the General Staff. (From 1946 to 1948, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, went by the title of Director of Intelligence.) Administering a Fort Holabird-based organization from the Pentagon quickly proved an impractical arrangement so within a year a dual-hatted general officer's position was created: Chief, CIC and Commanding General, CIC Center. The consolidated mission consisted of countering espionage,



*Learning the craft: making casts of footprints. (INSCOM)*

sabotage, and subversion within the ranks of the Army and assuming responsibility for the procurement, training, and administration of all counterintelligence personnel. Investigations continued to be supervised by the local G2s, although the most sensitive cases were controlled by the Director of Intelligence within the War Department.

Between 1946 and 1950, the CIC Center wrestled with the central problem of sustaining a well-trained force of sufficient numbers. To obtain the nearly 6,000 personnel required for its worldwide operations, the CIC was forced to make a number of adjustments in its policies.

During World War II, the Army, from time-to-time, reassigned experienced agents to non-CIC duties despite regulations to the contrary. Such losses were relatively small in number, but given the extraordinary needs at the time, the Chief, CIC, felt compelled to request MG Edward Witsell, The Adjutant General, to send a letter to all commands informing them of the War Department's problem in procuring qualified personnel and reminding them of the existing policy that prohibited nonapproved transfers. The policy of rotating personnel from overseas to state-side assignment was also relooked on an individual-by-individual basis. For example, retention of agents with the requisite language skills overseas where they were badly in demand was preferable to reassigning them stateside to routine duties.

Just as serious as acquiring numbers was CIC's struggle to obtain quality personnel. The termination of the draft eliminated the reservoir of skilled and highly-educated personnel with whom the wartime Counter Intelligence Corps had become identified. In World War II, two-thirds of all enlisted agents had been college graduates, and half of these had a law or related degree. Now, overseas commanders began reporting that only 10 percent of Counter Intelligence Corps School-trained personnel possessed a college education. A survey of a 1949 class of officers revealed that the majority were rated as having met only minimal standards. Noncommissioned officers arriving at the Center were of such low quality that pre-tests were reinstated and deficient personnel ordered to appear before waiver boards. Eventually, all CIC School candidates were required to come before an evaluation board upon their arrival at the center, and those meeting



*The CIC School settled into Fort Holabird. Note the school symbol on the sign. (INSCOM)*

minimum qualifications were considered on probation. The CIC leadership continued to suggest to the Army that creating a branch for military intelligence personnel was the ultimate solution, but to no avail.

Other decisions and policies affected the makeup of the corps. In 1947, the Air Force became a separate service from the Army, which meant the reassignment of detachments and loss of Air Force officers at the center and school. In March 1950, CIC decided it was necessary to adopt, for security's sake, a policy that prohibited agents from marrying foreign nationals. After 1 June, only the Chief, CIC, could waive the marriage prohibition and permit retention in the corps. This prohibition caused the loss of still more highly qualified individuals, many of whom possessed much needed language skills. An exception was made for those who were already married. They could remain, but could not be stationed in their spouse's native country.

The need for qualified personnel led the CIC to increase the proportion of officers in the force, authorize the recruitment of warrant officers, and admit four members of the Women's Army Corps (WAC) to the CIC School in 1946. One of them was Ann Bray, whom her fellow agents would come to call "The First Lady of CIC" for her lifetime devotion to the corps. A former high school teacher and newspaper reporter from Indiana, Bray was herself a veteran of World War II. One agent who was on assignment with Major Bray in Washington, DC argued that diversity in the corps was actually essential for effective operations. For instance, during a stakeout,

the presence of both male and female agents in a car was apt to raise less suspicion on the part of anyone observing the scene. In 1947, 11 more WAC students were added. Two years later a WAC detachment was assigned to the center to assist with administrative duties, and an all-WAC unit, the 600<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, was activated at Fort Lee, Virginia and made responsible for security of the WAC School as well as the local installation.

By 1949 the CIC consisted of 1,125 Reserve officers and 100 Regular Army officers, 452 warrant officers, and 1,690 enlisted men and had a procurement goal of 1,100 men a year. More importantly, the corps was experiencing a re-enlistment rate of 65 percent. These kinds of positive numbers allowed the CIC to reinstate its high standards and eliminate qualification waivers for enlisted men and to curtail them for officers. The crisis years when CIC would take whoever was available had for now come to an end.

### Professionalization

The school began to take on the trappings of a professional institution. It even acquired its own distinc-

tive unit insignia for wear by staff and students and a motto, "Custos Fidelitatis—Guardians of Loyalty." The insignia depicted a crouching sphinx representing wisdom and discreet silence and which, since the 1920s, had served as the symbol of military intelligence. Between its forepaws, the sphinx held a lamp demonstrating the school's mission to instill knowledge.

The school also made changes of substance. During the late 1940s, the school diversified, offering the basic 12-week investigative course (at a cost of \$963 per person); an 8-week language and area specialization class (\$280); a 2-week administrative training class (\$170); and a 4-week technical training class (\$240) in such subjects as photography, "defense against methods of entry" (DAME), and polygraph. School administrators initiated refresher and extension courses as well as a research library. The coming of the Cold War furnished impetus for studying the new adversary and his methods. In 1948, a 10-hour block of instruction on communism was added to the basic investigative course to emphasize Russian language and Soviet area studies. Finally, the arrival of civilian instructors and creation of a curriculum in technical



*First home of the 116<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment at 415 22<sup>nd</sup> Street, NW, Washington, DC, the one-time Briggs Schoolhouse. (AHEC)*



*A soldier stands guard at the Pentagon. In the 1940s, the 118<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment had responsibility for protecting the building's secrets. (NARA)*

instruction for military attachés and State Department employees were added indicators of the school's growing prestige.

In 1947, the Army established a CIC Board at Fort Holabird for the purpose of developing special investigative equipment and techniques. Listening devices, a 75-exposure wrist camera, a telephone dial click counter, and visual surveillance glasses were among some of the early items procured.

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence established a clearing house or central file of counterintelligence investigations—a long-time goal. The central index system would allow cross referencing by personality, organization, etc. In 1949, the CIC in Europe sent a

microfilmed copy of its files to Fort Holabird for safe keeping. Building upon this, the CIC then asked all overseas commands to do the same. After October 1950, a carbon copy of all CIC operational reports was also forwarded, and finally, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence would formally direct the transfer of all counterintelligence personality files from throughout CONUS to a central index at Fort Holabird.

### **Army Area Commands**

The bulk of the work in CONUS was performed by Counter Intelligence Corps detachments in support of each of the six Army Area Commands that replaced the former Service Commands. Activated in 1946, the detachments carried out necessary background investigations required for the Cold War military-civilian force and provided the traditional range of counter-intelligence support to the various armies and subordinate units. Routine background checks and loyalty investigations to screen for communists and other groups considered to be

threats to national security constituted the bulk of the workload. Security surveys, safeguarding of military information, and the investigation of possible subversive activities were equally important duties.

Although sharing a similar mission and organization consisting of field offices and smaller resident offices scattered throughout the six Army areas, each detachment, as in World War II, had its own set of unique challenges. The 115<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, for example, conducted a mission over a large geographical area of eight states stretching from Washington to Arizona. Headquartered at the Presidio of San Francisco, the 115<sup>th</sup> possessed an initial strength of 20 officers, 12 warrant officers, and 28 enlisted men. The 108<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, which was based out of New York City and was respon-

sible for the First Army and New England area, had just the opposite problem: 170 personnel to cover a population of 27 million. Naturally, the workload of the detachments varied greatly. The 111<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment in the southeastern States was average, completing just over 8,000 cases, or 190 per man in 1949. However, it still had nearly 3,800 cases to be closed. By 1950, all detachments were beginning to make real inroads toward doing away with their backlogs; increased manning coupled with assistance from nearby combat CIC elements made the difference.

The 116<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment performed similar responsibilities for the Military District of Washington surrounding the Nation's capital. The 116th was located in temporary buildings constructed during the war and situated adjacent to Fort McNair. Being in Washington, DC, the 116<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment surpassed other CONUS detachments in the number of investigations conducted. Of the 16,000 cases processed in 1949, 11,800 were checks performed for other detachments. To meet their quotas, members of the detachment often worked nights and Saturdays and depended upon the temporary loan of civilian employees from the Office, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

Elsewhere CIC planners established a number of detachments to carry out one-of-a-kind missions. These included the 70-person 118<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, activated at Fort Holabird in 1946, but with duty station at the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia. For the next 6 years, it conducted the Pentagon's counterintelligence mission in direct support of the Army staff. Members of the 118<sup>th</sup>

often handled sensitive cases and interfaced with the highest levels of command within the War Department.

In 1947, the enactment of the Atomic Energy Commission Act resulted in the formation of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP) to carry on the military functions of the Manhattan Project. Subsequently, 15 CIC agents were assigned to furnish security support to the new organization. As AFSWP activities increased, the existing arrangements proved unsatisfactory, causing the Joint Chiefs of Staff to direct the Army to furnish a dedicated security capability. On 26 February 1951, the 901<sup>st</sup> CIC Detachment was activated at Albuquerque, New Mexico, where it was assigned to the Commanding General, Sandia Base. With the exception of creating a field office in the Washington, DC, area, the use of a lone detachment to provide security support for the atomic program remained virtually unchanged for the next 25 years.

## OCCUPATION OF EUROPE

What would follow in the aftermath of Victory in Europe had been the subject of Army intelligence planners since the fall of 1944. High on their agenda was the handling of emerging security issues. The 418<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, serving the headquarters of the 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group, was given responsibility for planning a CIC organization that would manage counterintelligence operations post VE Day. Finding the necessary resources was a first priority. Interrogation, order of battle, and interpreter personnel were shifted from combat intelli-



I.G. Farben Building (in background) served as headquarters to Army intelligence in Europe and early home to the 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment. Here, agents are shown returning from an operation. (NARA)



*Not possessing the correct documentation, two youths were picked up in a raid. (NARA)*

gence duties to support the counterintelligence mission. Simultaneously, personnel from CIC detachments in support of combat divisions were transferred temporarily into the 418<sup>th</sup> Detachment.

On 10 May 1945, the 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment was established in place of the 418<sup>th</sup> at Wiesbaden, Germany. In turn, the personnel from 55 CIC divisional detachments were stood up as subordinate teams of the 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, giving it an actual strength of 323 officers and 1,100 agents. Although on paper all personnel of combat components were reassigned to the 970<sup>th</sup>, small teams continued in support of divisions and corps until parent commands redeployed at which time the remaining counterintelligence resources became a permanent part of the 970<sup>th</sup>. Lieutenant Colonel Norman J. Hearn served as the first commander of the 970<sup>th</sup> Detachment. In July, he oversaw the relocation of his command to Frankfurt, eventually finding a home in the city's largest office building—the I.G. Farben Building, former home to a chemical company.

Major Anthony Lobb, Commander, 303<sup>d</sup> CIC Detachment, described counterintelligence's greatest challenge at the beginning of the post-war period: "...many 'investigating' agencies running around Germany, one delving into the other's case, each doing a part of a case, and leaving it half done. The most important thing facing CIC is coordination at the top." Apart from the 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, CIC personnel were assigned to the Seventh Army (Western Military District), Third Army (Eastern Military District), combat divisions, and the Bremen Enclave. To bring some sort of order, the 970<sup>th</sup> organized regional headquarters to correspond with former corps areas. For example, the Third Army area of operations (Eastern Military District) had regional offices in Munich, Bamberg, and Regensburg. These offices were given responsibility for coordinating the sub-regions within their respective areas. Each of the sub-regions had one to four teams, often referred to as "slash" teams since their numerical designators were 970 followed by a "/" and a team number, i.e., 970/88. However, movement of tactical units within the regions created an on-going coordination problem even though the duties of their organic

counterintelligence elements were supposedly separate and limited to the security of troops and the local installation. Despite the confusion, by November 1945, the CIC had teams functioning in every mid-size city, at border control points, and at various headquarters and military installations.

### Occupational Duties

During the first 6 months of occupation duty, CIC personnel spent most of their time conducting wholesale roundups and interrogating individuals on various "wanted" lists. For example, TALLY HO was the first US zone-wide security search and seizure operation. The Seventh Army alone contributed some 160,000 troops in the massive checking of credentials and seizing of contraband during the last week of July. The operation apprehended more than 85,000 individuals, some for travel violations and others for posing a possible security risk, and seized over 300,000 contraband items, including anti-tank weapons.

In Operation CHOO CHOO, the Sub-Regional Office in Bamberg ran a smaller but very effective operation in which entire trains were stopped. The passengers disembarked to be screened by agents who also searched the train for contraband. Undercover agents circulated among the passengers to listen and watch their reaction to the search. Disgruntled individuals tended to reveal information withheld from the screeners. Elsewhere the CIC monitored fishing boats and their crews who worked out of the Bremerhaven harbor. One anticipated benefit of all these types of operations was to set into motion a grapevine effect—spreading the word that all persons were within the reach of the CIC.

Counterintelligence agents found a very diverse group of individuals on their wanted lists. For example, the 29<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment apprehended the following: "a physician and nerve specialist who was believed to have been responsible for the extermination of patients in an asylum; a former member of the embassy in Rome who was considered a 'fanatical Nazi'; a school teacher and organist who had been a party group leader; the chief cook for IG Farben Works who had been denounced as a



*The CIC rounded up thousands of Nazis. Here, Germany's leaders faced justice at the Nuremberg trials. (NARA)*



*The presence of thousands of displaced persons posed a major problem for Army counterintelligence. (NARA)*

brutal guard for the SS; . . . and a butcher who had beaten a captured airman.” By June, the members of the 29<sup>th</sup> had arrested 175 of these types of individuals.

One of those high on CIC’s list of most wanted was Ernst Kaltenbrunner, appointed Chief of the Gestapo and dubbed the “The Hangman.” Following the interrogation of Kaltenbrunner’s wife, Robert E. Matteson of the 80<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment discovered that a cabin in the Teton Gebirge Range of the Austrian Alps was the likely hiding place. Donning traditional Austrian clothes so as not to arouse suspicion, Agent Matteson’s team approached the site during semi-darkness and captured Kaltenbrunner and his three companions without resistance. But not all individuals being sought were guilty of war crimes. Dr. Werner von Braun and six other research scientists in Germany’s rocket program crossed the Alps into Austria where they surrendered to Agent Charles Stewart.

The functions of the 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment varied during the early months of the occupation. For example, the Army used its agents to determine the loyalty of US

citizens working for the Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and to screen German war brides desiring American visas. Under Operation GRAB BAG, the CIC participated in the search of the so-called “Hungarian Navy,” 375 vessels of various sizes anchored in the Danube River between Passau and Deggendorf. Several hundred members of the Hungarian Navy and their families who had fled the Black Sea inhabited the mothballed fleet. The CIC was specifically interested in shutting down possible escape routes being used by former SS members. In the process, the operation yielded battlefield weapons and resulted in the apprehension of a counterfeit ring.

In the midst of all of these activities, the denazification program, or Operation LIFE BUOY, remained the CIC’s primary focus. During a typical week in July 1945, more than 120,000 people were questioned and 6,500 arrests took place. Screening citizens for civil service actually met with greater success than anticipated; only a third were disapproved. In determining candidates for dismissal, individuals who had a party membership date after 1 May 1937 were scrutinized but faced removal only if CIC

Captain Edward W. Lattner, a Bavarian by birth, donned civilian clothes and posed as an admirer of Hitler. Subsequently, he won the confidence of a local group plotting sabotage. He offered to transport the leaders, including two former German generals, in an American jeep he had stolen so that the conspirators could find a suitable location to hide weapons. Instead he used the commandeered vehicle to drive the plotters through the gates of the Munich headquarters of the CIC. All of the passengers were eventually convicted, largely due to Lattner's testimony in open court.

investigators felt circumstances warranted it. When LIFE BUOY neared the goal of purging public officials, the CIC then turned its attention to businesses, the professions, and university faculties.

As a whole, the German population proved surprisingly docile and cooperative; this, along with the CIC's use of a firm hand, was a major factor in the overall success of the program. To their amusement, CIC offices frequently received mail addressed to the "American Gestapo." However, with the coming winter months, the acute economic shortages and the strain of the denazification program caused cracks in new post-war relationships. Many Germans were particularly against the denazification of all commercial enterprises, fearful that the new law would wreak havoc on the already frail economy. The general population also failed to see the reasoning behind the need to replace competent, former Nazi officials at the local level.

Tensions manifested themselves during incidents involving troop fraternization, confrontations between German youth and American soldiers, pilfering, and increased black market activities. On occasion, they escalated to serious acts of sabotage; communications lines being a favorite target. A more serious case involved 40 former Nazis under the control of a notorious Gestapo officer who had gone undercover as a baker in Cologne. Fortunately, surveillance by CIC agents exposed their plot to dynamite US installations. On a larger scale, undercover efforts by counterintelligence agents led to a coordinated surprise raid on 300 towns and villages on the night of 1 April 1946. The net result was the arrest of 1,000 members of an underground organization bent on perpetuating National Socialist ideals through certain German political leaders.

Up until 1948, the Counter Intelligence Corps in Germany tried to limit its involvement in displaced

persons. One area that did concern the CIC was the large-scale black marketing within the displaced persons camps. Unfortunately, sweeps of the camps seldom netted the ringleaders. Another exception to policy was the Jews. Plans called for the creation of a homeland for the Jews in Palestine, but before a formal state of Israel existed, an underground government issued orders to peoples still in displaced persons camps in Germany. Under Operation RUMMAGE, the CIC used informants to learn about the route being used to smuggle Jews to Italy aboard unseaworthy freighters eventually bound for Palestine, and about attempts to purchase weapons in Germany and smuggle these arms to the mid-East. Army counterintelligence, for the most part, limited its activities to monitoring the evolving situation.

In 1948, CIC's role regarding displaced persons significantly changed when the US Congress voted to open the country's doors to a given number of them. Being the only agency with the necessary expertise and resources meant that the CIC would become heavily involved in determining whether or not individuals and families qualified for immigration. The sheer size of the case load (12,500 a month) placed a heavy burden on CIC's limited manpower.

## German Technology

The early effort by the War and Navy Departments to exploit German technology went by the name of Operation OVERCAST. Several hundred Germans with unique skills were brought to the US on a temporary basis to supposedly assist in the final phase of the war against Japan. Its *ad hoc* approach left much to be desired. Consequently, in October 1946, US authorities implemented a program under the title of MESA—later changed to PAPERCLIP—for the "denial and exploitation of scientists and technicians of the US Zone of Germany and Austria." The 970<sup>th</sup> played a key role. Its mission was to locate literally hundreds of individuals falling into those categories and to report the names of those contemplating immigration to the United States. Even those who were not desirable candidates for immigration were monitored because they often were targets of other nations, and in some cases their movements were restricted so they would not wind up in the Soviet Union. PAPERCLIP provided the United States with many leading professionals in such key research fields as rocket science and physics.

In a separate program, the State Department established in 1947 what became known as the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). Its ambitious goal was to roll back the Iron Curtain and liberate captive states through guerrilla warfare. This led to the entrance of former Nazis and other undesirables into the United States to undergo training to those ends. The book *America's Secret Army* reported that upon learning about the secret immigration



*Werner von Braun, who was Germany's leading rocket expert (arm in cast), and fellow scientists surrender to the CIC. (NARA)*

policy, a number of CIC agents in Germany registered their complaints with the Pentagon and Department of Justice.

### Restructuring

As the initial phase drew to a close, routine redeployments of soldiers back to the States quickly depleted the 970<sup>th</sup> of its trained personnel. Simultaneously, a survey in Europe revealed that 20 percent of the replacement personnel were unfit for their assignment. Thinking that discipline and firmer control was what was needed, Army leaders responded by ordering CIC agents and clerks alike to don uniforms and to rejoin the Army, unless civilian attire was absolutely essential. Despite these distractions, the 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment managed to achieve an operating force of 1,400 officers and men. In a 3-month period in 1948, the 970<sup>th</sup> conducted a total 24,000 investigations of all types by "the intelligent exercise of routine controls, the exhaustive searching of available documents, and the


vigorous exploitation of informants as well as a complete disregard for the conventional 40-hour week enjoyed by the bulk of the Army."

The 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment was divided into eight subordinate regions (Stuttgart (I), Frankfurt (II), Bad Nauheim (III), Munich (IV), Regensburg (V), Bamberg (VI), Berlin (VIII), and Bremen (IX).) This pattern remained in place until 1948 when the Counter Intelligence Corps in Europe went through a series of rapid changes. The first was the inactivation of the 970<sup>th</sup> in June 1948 and the organization of the 7970<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, which allowed for greater structural flexibility. The next year, the 7970<sup>th</sup> moved its headquarters from Frankfurt to Stuttgart.

Because the 7970<sup>th</sup> did not have a cellular structure, it soon became evident that the unit was not automatically receiving its share of personnel. What good was flexibility when there were no people? The 7970<sup>th</sup> was conse-



*The emergence of an active Communist Party in Occupied Germany confronted Army intelligence with a new challenge. (INSCOM)*



*A special military commission arraigned eight persons on charges of gathering information relative to military activities in the US Zone of Germany. (INSCOM)*

quently replaced with the 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, subdivided into twelve regions: Stuttgart (I), Heidelberg (II), Frankfurt (III), Munich (IV), Regensburg (V), Nuremberg (VI), Bayreuth (VII), Berlin (VIII), Bremen (IX), Bad Wildungen (X), Wurzburg (XI), and Augsburg (XII). Within each of these regions, investigative personnel were further broken down into Political, Counter Espionage, General Investigation, and Visa Screening teams.

### Communism

The greatest threat to a democratic, free Germany did not come from within. It came from the Soviet Union. Operation BINGO in July 1946 was a coordinated effort by the CIC to apprehend low-echelon agents. Tight security preceded the coordinated round-up of suspects. In total, 407 individuals were arrested. More importantly, follow-up interrogations confirmed US intelligence's suspicion that Soviet liaison officers were actively engaging in espionage within the US occupational zone, and if nothing else, Operation BINGO served notice that the Soviets couldn't flood the US zone with spies with impunity. During Operation LITHIA, a similar zone-wide round up was conducted; this time it rounded up a spy network

being run by one of the Soviet-satellite countries—Czechoslovakia.

The Soviets exploited their links to the small Communist Party in Germany (*Kommunistische Partei Deutschland* or KPD), which had disappeared during the Third Reich, only to reemerge in post-war Germany as one of the four political groups authorized to resume activity. Evidence gathered by the CIC revealed that the Soviets saw the KPD as a handy vehicle to disrupt the political process in West Germany. Subsequently, the Deputy Director of Intelligence, EUCOM (European Command), gave the Counter Intelligence Corps the green light to penetrate the KPD. In Operation SUNRISE, the CIC monitored the KPD's activities and used informants to infiltrate the party and its plans.

The KPD's primary role was as a tireless source of propaganda. Consequently, the KPD was also behind a concerted effort to foment demonstrations and encourage labor strikes, particularly during those winters in which the populace suffered from coal shortages. Individual pieces often bore propaganda messages such as "The Socialist Unity Party of Germany Wishes Coal for Everyone." German Communists also exploited various youth

groups and sponsored gatherings as a means to indoctrinate a future generation of German citizens on the benefits of life in a Communist state. Finally, the party routinely conducted classes to instruct followers on how to spread its gospel.

In turn, the CIC began an espionage effort of its own in 1948, monitoring the largest Soviet Army maneuver in East Germany by recruiting teams to gather intelligence independent of one another; thus their observations could be compared for accuracy. As the Cold War grew more confrontational, the Soviets blockaded Berlin, leading to tightened border control on all sides; consequently, Army counterintelligence began recruiting informants whose business dealings routinely took them across the various zones. One story picked up by the International Press told of Czechoslovakian officials denouncing the network of spies operating in their country under the direction of the American Counter Intelligence Corps; another carried the laughable claim that the CIC had dispatched a band of five assassins to kill Defense Minister General Ludvik Svoboda.

When the Iron Curtain descended over Eastern Europe, the Counter Intelligence Corps agents suddenly found themselves turning to former enemies to help combat new threats. One of these new recruits was Klaus Barbie, the former Gestapo Chief at Lyon in German-occupied France. Although a war criminal in hiding, Barbie offered a wealth of contacts that some in the CIC, against the advice of others, found hard to turn down. Barbie provided information on the German Communist party and what was

The arrest of General Reinhard Gehlen, the former head of Germany's Foreign Armies East, the intelligence organization on the Eastern Front, proved to be invaluable to the CIC. Gehlen had access to a huge number of files on the Soviet Union that would eventually prove invaluable in the forthcoming Cold War. Gehlen guided a CIC team to the Bavarian Alps where microfilm of documents had been buried in metal boxes. Eventually someone in the Army's intelligence chain of command realized the full significance of Gehlen's experience and contacts. One of Gehlen's first actions as a collaborator was to use his informants to help the CIC weed out Soviet agents from among the displaced persons. Gehlen himself would go on to become the architect of the Federal Republic of Germany's foreign intelligence organization.

transpiring in the nearby French zone in Germany and gave the CIC access to an enormous network of former German SS officers. Because of what he brought to the table, CIC handlers came to view Barbie as one of their most valuable assets. Ignoring Barbie's past seemed justified in light of the declining denazification program and the many former Nazis who were finding their way back into the professions.

In the meantime, the French were exerting pressure to have Barbie turned over so that he could be tried as a war criminal. However, CIC personnel were afraid that French intelligence had been penetrated by Communists and that their real intentions were to use Barbie to gain information on the corps and its informants. Consequently, CIC handlers aided Barbie and his family in gaining access to an underground railroad, called the "Ratline," run as an escape service for Croatian nationalists fleeing Yugoslavia. In the end, Barbie relocated to South America where for the next 33 years he would elude justice. His freedom ended when he was finally captured and forced to face justice in a French court. The whole episode would again shine the light on decisions made by the CIC personnel in the early years of the Cold War and would serve as a bitter reminder of the fine line walked by intelligence officers and how misplaced priorities could have far-reaching consequences.

## Austria

Because it was deemed to have been a reluctant member of the Axis Powers, Austria was looked upon as being more liberated than occupied. By agreement of the four powers, Austria was divided into separate zones of occupation. The United States, with headquarters first at Vienna and later at Salzburg, controlled the northwest segment of the country; France occupied the western portion with headquarters at Innsbruck; Great Britain maintained headquarters at Graz and controlled the southern zone; and the Soviets occupied the areas to the northeast, with headquarters at Vienna, the Austrian capital. Each of the Allies was responsible for a zone in Vienna and controlled a separate international zone on a rotational basis. As in Germany, there were rules and understandings on when and how counterintelligence personnel could cross between the French, British, and American Zones; restrictions remained in place that forbade journeying into the Soviet area of occupation without prior approval.

As authorities debated and negotiated on how and even if the United States would help occupy Austria, the CIC leadership in Rome busily set about planning for such an eventuality. To prepare CIC personnel for their new mission in Austria, officers and agents were sent to a school established by the British in Castellamare, Italy, overlooking the Bay of Naples. Here, for two weeks, they



*Members of the 430<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment stationed at Linz, Austria. (AHEC)*

learned the structure of the Nazi Party and related organizations in Austria along with the country's culture and geography. On 1 May 1945, a convoy of 15 jeeps carrying 25 CIC agents moved slowly through the Brenner Pass in the Italian Alps before crossing the border into Austria. By July, the contingent had progressed to Vienna where posted Soviet soldiers with machine guns greeted the American caravan as it moved through their sector on the way to the CIC's new offices on Roosevelt-platz. Here, they formally activated the 430<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment. Later, a third sub-detachment at Linz was added to those already in Salzburg and Vienna.

Despite the rapid turnover of personnel over the next few years, the 430<sup>th</sup> maintained an average of approximately 125 agents. The CIC helped to make up shortfalls by recruiting qualified soldiers from among the larger army contingent in Austria and contracting CIC veterans whose military obligation was up but who would consider staying on as civilian investigators.

Denazification met with even greater resistance in Austria than the CIC had found in Germany. Although the Counter Intelligence Corps agents were successful in apprehending a number of highly visible war criminals, they found throughout the US zone a reluctance to strictly enforce the denazification law. Almost all detainees insisted they had reluctantly signed questionnaires back in 1938 and 1939. In addition, the Austrian

reviewing commissions didn't take advantage of information they were provided, and in fact, themselves were frequent sources of security leaks. Austrian officials continued to argue that further arrests and trials of low ranking Nazis would only hamper the country's economy and overburden the court system. For example, in one geographical area 111 of 164 dentists faced removal.

One of the more notable cases involved the arrest of a notorious figure by the name of Johann Schanda. A minor figure in the Nazi Party, Schanda had acquired the reputation for dynamiting public buildings, beating Jews, and tossing persons out of upper-floor windows. Fortunately, one of Schanda's victims recognized him on the streets despite the fact that his appearance had been altered through plastic surgery and that he had assumed a false identity. Upon hearing the news, counterintelligence agents began around-the-clock surveillance of the house of Schanda's former mistress; the residence, however, lay in the Soviet Zone. To lure him back to the American side where he could be arrested, an undercover agent approached Schanda, and requested that he appear to testify in a black market case. Schanda fell for the line and proceeded to walk into the CIC headquarters where he was immediately placed under arrest.

Counterintelligence in post-war Austria quickly moved away from policing war criminals. Seventy-five percent of the 430<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment's workload dealt with displaced persons. Austria had become the temporary home for

The case began when the CIC was notified that someone was stealing trash from the wastebaskets of a military office. The suspect was easily identified—a Hungarian refugee, Kalman Gabris, who worked as a janitor. The next step was to determine the identity of Gabris' control officer. This was also quickly done. One fact that immediately became apparent was that neither Gabris nor his handler, a Major Gyorgy Csergo, could read English, and everything from menus to millinery bills were finding their way into the Soviet intelligence chain. Circumstances were such that the case had to be brought to a quick close. The Chief of CIC Operations decided to type the following message on a piece of paper stamped TOP SECRET: "Dear Major Gy.Cs., This is a greeting from your American friends in the Counterintelligence Corps. We have been watching your efforts with growing sympathy....We want to help you....Since most of the information you seem to want is available in the regular daily edition of *The Stars and Stripes*, we will enter a subscription for you if you agree to send over no more drunks, half-wits, or juvenile delinquents." The letter was then deposited into a trash can. Months later, word was received that Kalman Gabris had been thrown into a forced labor camp in Hungary. The last anyone saw of the major was his entering the intelligence headquarters in Budapest.

numerous ethnic groups. Many had been liberated from concentration camps where they suffered imprisonment because of racial, religious, or political reasons. Others had served as forced laborers in German camps and factories. The presence of the various ethnic diversities created added political tensions and on occasion led to riots. The sheer numbers of foreigners also complicated the security problem. The Soviets continually sent spies to ascertain disposition and strength of US military forces. Espionage agents easily blended with the various ethnic groups, and given the presence of mountainous and wooded areas, they could travel virtually undetected in and out of the country.

It became the CIC's job to screen displaced persons and return them to their homeland; however, because of persecution, lack of desire to return to now Communist states, and expectations of a better life elsewhere, many people simply did not want to go back to their place of birth. In 1948, with the changes in America's immigration policy, the CIC was given the additional task of screening displaced persons for entrance into the United States.

As in Germany, the Jews gave the CIC its greatest challenge. Because of their sufferings during World War II, the Jewish people emerged from the conflict intensely nationalistic. Many desired to migrate to Palestine, and a number of the leaders were already preparing for future paramilitary activities. The presence of this militant element created a number of security problems in the Bad Gastein and the Bindermichi displaced persons camps in Upper Austria. To make matters worse, Communist agitators encouraged anti-Semitic and anti-foreigner

demonstrations on the part of local Austrians. By 1949, much of the displaced persons problem was solved by the return of persons to their homelands, the immigration of many peoples to the United States, and the departure of the Jews for Palestine.

Besides routine occupational duties, the Counter Intelligence Corps in Austria faced a major security challenge from the Soviet Union and local Communists. Kidnapping became routine, beginning as early as 1946. In fact, the Soviets even hired black marketers (the Benno Blum gang) to assist in the work. Typical of those abducted were former residents of Soviet satellite countries. One incident involved a woman who was literally carried from her apartment rolled in a rug. Another concerned a Hungarian repatriation commissioner who disappeared when offered a ride in another official's automobile. Then there were instances involving local scientists and other professionals. Even university students were not safe. When CIC agents uncovered a Soviet plot to kidnap an Austrian citizen who was a key counter-espionage source for the Americans, they set a trap that led to the apprehension of members of the Soviet Repatriation Mission disguised in the uniforms of US Military Police. In another case, undercover Soviet Army officers in disguise were caught doctoring cherry brandy for the purpose of drugging and removing a US informant from the St. Valentine Hotel.

Overtime, the general populous became outraged at the Soviet employment of such tactics, causing the number of episodes to diminish, but the threat of abductions never completely disappeared. In 1948, for instance, a CIC agent



*Line crossers along the border proved a primary source of information on conditions behind the Iron Curtain. (INSCOM)*

himself became a victim, and 2 weeks later, a civilian employee assigned to military intelligence. Both underwent interrogations and physical manhandling before being released. However, it was not just a one-way street. The Counter Intelligence Corps found many Soviet soldiers and airmen who regularly defected on their own to the American Zone to be excellent sources of information.

### **Italy**

Counterintelligence activities continued after the unconditional surrender of the German armies in Italy. Task forces remained active as late as June 1945 in arresting senior enemy intelligence personnel and policing up documents of interest. The IV Corps CIC agents uncovered a large stay-behind sabotage network that operated under the guise of a cosmetics distribution firm, *Gibim Prodotti*—a case broken through a series of follow-up investigations. Elsewhere, extensive legwork on the part of CIC agents led to the arrest of 10 more would-be saboteurs along with numerous war criminals—more examples of the professionalism and efficiency that characterized the corps at the war's end.

The Territory of Trieste, the area on the west side of the Istrian Peninsula, surrounded the city of Trieste and was divided into two zones: one controlled by the Americans and British and the second by the Yugoslavs. Trieste became an early contest in the Cold War because the territory served as a vital lifeline to the Mediterranean both for Allied forces in Austria and for Yugoslavia and the Soviets. The 428<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment handled the Army's counterintelligence duties until replaced in 1947 by the 17<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment. As the Cold War heated up, so did the numerous instances of spying, principally involving the Yugoslavs. In Trieste, the CIC investigated commercial firms and monitored consulates, both known for providing cover for espionage activities in the region.

As was the case in Austria, espionage soon became a two-way street. To exploit persons coming from the other side, the CIC and the British Field Security Service established a joint interrogation center to screen displaced persons, line crossers, and smugglers—many originating in Austria. Using these sources, CIC agents identified possible intelligence sources and obtained order-of-battle data, but the intense rivalry between the Allied intelligence agencies undermined the effectiveness of the overall effort. Intelligence officers from both sides often

debriefed apprehended persons before reaching the interrogation center. British and American intelligence agencies each launched long- and short-range line crossers into Yugoslavia for the purpose of collecting human intelligence and Soviet order-of-battle information. But by 1948, the need for greater cooperation forced the G2, Trieste US Troops (TRUST) to be integrated with British Intelligence.

Because the central concern of TRUST was maintaining the status quo, the CIC monitored political activities, demonstrations and riots, and any incident involving US servicemen that might disturb the peace. As an exception to established practices, the Counter Intelligence Corps uncharacteristically involved itself in criminal matters and helped to solve a number of highly visible cases, one involving a triple murder. Black marketing and instances of kidnapping became a growing concern to the corps. While conducting port security, CIC agents discovered a ring smuggling people to the United States in return for money.

## POST-WAR PACIFIC

When Imperial Japan surrendered on 14 August 1945, the Counter Intelligence Corps had 4 regional and 66 area

In his book, *Special Agent in the Pacific, WWII*, William B. Simpson described what it was like to be among the first to arrive in post-war Japan: "Being in Tokyo during the first days of occupation was a strange experience. The Japanese stared as we went about the city. Often we would be the first American or Allied troops to be seen, or the first to speak to somebody, or the first Caucasians seen by the war-time generation. Japanese civil police, augmented by Japanese Military Police, swarmed the city to prevent incidents arising from actions of the Japanese. Japanese traffic police held back traffic in all directions to allow us to pass, even if we were far from the intersection when first seen."

detachments operating in the Philippines and Okinawa, plus another 36 assigned to combat units. In the brief window of time between the surrender and actual occupation of Japan's home islands, the 441<sup>st</sup> CIC Detachment,



The CIC was located in the former Kempei Tai headquarters building in Tokyo; the facilities were renamed Norton Hall in honor of CPT John H. Norton, killed on Okinawa. (INSCOM)



A CIC agent shows his badge to a sentry. Nisei continued to play an important role in the Occupation of Japan. (NARA)

which controlled all CIC elements in theater, busied itself preparing for future duties. While counterintelligence units worked to finish their investigations in Okinawa and the Philippines, personnel who could be spared were sent to Manila to attend a brief orientation class on what awaited them in Japan. At the same time, an additional 32 *Nisei* soldiers arrived from the States to receive instructions in counterintelligence work. They would provide much needed language skills for the work that lay ahead.

In October 1945, General Douglas MacArthur, who had been named the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers (SCAP), established a special staff section, the Civil Intelligence Section (CIS), and placed BG Elliot R. Thorpe at its head. The CIS advised MacArthur on policies relating to “public safety agencies in Japan and Korea and to conduct such investigations relating to compliance with orders and instructions to the Japanese government as may be directed.” To fulfill his mission, the Chief, CIS, exercised oversight of the 441<sup>st</sup> CIC Detachment, a Civil Censor Detachment, and the Public Safety Division.

Six months later, counterintelligence and intelligence would be brought directly under the G2—Major General Charles A. Willoughby. This change occurred because of growing tensions between the General Staff and the Civil Intelligence Section; the latter advocated a greater purge at the lower levels of government and society, but the former believed this would only further harm an already fragile economy.

The 308<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment assigned to the Eighth Army and the 306<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment in support of the Sixth was the first of their kind to arrive in Japan and proceeded to supervise the movement of tactical CIC units throughout the islands. Altogether, 22 detachments would be under the overall administrative control of the 441<sup>st</sup> CIC Detachment, commanded by LTC Dennis R. Galloway, but as the 441<sup>st</sup> Detachment became more established, it systematically assumed operational control of all resources. Those once organic to tactical commands eventually transitioned into one of the 13 Area units (1 in Kyushu, 1 in Hokkaido, and 11 in Honshu) or as one of the 9 Metropolitan units: Tokyo, Yokohama, Hakodate, Kobe, Shimonoseki, Fukuoka, Yawata, Nagoya, and Sapporo. By 1947, this organization had further dissolved into a handful of regions, leaving CIC personnel posted at 61 sites across the country.

The CIC in Japan initially consisted of 181 officers, 22 warrant officers, and 726 enlisted men. To maintain its fill, the 441<sup>st</sup> resorted to recruiting Army personnel into the corps from among those already in theater. Many on-hand service men were “better qualified” than those being received from CONUS, but this proved only a temporary solution. By late 1947, the War Department ordered the practice to cease.



Japanese Premier Hideki Tojo (center) stands trial for war crimes. CIC agents were responsible for his arrest. (NARA)



*Agents arrest the head of the Osaka Japanese Thought Police. (INSCOM)*

The CIC School, which had begun in Melbourne, Australia, and had island-hopped its way to Japan, was reestablished at Norton Hall in Tokyo where it offered orientation classes to new arrivals.

Most agents lacked adequate language skills. At first, the CIC used members of the Allied Translator and Interpreter Service on a loan basis to help fill the gap. Although security regulations prohibited the assignment of *Nisei* on a permanent basis, the 319<sup>th</sup> MI Battalion was activated as a means of circumventing the exclusion of Japanese-Americans. The 319<sup>th</sup> Battalion was a "paper organization" filled with 80 officers and 239 enlisted *Nisei* who were given special counterintelligence credentials by the Far East Command.

### Serving in the Land of the Rising Sun

On 11 September, the 441<sup>st</sup> CIC Detachment received a radiogram from General MacArthur's headquarters listing individuals to be arrested and imprisoned for war crimes. The list was considerably shorter than in Europe. The number one name was General Hideki Tojo, former Prime Minister and Chief of the Imperial General Staff, who was considered most responsible for Japan's acts of aggression. A team of four led by MAJ Paul Krause of the 81<sup>st</sup> Metropolitan CIC Detachment proceeded to Tojo's private residence in Tokyo. At the door, the CIC party talked to Tojo's secretary before the general himself appeared at the window. After having been informed of his pending arrest, Tojo eventually agreed to accompany Major Krause;

however, he no more than disappeared from sight when a shot was heard from inside the house. Breaking down the door, the CIC contingent found Tojo slumped in a chair bleeding from a self-inflicted wound. Major Krause quickly arranged for medical treatment to be administered. General Tojo survived only to face trial and execution for his war crimes. Another highly publicized case involved the apprehension of COL Josef Albert Meisinger, German Attaché and so-called "Butcher of Warsaw."

Unlike European countries, the Japanese Government took the lead in purging itself and the rest of Japanese society of undesirable militarists and ultranationalists, subject to the approval of the Supreme Commander Allied Power. Taskings came in the form of SCAPINS, or Supreme Commander Allied Power Instructions; SCAPINS 548 and 550, were often

referred to as the "Purge Directives." Their purpose was to remove the ultra-nationalists and militarists from positions of power. Surprisingly the *Kempei Tai* or Imperial Japan's security police quickly dissolved on its



*General Charles A. Willoughby, G2 of the Far East Command, oversaw the Civil Intelligence Section, which included members of the CIC. (NARA)*

own. Many of its leadership committed suicide, others went into hiding, and still others turned informants. The CIC were able to successfully plant sources in positions that furnished access to matters of interest to military authorities. Captain Benjamin T. Obata recalled routinely meeting his clandestine contact in an out of the way teahouse. In the Japanese culture, "gifts" were often exchanged for information in lieu of monies, especially cases involving liaison with police officers who passed on information concerning their investigations of suspected communists.

Elsewhere, the CIC labored to piece together the history and post-war activities of the *Kokuryu Kai* or Black Dragon Society, the most powerful of the Japanese patriot organizations. More serious was CIC's exposure of a 300-man Current Events Club composed of former soldiers and bent on harassing occupational troops and terrorizing local community leaders. The CIC also became quite successful in locating treasures of war hidden by Japanese leaders. In one instance, 11 crates of platinum were found hidden in a chicken coop, some 160 miles from Tokyo. When further questioned by CIC agents, the custodian of the cache brought forth a bucket filled with diamonds.

Besides the traditional security function of preventing espionage and sabotage, the 441<sup>st</sup> was assigned responsibility for "suppression of organizations, individuals, and movements whose existence and continued activities are

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***"A good 75 percent of the trouble we have gotten into in the past has been because we were trespassing on some other agency's territory....Where the other agency was not aware of this, bad feeling resulted. When they were aware of it and were willing for us to go ahead, it was usually for one or two reasons: (a) the case was too hot for them to handle and they were willing for us to stick our neck out, or (b) the job was impossible to accomplish and they were willing for us to take the blame for failure, rather than assume it themselves."***

**LTC Wayne E. Homan, Commander, 441<sup>st</sup> CIC Detachment (Japan)**

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considered an impediment to the lasting peaceful reconstruction of Japan." In the course of carrying out this assignment, the CIC became known as "Eyes and Ears of the Occupation" by issuing so-called "spot reports"—news flashes on subjects of current interest to occupation authorities or on activities that might present problems in the future. It was natural that such a role be given the CIC. Although small in size, it was the most widely dispersed of all the US agencies and possessed access to informant nets.

In 1949, the number of spot reports reached nearly 5,000. Labor issues, foreign activity, and political matters were the most common categories. On one occasion, General Willoughby desired coverage on a strike taking place only 10 miles from Tokyo, but the communication workers in sympathy with the protest shut down the telephone lines. The CIC assembled a relay system of five jeeps with radios to provide up-to-the minute coverage. Besides spot reports there was the time-consuming activity of preparing weekly summary reports, covering such trivial subjects as the number of school books or feet of hoses at the fire station in each community.

Over time, the Counter Intelligence Corps found itself being assigned cases that other agencies couldn't handle or didn't want because the subject matter was too politically sensitive. Subsequently, the G2 created a guide to differentiate between which assignments fell under the 441<sup>st</sup> and which belonged to the Military Police, Military Government, Civil Intelligence, Education, etc. Later, the G2 organized the Counter Intelligence Division as an added buffer between the 441<sup>st</sup> CIC Detachment and the CIS.

### **Communist Threat**

In 1947, the Counter Intelligence Corps began to refocus its energies and resources to monitoring the Japanese Communist Party (JCP)—the greatest single threat against security and stability. The Civil Intelligence Section described the JCP as an ongoing "menace to all duly constituted democratic authority [as a result] of its varied and continued attempts to nullify, discredit and embarrass the program of democratization." Although relatively small in size, the JCP was able to tap into feelings of discontent on the part of various economic, ethnic, and political groups. In the early post-war period, the majority of the people existed in marginal poverty. To them, the JCP presented itself as the champion of the downtrodden. Communists also successfully infiltrated labor unions and used them as a means of public protest.

The Counter Intelligence Corps' main rationale for directing a disproportionate amount of attention at the JCP was its strong anti-American stance. This concern was validated in 1948 when the CIC acquired the text of a



*A CIC mobile raiding party offloads its jeep from a C-47 transport plane at Atsugi Airport. (NARA)*

Moscow directive to JCP ordering the fostering of conflicts and strikes and distribution of counterfeit money. Just as important was the use of JCP as a conduit for espionage. Here, the Counter Intelligence Corps specifically focused on the Urban People's Department, created by the JCP to collect information concerning the Allied Occupation Forces in Japan.

An important part of CIC's monitoring the Communist threat was screening Japanese prisoners of war who were repatriated from areas under Soviet occupation. During interviews, the CIC determined the majority of returnees had been subjected to the most intense program of indoctrination then known. In one survey, 11 were found to have joined the local Communist Party, 16 others were sympathetic to the cause, but the remaining 74 identified themselves as being very anti-Communist. Also hidden among the group were Soviet spies and collaborators. During what was known as Project SWITCH, CIC personnel interviewed as many returnees as possible in an effort to identify who were Soviet agents and to obtain other bits of general intelligence. Given their sheer numbers, reaching over 20,000 a month, these returning soldiers made a serious impact.

By 1949, the Communists carried 10 percent of the vote in national elections. But the same year witnessed the beginning of a turn around for Japan's economy, just in time for most repatriated soldiers to find their homeland

not in the dismal condition described by their former captors. For example, the White Clan Society was a national organization of veterans who became dedicated anti-Communists. The arrival of these anti-Communists helped to counter the JCP propaganda, provided useful information on individuals belonging to the JCP, and furnished American intelligence with insights as to Soviet indoctrination techniques.

The Korean nationals residing in Japan also posed a major problem. A large portion was disgruntled with the current state of affairs, making them susceptible to communism, civil disturbances, and crime. A report from First CIC Region contained the following sweeping judgment: "Much of the crime in Japan has been attributed to Koreans." The Koreans in Japan also mirrored the political turmoil taking place on the Korean Peninsula. The leaders of the Japanese Communist Party were quick to exploit the discontent of Korean nationals and enlisted them for liaison trips to North Korea. In one instance, the Communists took advantage of a protest involving 5,000 Koreans in Osaka. What began as a march soon turned into a riot. Numerous red banners and signs were in prominent display and the Osaka Prefecture building was occupied by the rioters.

To counter the Soviet threat, a small element of the 441<sup>st</sup> CIC Detachment was designated as "Hongo House Group" (later to be named the "Zed Section") and placed



*Counter Intelligence Corps agents escort Filipino collaborators back to their home islands to stand trial. (NARA)*

under the direct control of MG Willoughby, G2. At the head of this team was a colorful and, at times, controversial counterintelligence veteran—MAJ Jack Canon. Zed focused on the Soviet diplomatic mission and the colony of Soviet nationals in Japan. Because most of the Soviets resided in the Tokyo-Kanagawa District, there arose, from time-to-time, tension between the Zed members and local CIC investigators. In time, Zed became responsible for all sensitive investigations that were of special interest to General Willoughby.

### The Philippines and Okinawa

Following the formal surrender of Japan, the 441<sup>st</sup> CIC Detachment and the majority of the units transferred to the Japanese home islands. This left the First CIC Region of the 441<sup>st</sup> CIC Detachment behind to finish the work in the Philippines. On 27 August 1945, the war-time activities of the CIC in the Philippines were brought to an end; all records on wartime collaborators were turned over to the Department of Justice of the Philippine Government. Later, Sergeant Richard Sakakida, the former stay-behind

agent in the Philippines, would return to the islands to serve as an important witness at upcoming war trials.

In early 1946, the US Army Western Pacific (WESPAC) was established. In turn, the 1135<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment was activated in the Philippines to assume the mission of the First CIC Region. A major focus of the 1135<sup>th</sup> remained the various local political entities and their attempt to undermine the morale of American troops. On one occasion, instigators encouraged US soldiers to stage a mass demonstration in Manila demanding demobilization. The 1135<sup>th</sup> Detachment's excellent coverage of evolving political events quickly earned the nickname of the "listening post of WESPAC." The CIC in Philippines were also drawn into monitoring the Philippine Army's campaign against *Hukbalahap* guerrillas as well as various Communist-front organizations. The effectiveness of the 1135<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment was eventually undermined by its dwindling size. By 1947, it had shrunk to only 10 officers, 2 warrant officers, and 15 enlisted—close to the CIC's pre-war strength on the islands.

Counterintelligence changes in the Philippines also impacted CIC's mission on the Ryukyus Islands, where a field office of the 1135<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment replaced the Fifth CIC Region of the 441<sup>st</sup> CIC Detachment. Based on Okinawa, the largest of the islands, the field office's mission differed from its parent unit. Rather than serve as a news organization, it focused on traditional espionage, sabotage, and security investigations related to the military. Because of the language barrier, the field office was especially dependent upon informants. The agents also checked lists of passengers and crews of incoming ships against names on prepared black lists. Troublesome issues included the growing presence of Communist agitators and the low morale of US servicemen, factors that caused an increase in criminal acts against the local population. By December 1947, the field office was replaced by the 526<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment consisting of only four officers, four warrants, and nine enlisted men.

### Korea

At the cessation of World War II, Korea was divided into two occupational zones along the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel with the United States in the south and the Soviets in the north. With the end of Japanese rule, Korea was a political vacuum, and the population lacked the experience necessary to perform even basic governmental functions. During their occupation, the Japanese had so controlled the economy that someone observed, tongue-in-cheek, that the Koreans didn't possess the experience required to run a locomotive. The XXIV Corps, part of the Tenth Army, was given the occupational mission of disarming Japanese troops left behind, repatriating Japanese nationals, and maintaining law and order. The American authorities, somewhat naively, believed they could fulfill the goal of seeing the creation of an independent and united Korea and then quickly depart.

Members of the 224<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment first arrived at Inchon on board the USS *Chilton*. Most were veterans of the campaigns in the Philippines or Okinawa. The 224<sup>th</sup> was given overall charge of coordinating CIC resources in-country. The metropolitan and area units were situated at Pusan, Seoul, Taejon, and Kunsa. Combat detachments were assigned separately to the three US infantry divisions. But within the year, the Counter Intelligence Corps in Korea would undergo a cosmetic change. The 100-person 971<sup>st</sup> CIC Detachment replaced the 224<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment and its subordinate elements.

Organizationally, the 971<sup>st</sup> divided itself into district offices. The largest (20 CIC plus 11 Korean typists and linguists) was located adjacent to the detachment's headquarters in Seoul. Other district elements were situated in Pusan and Chonju. The 971<sup>st</sup> Detachment also developed what it liked to call "travel agents," highly mobile trouble shooters who drew special assignments in out-of-the-way areas. Although the 971<sup>st</sup> was not subordi-

nated to the 441<sup>st</sup> CIC Detachment in Japan, an unofficial link was forged. In fact, the 971<sup>st</sup> was required to transmit all reports destined for the States through the 441<sup>st</sup> CIC Detachment. Many of the personnel assigned to Korea over the months came by way of the 441<sup>st</sup>, and individual counterintelligence personnel were often transferred from Korea to Japan.

The early CIC personnel were handicapped by the lack of language skills and no orientation to Korean culture. Second Lieutenant Gordon W. Avison, Jr.—a son of missionary parents—and Technical Sergeant Donald P. Whitaker were the exceptions. Fortunately, Whitaker decided to stay on in a civilian capacity following his initial tour of duty. In addition, there were 12 second-generation Korean agents, most of them from Hawaii. Lee Yong Son known as "Wylie" was particularly notable since he was related to the Korean royal family, giving him access to the inner circles of the society. But for the most part, the CIC continued to rely heavily upon native interpreters and translators. Consequently a special team was given the responsibility for the recruitment and supervision of all Korean interpreters/translators. Unfortunately, many of the early recruits were discovered to be motivated by money and deemed untrustworthy.

On paper, LTG John R. Hodge, Commanding General of XXIV Corps, controlled both the United States Army Military Government in Korea and the various tactical elements. However, conflicting missions and poor communications quickly created a serious divide between the two. In some provinces, the rivalry among the Americans became so intense that separate social and even religious gatherings were held. Similarly, the CIC

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***"Timely information is just as important in making sound decisions during the occupational phase as it was during combat. The contributions of your organization [971<sup>st</sup> CIC Detachment] to a proper understanding of the political situation, the suppression of espionage, subversive activity, and illegal organizations, have been major factors in the establishment of an orderly and peaceful administration for South Korea."***

**LTG John R. Hodge, Commander, US Army Forces in Korea**

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and the Military Government experienced their share of tensions. Issues of contention included the Military Government's dislike of CIC's investigating Koreans being considered for leadership positions; on the other hand, Army counterintelligence believed the government to be ignoring serious security issues. Eventually, some of the friction would dissipate when the CIC succeeded in exposing the true intentions of various leftist political organizations being engaged by the Military Government.

The political situation led to the creation of literally hundreds of special interest parties. Lyuh Woon-hyung, who had led a small underground resistance force against the Japanese, became the head of the Labor Party. The other major political entity was the Korean Provisional Government, headed in exile by Syngman Rhee and Kim Koo. The US Military Government adopted a position of neutrality and took steps to give the Koreans more and more say; in February 1946, an all-Korean advisory counsel was established; and in October, a provincial legislative body was formed. (The US still retained veto power.)

### Communist Spies

The US forces continually faced threats of espionage and sabotage. Communist agents were trained in various spy schools such as the one run in Tunghua, Manchuria, which produced hundreds of graduates. Information was



*North Korean spies often posed as businessmen. (INSCOM)*

easy to come by even for the most inexperienced spy. The Korean Constabulary and Coast Guard were both heavily infiltrated, and even the Korean National Police during its early days had its share of Communist agents. The US installations regularly hired locals to perform such duties as laundry help, kitchen workers, translators, and houseboys. A typical case involved Shizui Kato, an attractive Japanese housemaid in the home of a South Korean government official, who regularly met her contact in Seoul's Pagoda Park, where she passed on the latest news about American intelligence agencies.

Most foreign agents didn't even try to penetrate the Military Government but simply wandered the country keeping their eyes and ears open, primarily for order-of-battle information. From their consulate in Seoul, the Soviets maintained communications with their agents using the Russian Orthodox Church in Seoul and South Korean companies that did business with the North. For the most part, the spies proved to be inexperienced with no advance training, which fortunately marginalized their ability to transmit back completely accurate reports.

To help address the espionage problem, the CIC sent screeners to each of the refugee centers along the border, but agents' lack of language skills once again undermined the effectiveness of the effort. To rectify the situation, the CIC employed members of the North West Young Men's Association, a group of Koreans who had suffered loss of land and livelihood at the hands of the Communists in the North. They served to spot and report on strangers. The problem was that many of these individuals were motivated by a get-even mentality. Over time the Counter Intelligence Corps forged an important relationship with the Korean National Police, who had been given increased autonomy by the Military Government. Although the effectiveness of these efforts varied greatly from district to district, the corps still managed to apprehend 150 suspected enemy agents in 1947.

Counter Intelligence Corps agents were also concerned with acts of sabotage. From the Soviet zone, it was easy to smuggle explosives south. The US Military Government's failure to take strong measures to control the borders became still another issue of contention between it and the CIC. The major targets included communications (power, telephone, and telegraph lines) and transportation links (bridges and railroads), but frequently locals in need of wood or wire were the actual culprits. The CIC estimated that only 20 percent of industrial disasters were due to sabotage.

### The State of Politics

As in Japan, the CIC directed a disproportionate amount of its time to monitoring and reporting on political activities. In 1946, the Counter Intelligence Corps made an important discovery—the existence of a Communist



## GREAT KOREA LABOR ALLIANCE

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*Armband of the Great Korea Labor Alliance, just one of the many political parties in occupied Korea monitored by the CIC. (INSCOM)*

Master Plan, calling for the ultimate domination of the entire Korean Peninsula. In a separate incident, an agent from the CIC District Office in Pusan rushed to the hospital to interview a suspect fatally wounded during the shooting of a police detective; the dying man revealed that he was a Communist and had murdered the officer to obtain his weapon. He also disclosed that his orders had come from Chan Sei Moo, a leader of one of the largest of the South Korean underground groups—The People's Liberation Army (PLA). The arrest and follow-up interrogation of Chan revealed documents in his possession that for the first time disclosed the size and true intentions of the People's Liberation Army, which at the time served primarily as an intelligence gathering network. From these papers, CIC agents discovered that they and their Korean staff were listed among the PLA's top targets.

In 1946, a series of major labor strikes turned violent. At first the CIC believed them to be economic in nature, but obtained documents revealed the attacks to have been planned by leftists in the hope the protests would lead to general disorder, which could be exploited for political gain. Anticipating more trouble on the first anniversary of the October riots, the Counter Intelligence Corps raided the headquarters of the South Korean Labor Party and arrested a number of its leadership.

One of the turning points in the contest for the hearts and minds of the people came when the police and the CIC

broke the Chung Pan Sa counterfeit case. To fill party coffers, the Communists resorted to counterfeiting Bank of Chosen notes. When this activity was brought to public light, the party immediately suffered a loss of confidence from many sympathetic supporters as well as the trust of the Military Government. For the CIC, cutting off the money supply meant denying the party funds for espionage, subversion, and propaganda. In a related case, CIC agents exposed the purposes of some South Korean companies doing business with the North. Through the use of undercover informants, counterintelligence learned that companies were trafficking in information, goods, and capital for the South Korea Labor Party. The \$1.18, which Army counterintelligence had paid for each report, proved well worth the money.

### A Coming War

The CIC in Korea also dabbled in the area of human intelligence when in January 1947, 1LT Wallace K. Wittwer, a recent graduate of West Point, was placed in charge of the newly created Information Section at the 971<sup>st</sup> CIC Detachment. Under-resourced, the intelligence effort focused on supervising a number of operatives running order-of-battle type missions into the north; it also conducted liaison with several right-wing political organizations (for example, the North West Young Men's Association) that had created their own network of spies.

In an operation expected to fool no one, eight undercover CIC agents posed as drivers for the American delegation traveling to a US-USSR Commission held in Pyongyang, where they gained a first-hand look at conditions within the northern capital.

The best form of human intelligence came from refugees, many of whom could be talked into returning. They were planted in the North Korean Army where they would furnish US intelligence with indicators and an order of battle. Captain Kenneth E. MacDougall of the CIC reported that these sources were telling that war was certain and imminent; a belief widely shared by other intelligence officers.

By 1947, United States authorities were looking to the United Nations to act upon the Korean question. Failing to obtain the cooperation of the Soviets, the UN Temporary Commission on Korea proceeded to hold an election in the South. The results led to the convening of a National Assembly; adopting a constitution; and in August 1948, electing Syngman Rhee to the presidency. Several months later, the CIC turned over its functions and files to the Korean Research Bureau that it had organized and trained, drawing upon recruits from the National Police and Korean civilians already in the corps' employment. Pressure from South Korean Nationalists, cost-saving actions by bureaucrats in Washington, DC, and declining morale of US forces in country, led to the departure of the last American combat units in June 1949. Within a year, almost to the day, American troops would return as part of an international force to preserve the independence of South Korea.

### **Counterintelligence—A Force**

The post-war period marked the beginning of what might be called the “golden era” of Army counterintelligence. For the next 25 years, the mission remained a highly visible fixture in the US Army. It all began when the Army acknowledged that the discontinuance of the Counter Intelligence Corps in 1944 had been a mistake and took the corrective steps to reconstitute the organization and its center and school at Fort Holabird, Maryland. At the same time, a board was developed to test new technology to be used by agents in the field; a centralized case file was also established which would eventually benefit

counterintelligence worldwide. More than reversing a bad decision, the resurrection of CIC was recognition that for the first time in the Army’s long history a viable counterintelligence apparatus belonged in peacetime.


This is not to say that everything went smoothly for the CIC in its new overseas role; critics were not hard to find, especially during the early occupation period. One inspection team’s report cited the CIC Region IV (Munich) as being “bewildered, inept and chaotic.” The CIC also failed to meet all of its goals in obtaining qualified individuals who possessed the necessary language skills. It was equally difficult to replace tested veterans with new agents on their first overseas assignment and not suffer loss of operational efficiency.

The unlimited power of search and arrest also was cause for occasional abuse. In their book *America’s Secret Army*, the authors described the life styles of some of the agents who adopted an independent attitude of being “masters” and “conquerors.” Most allegations leveled against the CIC proved the exception not the rule and were often exaggerated or out-and-out falsified. For instance, one newspaper charged the CIC in Japan of holding hundreds of citizens in secret captivity.

Although suffering from many of the same personnel shortages of the larger Army, the CIC still managed to field a highly motivated and professional force which accomplished a number of significant achievements. The CIC ensured that militarists and ultranationalists did not retain positions of power and authority in post-war Germany and Japan. Army counterintelligence helped to apprehend and bring to justice various war criminals, especially in Germany and Austria. The denazification program in Germany was viewed as a great success and significantly contributed to the cultivation of democratic institutions. In Japan, the CIC served as the “eyes and ears” of the occupation power to ensure the success of reforms. When the United States opened its doors to displaced persons in 1948, the CIC assumed the responsibility for their screening. Finally, the CIC monitored the activities of the emerging Cold War threat—communism—and exposed its long-range plans of aggression in Korea and Western Europe. In a nutshell, Army counterintelligence made a significant and lasting contribution to the security of the United States and its Army at a critical time in their history.



*Lowering the colors at the Retreat ceremony at Furlow Field, Fort Holabird, MD.*



*“Counterintelligence is that part of military intelligence which deals with the prevention or neutralization of the effectiveness of hostile intelligence activities. It further includes those aspects of military intelligence which relate to security control measures, both active and passive, and which are designed to ensure the safeguarding of information, personnel, equipment, and installations against espionage, sabotage or subversive activities of foreign powers and disaffected or dissident groups or individuals which may constitute a threat to the national security.”*

CIC Investigator Handbook (1949)

## CHAPTER FOUR

# COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN THE COLD WAR

### THE KOREAN WAR

The sudden outbreak of the Korean War on 26 June 1950 came as a shock to US leaders. Since the onset of the Cold War, the Nation's intelligence assets had been targeted almost exclusively against the Soviet Union. In addition, intelligence responsibilities in the Far East were badly fragmented. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's Far East Command (FECOM), the major theater headquarters in the area, no longer had any jurisdiction over the Korean peninsula. Major General Charles Willoughby, MacArthur's G2, did maintain a residual intelligence organization in Korea, the Korean

Liaison Office (KLO), but the reports generated by this small office received little attention back in Tokyo.

With the start of war, the first intelligence assets brought to bear were those controlled by FECOM. On paper, these were substantial. General Willoughby had over 2,500 intelligence personnel at his disposal. However, these elements were organized to support an army of occupation, not a fighting command. The largest single intelligence component within FECOM was the 441<sup>st</sup> Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, targeted against Japanese subversive elements and reporting to MacArthur in his capacity as Supreme Commander Allied Powers, not as head of FECOM. The four Army divisions



*A team of the 441<sup>st</sup> CIC Detachment—the first to enter the Korean Conflict—was attached to the 24<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division. Linguists are in the front row. (INSCOM)*

***"How can I fight worth a damn without counterintelligence people around me?"***

**COL John H. "Mike" Michaelis, Commander,  
27<sup>th</sup> Infantry (Wolfhounds)**

in Japan were without organic CIC detachments of their own. A large Military Intelligence Service Company of Japanese interpreters supported the 441<sup>st</sup> CIC Detachment, but only two Korean linguists were at its disposal.

The deficiencies in the Nation's military intelligence capabilities were thrown into stark relief when the US committed combat forces to Korea. Although the Occupation of South Korea had terminated only a year before, the US troops that deployed found themselves fighting in what for all practical purposes was a *terra incognita*. Not only did they lack the linguistic capabilities to exploit their enemies or even communicate with their allies, but they were dependent on out-dated, Japanese maps. A major security threat to US forces manifested itself in the

counterintelligence arena. The endless columns of refugees that poured through the lines were laced with infiltrating enemy soldiers and intelligence agents. Nevertheless, despite the multiple handicaps under which it was forced to labor, the Eighth Army in Korea was able to cobble together enough of an intelligence structure to cope with the immediate threat. The Korean Liaison Office already in place on the peninsula was quickly augmented. The 441<sup>st</sup> CIC Detachment provided the personnel and equipment to constitute the 308<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment in support of the Eighth Army. The 308<sup>th</sup> was followed by other CIC detachments attached to each of the American divisions. By September, the 441<sup>st</sup> had transferred almost 240 CIC personnel and five detachments from Japan to Korea. At the same time, General Willoughby ordered that copies of all intelligence and progress reports continue to be submitted to the 441<sup>st</sup> as the parent organization.

Although many of the initial CIC personnel were combat veterans, few had seen action in a counterintelligence capacity. The shortage of experienced personnel led the 441<sup>st</sup> to create a course back in Japan for deploying officers and agents. Another problem for the CIC throughout the war was the lack of qualified linguists.



*General MacArthur watches as his daring plan to reverse the course of the war unfolds at Inchon. In Japan the CIC helped to keep the plan from falling into enemy hands. (NARA)*

The Army Language School in CONUS would take nearly a year before it was able to train the first 100 Korean linguists. This meant that almost all counterintelligence and human intelligence operations had to be conducted through interpreters of varying abilities. But few records were available to verify information provided by Korean Nationals being employed by US forces.

The Army's largest and most visible intelligence effort in the early stages of the Korean War came in the field of human intelligence (HUMINT). An organization was quickly built around the nucleus of the KLO, using personnel from the 441<sup>st</sup> CIC Detachment. To carry out its mission, the KLO hastily recruited Korean peasants, gave them a sketchy training, and airdropped them behind enemy lines with instructions to return with intelligence reports. In addition, it set up Tactical Liaison Offices (TLO) at division level to recruit Koreans as line-crossers to gather low-level HUMINT. One officer called the TLOs nothing more than simply "glorified reconnaissance units." Korean casualties were high, and the quality of intelligence they produced unsatisfactory. Historian

S.L.A. Marshal observed grimly, "Only the loss rate [of agents] fulfilled expectations." Regardless of the shortcomings, the jerry-rigged intelligence system and its mixed bag of assets were sufficient to save the Eighth Army from defeat during its darkest days as it manned the defenses of the Pusan Perimeter.

During this period, the 308<sup>th</sup> conducted prisoner-of-war interrogations, created project and target files, and integrated various reports—a pattern of operations that would be repeated throughout the campaign. From the headquarters office at Pusan, the CIC's biggest job was to monitor dock activities and provide indoctrination lectures to incoming troops on security measures and the need to safeguard military information. For the first year of the war, troops would continue to arrive at Pusan and be trucked up the peninsula.

Army counterintelligence served as a shield for the masterful landing of US forces under General MacArthur at Inchon on 15 September that would dramatically change the early course of the war. Preparations for such a



*Intelligence agent interrogates a wounded prisoner. (NARA)*

massive assault were too big to be hidden, and the staging areas in Japan were under observation by hostile eyes. In Japan, much of the sizeable Korean community favored the Kim Il Sung regime. As a result, the base areas for American forces swarmed with enemy agents whose activities the 441<sup>st</sup> CIC Detachment was hard-put to completely extinguish. Enemy espionage operations were financed through the sale of narcotics on the black market. The 441<sup>st</sup> CIC Detachment scooped up interlocking rings of agents, arresting 200 individuals, among them the head of the main spy ring less than a week before the landings. The capture of Seoul following Inchon was also a counterintelligence success because the files created by the 308<sup>th</sup> greatly aided the various combat counterintelligence detachments in reducing potential targets.

After the breakout from Pusan in late September, the various Counter Intelligence Corps elements faced a growing problem of refugee control. To accomplish its mission, the 308<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment acknowledged the need for closer liaison with the Korean National Police and the Republic of Korea's own counterintelligence organization. Previous lack of cooperation lay at the feet of the CIC agents who had frequently treated their counterparts with lack of deference, naturally leading to resentments.

The 24<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment alone processed 18,000 civilian refugees over a 2-month period. The 181<sup>st</sup> CIC Detachment in support of the Marines uncovered a small spy ring when a search of refugees revealed a handful of individuals carrying copper spoons, all broken in the same place as a sign of identification. Other means of identification included a pattern of buttons sewn on a specific area of clothing. Sometimes women spies purposely used markings on their inner thighs knowing any search would create an embarrassing situation.

North Korean troops—cut off and behind the lines—joined existing guerrilla groups or formed their own in the Chiri-San hills. The guerrilla bands in south-central Korea dated back to the Japanese occupation during World War II. The responsibility for keeping tabs on these 30,000 armed men fell upon the 704<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment. Evidence emerged that some bands had created an escape route from the prison on Koje-do Island and were conducting espionage on behalf of North Korea. To monitor the activities of the guerrillas, the 704<sup>th</sup> set up an informant net consisting of 20 to 30 locals.

## Human Intelligence

From the beginning, the CIC had involved itself in the business of collecting order-of-battle information and conducting reconnaissance missions. But the Inchon landing had put the enemy on the defensive and placed an even greater priority on gathering intelligence for immedi-

ate tactical use. Maintaining pace with the advancing UN force severely tested the intelligence organization and its effectiveness. As Allied elements moved forward, committees were formed in most villages to take over local governmental functions. At the same time, North

Master Sergeant John R. Wilson was among the CIC cadre deployed in the early days of the war. A veteran of World War II in the Pacific, Wilson had risen to the rank of major, but following the Army's downsizing, had enlisted with the CIC. When alerted early in the morning of 13 October that the enemy was moving to capture the small town of Pangso-ri, MSG John R. Wilson quickly assembled his contingent of 30 Korean police and interpreters and organized them into teams surrounding the town. Taking with him four Koreans, Wilson, who was an imposing figure at six feet, six inches, proceeded to dislodge the enemy who had made a stand in one of the houses. Although Wilson himself was killed by sniper fire, his actions facilitated the capture of 21 of the enemy. For his gallantry under fire, Wilson was posthumously awarded the Silver Star and was further honored by having a building at the CIC School named after him.

Korean forces continued to roam within the rear areas. The I Corps deployed two-man counterintelligence teams in jeeps to make contact with the new committees, report by radio on the local situation, accept the surrender of North Koreans, and pick up enemy agents.

By November, all signs indicated that the North Korean Army was in a state of collapse. Documents collected by the 308<sup>th</sup> in Seoul served as the foundation for plans to capture and liberate the northern capital of Pyongyang. Intelligence work was becoming the task of performing an autopsy on an expired enemy. A multi-unit party of CIC agents accompanied by a strong military escort—Task Force INDIANHEAD—scoured the wreckage of Pyongyang for documents of intelligence interest as soon as the North Korean capital had been liberated. The counterintelligence contingent consisted of 22 soldiers, mostly contributed by the 308<sup>th</sup> and the 2<sup>d</sup>



*Besides catching spies such as these, the CIC became heavily involved in boating espionage agents of their own behind enemy lines. (INSCOM)*

CIC Detachments. The capture of several thousand Korean and Russian documents caused Army leaders to label the operation a great success.

With eyes wide shut, the United Nations Command drove on towards the Yalu River until it was strategically surprised by a major Chinese Communist intervention and then thrown backward in defeat. Soon, the second stage of the war set in, witnessing both armies locked in battle on a fighting line that swayed back and forth in the vicinity of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel. Attacks and counterattacks mounted by both sides in this constricted zone of ground combat achieved local success, but failed to fundamentally alter the strategic balance. The last days of December 1950 proved to be a milestone both for the Eighth

Army and for military intelligence. They would no longer have to play a guessing game about the long-range intentions of the enemy.

Ground patrols could only reveal what was going on near the front lines, and technical collection systems had limitations. To meet its intelligence requirements, the UN Command relied on an expanded program of clandestine HUMINT. The Army, the CIA, and ROK forces were all players in this arena. On 20 December, the Army activated the 442<sup>d</sup> CIC Detachment to take over operational control of the KLO central office and the division level TLOs. Between January 1951 and the first armistice negotiations in June, the unit achieved significant accomplishments in the areas of agent insertion, communications, and training.

Just prior to the Hungnan evacuation, the division commander called his intelligence staff together and expressed dissatisfaction on its intelligence gathering efforts and ordered that the human intelligence mission be turned over to his CIC detachment, expressing his belief that they would be best qualified to run it. The CIC proceeded to assemble a team of 31 Koreans (12 military and 19 civilians) to support the mission. A number of them had previous counterintelligence experience and all were extremely capable individuals. Although starting from scratch, the team was able to gather intelligence on enemy troop concentrations, supply points, defensive positions, and unit designations all of which proved "almost 100 percent correct" during an upcoming offensive.



*Counterintelligence created files on captured enemy agents. (NARA)*

Until early 1951, agents had been inserted by line crossing and by parachute drop. At the TLO level, hundreds of Korean peasants were sent to gather limited information about enemy dispositions in front of the UN lines. The KLO had its own line crossers; it also paradedropped smaller numbers of Korean agents on long-range collection missions, using Air Force AVIARY C-47s controlled by Eighth Army's Special Activities Mission. Unfortunately, both techniques resulted in a heavy attrition of agents. During night drops, parachuted agents were routinely deposited miles from their intended objectives by untrained aircrews.

To remedy this situation, the 442<sup>d</sup> began to supplement its ground and parachute insertion methods by using boats to land agents behind enemy lines, a course first suggested in the summer of 1950. The TLO teams of the 3<sup>d</sup> and 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Divisions began transporting agents by small boat around the enemy's flank on the west coast of Korea. At the same time, the 442<sup>d</sup> CIC Detachment's headquarters element implemented a much larger program of amphibious espionage that was assigned the codename SALAMANDER. This involved the use of Korean-manned fishing boats to insert long-range agents deep within enemy territory. The native fishing boats proved

small and unseaworthy for the task, but the 442<sup>d</sup> quickly took steps to substitute fast American craft.

The 442<sup>d</sup> CIC Detachment initially conducted SALAMANDER operations from the numerous islands off the Korean west coast that were located to the rear of the enemy's lines. (The CIA made its own agent insertions from the east coast.) These islands were rendered more or less secure from hostile attack by the UN naval blockade, and many of them were already in the hands of anti-Communist North Korean partisans. There was also a counterintelligence side to the use of the islands. For example, the 201<sup>st</sup> CIC Detachment dispatched two individuals to Kangwha-do, an island north of Inchon. Here, they established liaison with local guerrilla forces to cut down on the black market that allowed goods to flow north to the enemy and to arrest North Korean agents making their way south.

Over the course of the war, human intelligence improved its agent communications. During the first year, radios had been unavailable, and "agent-handlers" were forced to wait for their sources to return to base before information could be obtained. The situation gradually improved in 1951. Radio teams equipped with SCR-300 "walkie-talkies" were provided for both AVIARY and

SALAMANDER operations. The use of voice radio allowed agents to furnish Army intelligence with information on a real-time basis. This, however, was not a panacea. Voice radio had its limitations; its short range meant relays had to be used or aircraft had to hover in the immediate area of the agent radio teams, risking compromise of the mission. An additional complication was that some of the Air Force crews who provided communications support to AVIARY operations lacked sufficient experience. This resulted in the loss of many agent radio teams.

In March 1951, the 442<sup>d</sup> set up a school at Pusan that was capable of providing 20 HUMINT agents at a time

with a basic 2-week course of instruction. (The facility moved to Taegu in June.) After completing training, the new agents went to the TLO teams and the 442<sup>d</sup> CIC Detachment's central office. Not surprisingly, the new breed of agents was rated as "far superior" to their predecessors. For one thing, it was noted that the new agents "appear to be enthusiastic" and "have a basic idea of the mission." Better training, however, seems to have been partially offset by increased enemy security measures. Line crossing continued to be a hazardous operation, although a surprisingly large number of collectors still managed to make it back to UN lines. At any rate, the new recruitment and training program made it easier to obtain replacements.



*Refugees complicated the search for infiltrating spies. (NARA)*



*During Operation BIG SWITCH, the CIC played an important role in debriefing repatriated prisoners. (NARA)*

### The Final Phase

The coming of peace negotiations by the summer of 1951 soon left the fighting in a stalemated situation not unlike World War I; units began to settle into their respective area of operations for the long haul, and counterintelligence returned to more traditional duties. The various CIC detachments undertook the evacuation of refugees from their areas by establishing a mobile checkpoint unit. During a 1-month period, the 14 agents of the 3<sup>d</sup> CIC Detachment screened more than 2,000 indigenous personnel and conducted some 900 interrogations. As units began to regularly rotate from rear to line duty, the CIC assumed responsibility for force protection, such as conducting background investigations on indigenous hires.

Although peace negotiations proved inconclusive, major fighting sputtered to a halt in November when both parties agreed on a tentative military demarcation line separating North and South Korea. That same month the Army reorganized its clandestine HUMINT organization. All CIC personnel gradually returned to their normal duty assignments, and the 442<sup>d</sup> CIC Detachment ceased to exist. The former KLO/TLO organization, now known as the Far East Command Liaison Detachment, Korea, had become a miniature Army version of the World War II Office of Strategic Services, with responsibilities both for intelligence gathering and special operations.

The North Koreans infiltrated agents into the UN prisoner-of-war camps to organize and mobilize the inmates against their captors. The camps were vulnerable to this type of approach, especially since no one had anticipated it. Prisoners of war might try to escape, but they were not supposed to behave like industrial workers on strike or participants at a political rally. Korea, however, was a new kind of war in which the enemy was prepared to disregard all conventions and subordinate all aspects to the political. Moreover, the camps had been allowed to slip from under Eighth Army's effective control. High-ranking North Korean political operatives donned the uniform of common soldiers and then deliberately allowed themselves to be captured for the purpose of taking control of the camps. They proceeded to propagandize, organize, and arm the inmates with crude weapons. Anyone in disagreement with these plans quickly found his life in peril. The goal of the operation was to undermine any attempts by the UN to identify prisoners who did not want to be repatriated and to create as much of a disturbance as possible. The situation came to a head in May 1952 when POWs on the island of Koje-do off the South Korean coast managed to kidnap the brigadier general who served as their camp commandant. In response, UN forces used tanks and paratroops to take back the compound. Once more a prison camp, and not a

peoples' revolutionary collective, CIC personnel could proceed with screening prisoners for repatriation.

As truce talks limped along, the CIC assumed the lead in debriefing US and Republic of Korea prisoners being returned. The first effort, known as LITTLE SWITCH, involved the exchange of many of those who were wounded or ill; the larger and more significant effort, BIG SWITCH, occurred in July 1953. The United States prisoners of war were processed at Inchon; Republic of Korea personnel at Yoncho-do; and all sick and wounded at Seoul. The 704<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment was responsible for making the security arrangements at the processing centers and points of embarkation. The extensive security measures surrounding the repatriation effort reflected a real apprehension on the part of the American leadership. What would be the state of mind of many of the internees who had been subjected to Soviet indoctrination?

## ADVENT OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

The Korean War was the proverbial pebble tossed into the pond of military intelligence; it created a series of ripples that resulted in significant changes for years to

come. Following his tenure as Commander of the United Nations Forces in Korea, General Matthew Ridgway recommended that the Army organize its own institutionalized human intelligence collection element. Such a force would help meet the Army's intelligence needs in both peacetime and conflict while preventing any future diversion of Counter Intelligence Corps assets from their assigned mission. General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, US Army, quickly signed off on Ridgeway's recommendations. In November 1953, the Army issued a regulation that set the standards for procurement of personnel to carry out the new discipline of HUMINT (human intelligence) under the euphemisms of "Field Operations Intelligence (FOI)" or "Area Intelligence."

In April 1954, Field Operations Intelligence was added to the curriculum at Fort Holabird, and for the first time, collection personnel began training side by side with counterintelligence agents. At the start, counterintelligence and human intelligence regarded each other as rivals, and an unhealthy rivalry to boot. According to one report, "there is too much bickering and snideness at the Center regarding these two fields." Some intelligence officers on the Army Staff and in Europe considered the new field operations intelligence personnel better qualified than CIC agents to handle especially sensitive counter-



*The symbol of CIC—the sphinx—took the form of a statue which rested in front of HQ CIC at Fort Holabird. (INSCOM)*



*Drama made training more realistic at the CIC School. (INSCOM)*

pionage operations. On the other hand, many in Army counterintelligence believed just the opposite. When given a choice to become FOI agents, veteran CIC personnel tended to look upon such a proposal as a step down professionally and, most often, chose to remain with the corps. To a man, CIC members were adamantly opposed to the transfer of any counterintelligence functions to the new HUMINT discipline.

In August 1954, the Chief, CIC gained still more responsibilities when he assumed command of the records facility at Holabird, which contained the Army's counterintelligence files worldwide. At this point, the Counter Intelligence Corps Center was redesignated the Army Intelligence Center, and the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, assumed an added title as the center's commanding general. In practice, the concept of an all-encompassing army intelligence center was never quite realized. The US Army Intelligence Center assumed only the training responsibilities but not the central administration of intelligence specialists. Thus the benefits enjoyed by CIC personnel were not extended to all members of military intelligence.

Seven months later, in March 1955, the Army transferred responsibility for training in combat intelligence from the Army General School at Fort Riley to the CIC School at Fort Holabird. The merger of the schools would also result in a new name—the US Army Intelligence School. The arrangement centralized almost all intelligence training at one post. Only the Army's Strategic Intelligence School in Washington, DC, for military attachés, and the Army Security Agency facility at Fort Devens, Massachusetts, for signals intelligence specialists, remained separate.

The year 1955 also witnessed the inception of an intelligence civilian career program within the Army. This step, first advocated by the second Hoover Commission on government reform, would augment nontactical military intelligence units with trained civilian specialists to provide continuity to operations. Three hundred such positions were authorized originally. Actual implementation began in 1957, overseen by an Administrative Survey Detachment organized within the Army Intelligence Center. The Army soon began to have second thoughts about the program. Civilians were limited to working 40-

***"Place of meeting: the entry of the restaurant "Tally-Ho" at the corner of Kensington Parkway and Frederick Av. (Trade Center). Time: 19.30, first Sunday after the putting down a signal, reserve meetings two following Sundays. You have the magazine 'Times' in your hand. You shall be approached by a man who will ask you: 'Don't you know where is a French restaurant 'Mediterranee?' You shall reply him: 'I have known such a restaurant, but in Paris.' After that you show each other your pendants with keys."***

**Instructions given to an Army spy by Nikolai Popov, a First Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, DC**

hour weeks and were not subject to courts-martial. These and other factors caused the Army leaders to restrict the number of employees.

Until the late 1950s, Army tactical elements received their intelligence support from small military intelligence units put together on the cellular principle. Combat intelligence elements were organically separate from their counterintelligence counterparts, and the local G2s had the responsibility of coordinating all of these disparate assets. In 1957, the Army introduced a new category of intelligence unit organized under a concept plan entitled the "Military Intelligence Organization." Interrogators, photo interpreters, order of battle specialists, and combat counterintelligence personnel would, for the first time, be integrated into a single unit. Under this concept, a Military Intelligence Battalion supported a field army and its organic MI detachments were attached to corps and division. The creation of the Military Intelligence Organization represented the first step in bringing about multidiscipline support to the field, but actual implementation would be limited.

#### The 902<sup>d</sup> CIC Group

Since World War II, the Counter Intelligence Corps had run a small cover program for administration of special projects and confidential funds out of the Office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, but the duties were



*The CIC goes airborne; however, jeeps, safes, typewriters, chairs, etc. were anything but mobile. (NARA)*

often carried out by untrained individuals. For example, two CIC sergeants were given cover status as heavy equipment operators and sent on a mission to Turkey. Before they departed they took a test to become warrant officers. Unbeknownst to them, while in transit, they were selected and their names published in the *Army Times*. When the undercover agents did finally arrive at their destination, a tongue-in-cheek committee was waiting to congratulate the would-be truck drivers who had suddenly become warrant officers.

As a solution, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI) activated the 902<sup>d</sup> CIC Detachment at Fort Holabird, Maryland on 8 January 1952. (To insiders, the unit became affectionately known as “The Deuce.”) The 902<sup>d</sup> assumed the mission of handling administrative support for the growing number of special operations being conducted throughout the world. In 1957, the 902<sup>d</sup> passed the management of cover programs on to the newly organized US Army Administrative Survey Detachment, so as to focus on running the Army’s most sensitive operations.

Personnel of the 902<sup>d</sup> deployed on a one-time basis to provide auxiliary technical and linguistic assistance to counterintelligence units at home and overseas. For example, in response to a Congressional probe run by then Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, the Army dispatched a small undercover detachment from the 902<sup>d</sup> to determine the cause of botched construction of Air Force bases in French Morocco. Poor engineering was found not to be the ultimate cause. Rather, the chief of the engineering firm who had been hired to plan the bases turned out to be a Communist and had actually designed the underground storage tanks and fuel lines so they would rupture under stress.

The 902<sup>d</sup>’s movement from Fort Holabird to Tempo A, just outside the gates of Fort McNair in Washington, DC, reflected the unit’s close ties to Headquarters, Department of Army. The 902<sup>d</sup> CIC Detachment also assumed the mission of the inactivated 118<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, which provided counterintelligence support for the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Army, and their staffs at the Pentagon. In its place, the 902<sup>d</sup> established Sub-Detachment A, better known by its informal title of the “Pentagon Counter Intelligence Force.” The emergence of the 902<sup>d</sup> as a key player in Army counterintelligence caused a change in its status from detachment to group in 1957. Another outgrowth of the Korean War had been the emergence for the first time of group- and battalion-size military intelligence units. Authorized strength for the 902<sup>d</sup> remained the same at just over 200.

### The Internal Soviet Threat

No sooner had much of the World War II economy been dismantled than the Iron Curtain went up in Eastern

A final judgment on the internal Soviet threat had to wait until after the end of the Cold War and the public release of the so-called VENONA Project. In 1943, Army cryptologists began to attack Soviet diplomatic messages that contained information on espionage matters. Once decoded, the messages revealed that the British scientist Klaus Fuchs had conveyed atomic secrets to the Soviets. Under arrest, Fuchs confessed to British authorities that he had an American accomplice named “Raymond.” Only then was the FBI in a position to undertake the complicated investigations that led first to Harry Gold, then to David Greenglass, and finally to Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. For 37 years, a small element of the Army (later the National Security Agency) and the FBI labored over the Soviet traffic that eventually yielded 200 names of spies and sources. Unfortunately, because all used cover names, it was virtually impossible to discover their true identity until after the fact. VENONA was the perfect illustration of counterintelligence’s dependence on a synergistic relationship with other intelligence disciplines.

Europe, leaving millions trapped behind it. Countries, such as Greece, were under the threat of going Communist, and an airlift was required to break the Soviet blockade of Berlin in 1948. The fall of China to Mao Tse-tung’s Communists in 1949 brought home to the American public the realization that the struggle against communism would be global in nature. And in 1950, the Cold War turned hot when North Korea unexpectedly invaded the South, leading to the deployment of US tactical forces. It was natural that these headlines would impact the American psyche.

But the so-called Red Scare that swept America was more than just a mere reaction to fabricated conspiracies. A number of events transpired to lend credibility to those who believed that the United States faced an internal threat. There were the initial revelations that Soviet spies had stolen US atomic secrets. Detailed testimonies of former Communists, such as Elizabeth Bentley and Whittaker Chambers, told of Soviet espionage at the highest levels of government, and several foreign policy missteps by the Truman Administration in its dealings with the Soviet Union seemed only to confirm that pro-Communist forces were at work. Unfortunately, instead of cooperating to identify and counter real national security threats, the Truman Administration and its critics politicized the debate.



*Agents of the CIC record evidence—messages stuffed in a pack of cigarettes. (NARA)*

Regardless, by 1950 the government had taken several actions to reduce the threat from dedicated Communists and other extremists. The first was the enforcement of the 1940 Smith Act, which prohibited “teaching and advocating the violent overthrow of the government.” The second was the efforts of the House Un-American Activities Committee to expose Communist-sponsored organizations and to bring to justice Alger Hiss, a highly placed Soviet agent within the State Department.

As one of the Nation’s agencies responsible for security, the Counter Intelligence Corps was a minor player in these events although it did help to enforce the Smith Act, which required all government employees to submit to a loyalty oath. However, in December 1953, the CIC moved to center stage when Senator Joseph R. McCarthy began to hold hearings intended to spotlight security problems at the Signal Corps’ Engineering Laboratories at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; more specifically, the senator accused the Army of granting clearances to known Communists. In a number of instances CIC investigations had noted potential security risks, but for a variety of reasons, local authorities had chosen to ignore them. The whole matter quickly turned

into a circus when the Army brought counter-charges that McCarthy had sought preferential treatment from the draft for one of his aides. McCarthy responded with allegations of his own that the Army was pressuring him to call off his investigation of Fort Monmouth. A former CIC agent later told of being tasked by Army authorities to shadow McCarthy’s staff to provide advance warning of what direction the Senator’s investigation would take. The whole episode culminated in televised hearings which revealed to the public McCarthy’s heavy-handed methods, undercut his popularity and ultimately led to his being censored by his fellow senators; thus bringing to an end America’s preoccupation with the Red Scare.

### Overseas

The 1950s witnessed the completion of the European buildup, the drawdown of forces in Korea, the withdrawal of all occupational forces from Austria, and a peace treaty with Japan. The end result was a force structure that left the Army with five divisions in Europe and two in Korea; these were under the respective commands of the Seventh and Eighth Armies. Even if the positioning of troops on the ground remained relatively static, theater command



*Counterintelligence kept up with the times and became increasingly mobile in monitoring the movements of suspects. (AHEC)*

relationships did not. This meant the tailoring of intelligence organizations to the specific theater and the threat at hand.

In December 1950, President Harry S. Truman appointed General Dwight D. Eisenhower to serve as

commander of the newly established supreme headquarters for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Based on his experience in World War II, Eisenhower immediately requested added counterintelligence support for the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE) and the Allied Command Europe (ACE). In



*Double-agent (face blotted out in photograph) and his courier under surveillance in Austria. (AHEC)*

response, the Army activated the 450<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment on 18 January 1951 under the title "ACE Counterintelligence Activity." Within the month, a cadre of 13 soldiers was on its way to Paris. Its first task involved conducting security surveys of General Eisenhower's private quarters at the Trianon Palace Hotel in Versailles and of the SHAPE Planning Group Headquarters in the Hotel Astoria. The 450<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment itself would eventually settle into a small villa near Versailles, not far from the SHAPE's new location in Rocquencourt, a western suburb of Paris. Besides protecting ACE forces, language-fluent members of the 450<sup>th</sup> performed liaison with national-level civil and military agencies in NATO-member countries. In Naples,


Italy, the 450<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment created the first of nine regional offices that eventually stretched 3,600 miles from Norway to Turkey.

Elsewhere in Europe, the 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment with an authorized strength of over 1,300 became an early candidate for conversion to group status. This was just the first of many restructurings that the 66<sup>th</sup> would undergo in the 1950s. The 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Group reduced the number of its internal regions to four and gave them letters (A, B, C and D) in place of Roman numerals. Next, it activated the 766<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment in Orleans, France to support the US Army Europe (USAREUR) Communications Zone. But the requirement to coordinate with French officials on a daily basis greatly handicapped the detachment's effectiveness.

The emergence of a separate human intelligence discipline resulted in a series of organizational changes in Europe that would last into the 1960s. The 66<sup>th</sup> transferred all of its functions that touched upon HUMINT to the newly activated 522<sup>d</sup> Military Intelligence Battalion, which was then subordinated to the 513<sup>th</sup> MI Group. On 1 November 1959, a second major mission shift occurred when USAREUR divided the counterintelligence and field operations intelligence responsibilities on a geographical basis between the 66<sup>th</sup> and the 513<sup>th</sup> Groups. The latter took responsibility for the northern half of the Federal Republic of Germany to include Berlin, while the 66<sup>th</sup> performed a similar mission for the southern half.

Next door in Austria, the 430<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment continued to support occupational forces up until their withdrawal. Working out of three sub-detachments based in Salzburg, Linz, and Vienna, the 315-strong detachment made a significant contribution to force protection. For instance, of the 2700 investigations open, 150 dealt with espionage and 120 with subversive activities; the remainder of cases consisted of background investigations on individuals being employed by the US Army. In 1953, agents of the 430<sup>th</sup> arrested two leaders of a Soviet spy ring attempting to employ soldiers, airmen, and civilians to gather classified information. The men, Kurt Ponger and his brother-in-law Otto Verber, were Austrian-born,

Otto Verber and Kurt Ponger were first identified as spies in July 1949 when a loyal naturalized US citizen employed by an intelligence organization in Vienna, Austria, came forward and indicated that he had been approached by Verber. "Hans" agreed to serve as an informant. In the coming months, he learned that Verber and Ponger had scores of other contacts among US employees. This relationship was allowed to continue, and eventually Hans was "reassigned" to Washington, DC. Here, in the Nation's capital, the FBI took over the case. For two and a half years, Hans provided valuable insights on his new handlers who worked for the Soviet Embassy, among them Yuri Novikov, Second Secretary. In the meantime, the 430<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment back in Austria designed an elaborate system to keep Verber and Ponger under surveillance. During this period, they observed Verber and Ponger's continued attempts to develop sources from within the American embassy and armed forces. The operation ended with the sentencing of Verber and Ponger to a prison term of 5 to 15 years, the arresting of three accomplices, and the declaring of Yuri Novikov as *persona-non-grata*.



*Shaping picks needed for surreptitious entry. (AHEC)*

naturalized US citizens, both of whom had once served with the US Army during World War II.

Detachment D, 430<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, became operational in Leghorn, Italy, in July 1951 for the purpose of supporting the 4<sup>th</sup> Logistical Command, which required employment applicants to be investigated. Because

Leghorn was the birthplace of communism in Italy, Detachment D adopted a low profile by assuming the cover name of "Labor Control Branch." The withdrawal of occupational forces from Austria in 1955 led to the inactivation of the 430<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment. But 3 months later, the 430<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment was resurrected with a new

mission and a new authorized strength: 7 officers, 8 warrant officers, and 19 enlisted men. The 430<sup>th</sup> had now become the replacement for its former Detachment D and was assigned to the Southern European Task Force.

Halfway around the world in Tokyo, Japan, the US Army Forces, Far East (USAFFE), served as the Army's principal headquarters element in the Pacific; its G2, directed an elaborate intelligence architecture. The major elements consisted of the US Army Command Reconnaissance Activity, Far East; the 500<sup>th</sup> Military Intelligence Group; and the 441<sup>st</sup> CIC Detachment. They each reported to the US Army Intelligence Support Center, Japan, under the command of a brigadier general. In 1957 the Eisenhower-Kishii agreement directed the drawdown of American troop strength in Japan. Subsequently, this led to the relocation of the Army's main Pacific headquarters to Hawaii, and the inactivation of the 441<sup>st</sup> CIC Detachment. In Korea, the Eighth Army divided its intelligence assets among a Collection Detachment, which had inherited the theater-level army HUMINT mission; the 308<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment; and the 528<sup>th</sup> MI Company. In 1961, these diverse missions were consolidated into the newly activated 502<sup>d</sup> MI Battalion.

The 1950s represented a series of organizational bumps for Army counterintelligence, much of it brought about by the creation of a separate human intelligence

discipline. However, the turmoil experienced would be minor compared to the roller coaster ride that awaited Army counterintelligence over the next two decades.

## A DECADE OF TURBULENCE

The arrival of the Kennedy Administration in 1961 brought with it a new defense policy of "gradual deterrence," conventional rather than strategic forces were emphasized. President John F. Kennedy selected a former Ford Motors executive with a background in systems analysis, Robert S. McNamara, to serve as his Secretary of Defense. McNamara's new direction towards greater centralization would have a lasting impact upon the intelligence community. For Army counterintelligence these changes would be disruptive to say the least. An early casualty to McNamara's planning was ACSI's Industrial and Personal Security Group whose mission and spaces were shifted to the newly created Defense Supply Agency.

Because of the rivalry between counterintelligence and human intelligence and the lack of a CONUS rotational base for the latter, the ACSI eventually decided it would be more economical and efficient to merge all field operations intelligence assets with the Counter Intelligence Corps and cross-train personnel to serve both as



*The Military Intelligence leadership surrounds the desk of Army Chief of Staff GEN George H. Decker as he signs the order creating the MI Branch on 1 July 1962. (INSCOM)*



*The front gates of Fort Holabird. (INSCOM)*

counterintelligence agents and as human intelligence collectors. Accordingly, a consolidated Intelligence Corps, commanded by the former Chief, CIC was created on 1 January 1961. The new organization incorporated slightly over 5,000 personnel, about 85 percent of whom came from the CIC. Entrance requirements for the Intelligence Corps (INTC) were less restrictive than they had been for the old Counter Intelligence Corps. In the past the CIC had attracted the "best and brightest," but at a cost. The retention rate was abysmal—7 percent for lieutenants and just 3 percent for enlisted. Consequently, a new type of recruit was sought: those who had the best career potential. The changes that followed left the Counter Intelligence Corps more like the rest of the Army. The Army General Test score was lowered for the new Intelligence Corps from 110 to 100. Although they were restricted to clerical duties, 18-year-olds were for the first time able to volunteer for 3-year enlistments.

In the past, the Chief, Intelligence Corps, had commanded the Army Intelligence Center that consisted of the Army Intelligence School and the Army Intelligence Board. In 1962, the Army transferred the school to the Continental Army Command (CONARC) and divided the board functions between the Army Materiel Command and the Combat Developments Command. A new entity, the Army Intelligence Corps Activity was created to pick up

all residual functions not transferred, such as the counterintelligence records facility, the Administrative Survey Detachment, and the Army Photo Interpretation Center. Besides controlling the new Army Intelligence Corps Activity, the Chief, Intelligence Corps, continued to serve as the Commandant of the Army Intelligence School and Commander of Fort Holabird. Consequently, the Chief, Intelligence Corps, reported to ACSI, CONARC, and Second Army in whose area Fort Holabird was located. It would be only a matter of time before further restructuring would be required to undo some of these organizational knots.

On 1 July 1962, the new ACSI, MG Alva R. Fitch, finally succeeded where others had failed by creating a new Military Intelligence (MI) Branch (originally named the Army Intelligence and Security Branch). It was a fitting recognition of a half-century of achievement by military intelligence professionals. In reality, the branch came about as a result of more practical considerations. The pool of reserve officers capable of filling intelligence slots was becoming exhausted, and by 1965 it was estimated that half of the positions would not be filled by qualified personnel. Over a third of the 283 Regular Army and 3,652 Reserve officers in the new branch came from the Intelligence Corps. The branch gave the Army the potential for the first time to promote and retain the necessary qualified

officers. Still, MI's inability to attract Regular Army officers would eventually precipitate the branch's further upgrade in 1967 to a combat support role status.

### Major Security Lapses

From the beginning of the Cold War, the KGB (Soviet Security and Intelligence Service) and the GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence) carried out a systematic program to recruit Americans, particularly those serving or employed at installations abroad. Younger and low-level workers, such as file clerks, guards, and secretaries were frequent targets, especially anyone having access to ciphers that would give the enemy an entrée to still more secrets.

During the early sixties, Army security experienced a series of serious penetrations. In May 1960, SFC Jack E. Dunlap walked into the Soviet embassy in downtown Washington, DC, with an offer that could not be refused by its intelligence officers—the sale of important secrets. Given his position as driver (later messenger) for the National Security Agency's (NSA) chief of staff at Fort Meade, Dunlap had easy access to papers within the office. Although Dunlap did not possess a background in intelligence, he knew enough to scoop up the right kind of documents to support a very lavish lifestyle that included a 30-foot yacht, a world-class hydroplane, two Cadillacs, a baby-blue Jaguar sports car, and a blonde mistress. He even took his girl friend with him on his visits to an apartment in the District of Columbia where he met his so-called "bookkeeper," always emerging with a wad of bills.

Feigning a bad back, Dunlap was able to keep from going on an overseas assignment, but eventually, the requirement to be reassigned caught up with him, at which point he took steps to resign from the Army and sign on as a civilian employee. At this juncture he failed the mandatory polygraph test and faced the loss of his security clearance along with the prospect of FBI questioning. Convinced he was about to be exposed, Dunlap purchased a bottle of the finest whiskey and drove to an isolated spot where he committed suicide by carbon monoxide poisoning in his parked car. Never formally charged with any crimes, Dunlap, a decorated Korean War veteran, was buried with full military honors at Arlington National Cemetery.

In the case of Dunlap there had been obvious life-style warnings. Living beyond his means should have been a neon sign for those who worked with him, but Dunlap was able to deflect suspicion by inventing a variety of stories: he was the heir to a chain of gas stations, his family was land rich in Louisiana, or his family farm had on it a special type of clay used in cosmetics. In response to the Dunlap case, the Army undertook a 2-year study called Project SECURITY SHIELD, which revealed serious weaknesses both in the traditional decentralized approach to counter-

intelligence operations and in the lack of coordination between Army counterintelligence and criminal investigators; the solution would lead to still more restructuring.

Occurring almost simultaneously, a second case of espionage by another Army sergeant, Robert Lee Johnson, would equal, if not surpass, the damage perpetrated by Dunlap. Since 1953 Sergeant Robert Lee Johnson and a fellow NCO had performed a number of low-level exchanges of information in the hire of the Soviets. On one occasion, they faced the possibility of exposure by Counter Intelligence Corps agents who searched their living quarters in response to a complaint. Fortunately, for the pair, they had misloaded their camera and the film revealed nothing.

In 1961, much to the delight of the Soviets, Johnson was positioned to become a guard at the Armed Forces Courier Center at Orly Airport outside of Paris. No other facility in all of Europe was more critical to the United States, and armed guards protected it day and night. Here, top-secret and higher documents passed through on way to their ultimate destinations in France, Germany, and Great Britain. Again, Johnson's luck held. His submission for an upgraded clearance was helped along by guidelines prohibiting counterintelligence agents from interviewing Johnson's French neighbors who might have revealed a less than normal family life style. Security lapses by fellow guards enabled Johnson to copy keys to the inner vaults containing the most secret of documents. The KGB eventually arranged for a number of their technicians to be on stand by for the sole purpose of copying documents absconded by Johnson. By the time he departed for a change of duty 2 years later, Johnson had delivered documents and cipher systems of NATO, American commands in Europe, and the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and had enabled his handlers to receive the prestigious Order of Lenin. In 1964, Johnson's life as a spy came unraveled when his wife who suffered from severe mental problems disclosed his double life. Johnson would later die in prison, stabbed to death by his visiting son who had recently returned from a tour of duty in Vietnam and who was apparently despondent over his father's treason.

### US Army Intelligence Command

On 1 January 1965, the Army created the Intelligence Corps Command, a major Army command, and assigned it operational control of counterintelligence in CONUS, principally the MI groups supporting the six CONUS armies and the Military District of Washington (Washington, DC). Its purpose was to correct the deficiencies pointed out in the SECURITY SHIELD study. The Chief of Staff, US Army, articulated the following goal: "that the Army, in these perilous times, should have a fully inte-



*Major General William H. Blakefield (on right) hosts a USAINTC Commanders Conference in 1967. (INSCOM)*

grated, centrally controlled investigative organization which can function smoothly and effectively on a local, national, or worldwide basis, and which will permit pinpoint concentration of responsibility for any and all of its operations.”

At the same time, the Army Intelligence Corps Activity went away and its noncounterintelligence functions, such as the newly designated Imagery Interpretation Center, were transferred to ACSI. For the first time in history, the Chief, Intelligence Corps, performed operational responsibilities while wearing his new hat as Commander, Intelligence Corps Command. However, this arrangement only further tightened the organizational knot. Instead of reporting to three bosses (ACSI, CONARC, and Second Army), the Chief, Intelligence Corps now had a fourth—the Chief of Staff, US Army. This arrangement would last for only 6 months.


On 1 July 1965, the Army redesignated the Intelligence Corps Command as the US Army Intelligence Command (USAINTC). Functions previously performed by the Intelligence Corps Command that were not directly related to counterintelligence operations—administering the intelligence civilian career program and procuring intelligence materiel—reverted to ACSI, resulting in the

establishment of the Administrative Survey Detachment and the Intelligence Materiel Development Support Office as separate field operating agencies. Over the coming 9 months, the combined headquarters structure associated with the Intelligence Corps was also broken up, and its major pieces, such as the US Army Intelligence School, placed under separate commanders. The Intelligence Corps itself was discontinued in March 1966, and its personnel functions transferred to the Department of Army level. This ended the Army’s attempts to integrate human intelligence and counterintelligence under a single organizational structure. Finally, discontinuation of the Intelligence Corps resulted in the redesignation of all its former units to that of “Military Intelligence.”

The creation of the US Army Intelligence Command meant that the Army counterintelligence organization had been turned inside out. The old Counter Intelligence Corps had selected, trained, and administered Army counterintelligence personnel, but counterintelligence operations themselves had been decentralized under the control of local Army commanders. The new major Army field command was a centralized operational organization without any administrative or training functions. The demise of the Intelligence Corps ended a special tradition



Until 1968, the 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Group was stationed at Wallace Barracks in Stuttgart, Germany. (INSCOM)



USAINTC soldiers man its operations center. During the late 1960s, the situation was anything but normal. (INSCOM)



*In 1961, East Berlin authorities built a wall to stop the exodus of its citizens. It also greatly reduced the flow of intelligence. (INSCOM)*

that went back to the Corps of Intelligence Police in World War I, but the new arrangements meant that Army counterintelligence was now aligned with the rest of the Army.

The US Army Intelligence Command (USAINTC) quickly developed into an extremely efficient organization. Its seven military intelligence groups maintained a network of 300 field and resident offices scattered across the continental United States, located in mostly large to mid-size metropolitan areas. Project SECURITY SHIELD led to the consolidation of the Army's criminal files with those of counterintelligence on 1 July 1965 and transfer of their control to USAINTC. For the first time, an investigative check of an individual's records would automatically result in a check of both past counterintelligence and criminal files. The master index of the facility at Fort Holabird included in excess of 11 million references, and its 20 miles of files were housed in a building as large as three football fields. The new facility was redesignated as the US Army Investigative Records Repository. Further consolidation of records from the US Army Europe Central

Registry and the Counterintelligence Repository, Japan, added seven million more files to the collection.

Finally, in 1966, USAINTC became the DOD agent administering the newly created Defense Central Index of Investigations (DCII) and the National Agency Check Center (NACC). The DCII was a master file of all counterintelligence and criminal investigations performed by the armed services, and the NACC performed records searches on files maintained by non-DOD agencies such as the FBI and local police departments. Over 1.6 million National Agency Checks were completed in the first year alone. Under the old decentralized system, it took an average of 97 days to perform a background investigation; now the process was down to a month.

### **Changes in Europe**

Opportunities by US intelligence to exploit Soviet and Warsaw Pact sources began to diminish in Europe. The construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 and the simultaneous imposition of tighter border controls by East

Germany effectively shut off the refugee flow. This development reduced the need to have three major intelligence units with partially overlapping responsibilities in Europe. Concurrently, the newly redesignated 66<sup>th</sup> and 513<sup>th</sup> Intelligence Corps (INTC) Groups were reorganized once again. This time to solve the coordination problems brought about by being structured along geographical lines. The 513<sup>th</sup> INTC Group assumed complete responsibility for human intelligence and certain sensitive counterespionage missions within US Army Europe, while the 66<sup>th</sup> INTC Group was reassigned to Seventh Army and assumed the mission of the inactivated 532<sup>d</sup> MI Battalion, which had previously been responsible for screening between 20,000 and 30,000 refugees annually. The 66<sup>th</sup> INTC Group lost its regional form of organization and emerged as the command headquarters

for various intelligence units attached to the Seventh Army's corps and divisions.

### South Vietnam

Barely registering on the radar in the Pacific was the activation of the 704<sup>th</sup> INTC Detachment on 25 January 1962 in Saigon, the capital of South Vietnam. The unit consisting of 46 officers and enlisted men was attached to the US Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam (MAAG-V), but remained assigned to the 500<sup>th</sup> INTC Group back in Japan. Personnel of the 704<sup>th</sup> were quartered at a large compound situated at #10 Hoang Hoa Tham, Gia Dinh Province—a residential community on the outskirts of Saigon. The facility provided space for billets, offices, a mess, and a recreational area.



*In Vietnam, facility security became a high priority for counterintelligence. Here, local workers are shown being searched before they depart. (INSCOM)*

Although not the first Army intelligence unit to be deployed, the 704<sup>th</sup> was the first one belonging to the Intelligence Corps. Unlike other military elements in South Vietnam, the 704<sup>th</sup> did not initially lack for proficient Vietnamese and French linguists. The detachment's mission entailed all phases of traditional counterintelligence work: counterespionage, countersabotage, and countersubversion.

Initially, the 704<sup>th</sup> Intelligence Corps Detachment focused its limited resources on advising its South Vietnamese counterpart, the Military Security Service. The Military Security Service had no direct connection with other Army, Republic of Vietnam intelligence elements and was solely responsible for counterintelligence. Unfortunately, Military Security Services' major interest was political reporting on internal threats to the regime.

The 704<sup>th</sup> also conducted each month some 100 security investigations on US personnel. Lack of means to travel safely throughout the country greatly cut down on the numbers of background checks performed. Counterintelligence personnel often waited for aircraft or convoys to become available, and upon arriving at a contact's home base, the investigating agent frequently faced still more delays waiting for the individual to return from an operation.

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***“Vietnam was not viewed as a high priority counterintelligence threat at the time.... Were our operations penetrated during that period? Obviously they were. Why? Failure to give proper emphasis to the CI aspects of clandestine operations.”***

**Russell Holmes, CIA counterintelligence officer**

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To keep South Vietnam from collapsing under the weight of military setbacks and political crises, US Army and Marine ground forces deployed in 1965 together with supporting air and naval elements. The new J2, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV)—MG Joseph A. McChristian—restructured his staff so that it could respond to the increased mission. Among the steps taken by McChristian was to create a Counterintelligence Division, which was divided into three branches: Personnel Security, Counterintelligence, and Security of Military Information. The Counterintelligence Division established an orientation course for all incoming personnel regardless of service to remind them that enemy intelligence was listening and watching. Other functions included conducting special operations and monitoring the status of those missing in action and POWs. In December, Com-

pany B, 519<sup>th</sup> MI Battalion, arrived to replace the 704<sup>th</sup> INTC Detachment. For the first time, sufficient counterintelligence teams existed for deployment throughout the country. However, lack of language skills and the inability of US counterintelligence agents to blend with the local population hampered operations. This meant a heavy dependence upon South Vietnamese linguists as part of joint teams. Nine months later, the counterintelligence effort was significantly upgraded when the 135<sup>th</sup> MI Group arrived under the command of COL Paul Goodman to replace Company B, 519<sup>th</sup> MI Battalion. Within a year, all MACV elements had access to counterintelligence support.

Winning the hearts and minds of the South Vietnamese was a major objective of the war planners. Consequently, the US Embassy, which was charged with developing counter themes, had a vital interest in the impact the enemy's words were having on the local population. The enemy's use of propaganda against Allied servicemen was of equal concern. In particular, the enemy bombarded the III Corps Tactical Zone, which surrounded Saigon, with leaflets. Besides monitoring and reporting on such propaganda efforts, counterintelligence also conducted security inspections, evaluations, and liaison visits to bring home to both US and South Vietnamese combat units the need to take appropriate countermeasures.

Because Vietnam was a guerrilla war and the threat of sabotage was always present, Army counterintelligence placed a great deal of emphasis upon physical security. Regular inspections of facilities noted any deficiency in terms of guard forces, alarm systems, perimeter lightings, and physical barriers. Counterintelligence also screened locally hired Vietnamese who had access to facilities. To safeguard the power grid that surrounded Allied installations in Saigon, Allied leaders established a Combined Security Committee under the leadership of the city's Chief of Police. Six short months later, the enemy put the system to the test when it launched a major offensive in January 1968 during the celebration of Tet. Communications lines were among the primary targets.

Vietnam has often been called an intelligence war—finding an elusive enemy in a sea of green. On the other hand, it was not noted for major successes in the area of counterintelligence. This is not to say a threat did not exist. General McChristian summed up the challenge: “The rather simple, unsophisticated character of the enemy disguised his complex, highly efficient intelligence system....Further, it is doubtful that the average US officer or enlisted man ever appreciated the extent of the Communist collection effort even though the Counterintelligence Division placed maximum emphasis on educating them to the security hazards confronting the command daily.”

Army counterintelligence was not alone in its challenge to improve security. Leaders of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Army Security Agency (ASA) both



*America's cities, both people and property, were put at risk during several large riots in the 1960s. (LC)*



*Troops were called out in response to the growing anti-war movement, which faded away when US forces in Vietnam drew down and the draft ended. (LC)*

acknowledged similar failures in their respective pieces of the security pie. For example, communications security specialists of ASA failed to convince Army personnel that enemy signal intelligence specialists could and did routinely monitor radio/telephone traffic and broke and exploited home-made codes in a timely manner.

By mid-1969, America's new president, Richard M. Nixon, announced the withdrawal of the first US troops and the transfer of the fighting back to the Army, Republic of Vietnam. Subsequently, military intelligence began a series of downsizing reorganizations. Marginally effective missions were first on the chopping block, which led to a reduction in counterintelligence resources and the inactivation of the 135<sup>th</sup> MI Group in September 1969.

### Civil Strife

The 1960s were marked by disturbances and riots in the wake of the Civil Rights Movement and anti-war movements, coupled by the increased presence of radical fringe groups. Commanders of Federal troops deployed to maintain the peace were demanding better knowledge of the local situation. Just showing up with force was not adequate. Since the early 1940s, the job for collecting domestic intelligence had fallen on the shoulders of the FBI. But the FBI possessed neither the personnel nor makeup of personnel to adequately do the job. Middle-age agents conducting surveillance didn't blend well with student rioters. This would cause Army counterintelligence to abandon its long-standing policy against involvement in domestic intelligence.

The leaders of USAINTC did not dive head-long into domestic intelligence; they would take a series of steps—

each encouraged and blessed by higher-ups. During the Watts Riots (Los Angeles) in August 1965, USAINTC established a crisis support center after the fact. To facilitate coordination during future incidents that might require a timely military response in the Nation's capital, USAINTC assigned plain-clothes agents to the Washington, DC, Police Department. The next major step was the formulation of a contingency plan in 1966 under the name of STEEP HILL that allowed for collection following the deployment of federal troops. But STEEP HILL (redesignated in 1967 as GARDEN PLOT) was soon judged to be inadequate; for commanders in the field to receive the help needed, USAINTC would have to begin collection once it became likely that troops would deploy. Thus a new plan by the name of ROSE HILL (later designated PUNCH BLOCK and still later LANTERN SPIKE) was prepared. During the Meredith Civil Rights March in Mississippi, members of the 111<sup>th</sup> MI Group filed regular spot reports (130 altogether) using mobile-mounted telephones along the route.

In 1967 alone, 83 riots and civil disorders left over 80 dead and 2,000 injured. The National Guard deployed in response to 25 of these disturbances, and the LANTERN SPIKE collection plan was implemented four times. In the wake of the riots in Detroit, which resulted in more than \$100 million of damages, Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance tasked the Army with "reconnoitering the major cities" to gain such information as topography and vulnerability before any troops would be sent into urban areas. One of the warrant officers involved was quick to point out the major flaw in such thinking, "There we were plotting power plants, radio stations, and armories on the situation maps when we should have been locating the

liquor and color-television stores instead.” Deputy Secretary Vance went on to urge greater analysis of data—another step towards involvement. The emerging anti-war movement brought with it still more disturbances and actual attacks against Federal facilities and potential harm to government personnel. The anti-war movement also presented a new threat by fostering sedition in the ranks.

During the march on the Pentagon in October 1967, USAINTC agents issued 687 spot reports, and the command provided 49 special summaries to the Pentagon Operations Center. USAINTC began to dramatically widen its collection on sources of potential subversion

***“I honestly believe we drifted into this area without quite realizing what we were getting into and because no one else was around to do the job. I’m convinced that no one intended to spy on individuals or control civilian life in any way. But I also believe that some of the things begun, if expanded, sure as hell posed a real risk.”***

**Robert E. Jordan III, General Counsel of the Army**

and sabotage; subsequently USAINTC’s files at Fort Holabird began to bulge. Despite being blessed by the leadership of the Johnson Administration, the assembling of this data bank of civilian intelligence still lacked formal authorization by statute. Domestic intelligence data collection also involved an independent effort on the part of intelligence and counterintelligence units assigned to the Continental Army Command and the field armies in the United States. Although on a much smaller scale than USAINTC, these elements maintained their own files.

Riots in the Nation’s capital following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in 1968 initiated still stronger measures by Army counterintelligence. Nationwide, USAINTC expended nearly a half million dollars in response to various disturbances and events surrounding the King assassination. In a 2-week period, USAINTC furnished a total of 2,388 reports of information to Army commands and governmental agencies. The command also prepared 29 special summaries in response to Department of the Army one-time requests. The various military intelligence groups submitted some 3,000 spot reports to USAINTC’s operations center.

At this point, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence set up civil disturbance elements within its Counterintelli-

gence and Counterintelligence Analysis Branches. They soon became the recipients of a huge amount of data on a daily basis from the FBI. During 1968, the CI Analysis Branch sent observers to the Democratic National Convention in Chicago and the Republican convention in Miami. In Chicago, the 113<sup>th</sup> MI Group created an emergency command and control facility. Eighteen two-man teams gathered information on demonstrations and the subsequent confrontations with the police, and a separate element performed visual surveillance out of a van painted to look like it belonged to a bogus television broadcasting company. Army authorities judged the overall support furnished by USAINTC elements as excellent.

In 1968, the Department of the Army created a classified Civil Disturbance Information Collection Plan that levied requirements upon USAINTC that could not be filled by traditional methods of overt collection or liaison with the FBI and local law enforcement. The plan indicated that the current state of affairs was such that the Army must obtain information on future hot spots and potential trouble makers. Although the plan acknowledged that anti-war and racial movements were made up of mostly sincere Americans, it contended that a handful still meant to exploit the situation for violence. In keeping with a long historical tradition, the Army only “seeks to collect that needed to exercise honest and sound judgment of the measures to be taken in suppressing rampant violence and restoring order—to assure that only the mildest effective measures are exercised...”.

The most significant flaw of the Civil Disturbance Information Collection Plan was its openness to receiving input on individuals and organizations on the fringe. For instance, it encouraged a vacuum cleaner approach that swept up a wide variety of information on university, church, and political groups opposed to the Vietnam War. For this reason, when the executive secretary of the Central Committee of Conscientious Objectors spoke on a college campus, a new file was created. Consequently, the central data base soon ballooned to some 100,000 entities. Then there were the rare occasions when even the lines drawn by the Army were crossed. For example, in 1969, FBI agents, without a search warrant, did a surreptitious search of the Washington Free Press headquarters. Their findings were subsequently turned over to USAINTC for analysis.

Members of the new Nixon Administration in 1969 were the first to question the long-range consequences of these blanket requirements. Robert F. Froehlke, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration, expressed his doubt about whether or not the demands made upon USAINTC had gone “substantially beyond the capability for military intelligence units to collect. These questions reflected the all encompassing and uninhibited demand for information directed at the Department of the Army.” But it would take a suit in 1970 by the American Civil Liberties Union against US Army Intelligence Command for “spying

on civilians" to bring the collection effort to a screeching halt.

In summing up this period, it is important to remember that civil disobedience and disturbance tested the system on a scale never before faced. Each cause had its radical fringe groups bent on violence, and the civil-rights movement experienced a counter reaction of violence against many of its activities and organizations. A legitimate rationale existed for collecting against such groups that threatened the life and property of ordinary citizens, destruction of Government property, and sedition within the ranks of the Armed Forces. The Justice Department and FBI could not provide the Department of Defense and law enforcement with the extent of information that was believed necessary to maintain order. So with the full weight of the chain of command behind them, Army counterintelligence stepped in to help fill the void.


If there was one great overarching mistake made by USAINTC, it was that the command collected information for the sake of collecting. So much of it was peripheral to any threat, real or imagined. One officer who served in one of the field offices recalled jokingly that sometimes more agents than activists showed up at anti-war rallies. Ironically, what allowed USAINTC to accomplish as much as it did was its tremendous efficiency; USAINTC did all

of this collection, reporting, and filing while fulfilling its major duties of conducting background investigations, performing force protection, and dealing with day-to-day security issues.

For any excesses, the White House, the Justice Department, FBI, and the Army leadership all legally shouldered a part of the responsibility or as Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird put it, "The military is sometimes blamed but this operation was known by the highest authorities within government." However, as is often the case, the lowest echelon—in this instance, Army counterintelligence—would bear more than its share of the consequences.

## NEW DIRECTIONS

Public disclosure of the Army's domestic intelligence efforts through newspapers and a national television documentary brought a swift response by the Army to minimize potential damage. The US Army Intelligence Command would undergo a complete 180-degree reversal overnight. On 19 February 1970, USAINTC issued orders that all civil disturbance and civilian biographic data stored in the Investigative Records Repository at Fort Holabird be destroyed. As the command's historian put it,



*Since the 1950s, the Investigative Records Repository served as an important asset to Army Counterintelligence. (INSCOM)*



*Defense Against Methods of Entry Class being taught at the newly established US Army Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. (INSCOM)*

"instead of collect, process, and store, the order of the day was research, screen, and destroy." The Continental Army Command and the field armies in the United States would carry out a similar purge of their collections of domestic intelligence. Finally, the ambitious Civil Disturbance Information Collection Plan was formally rescinded in June. In spite of these steps, the damage had been done.

In early 1971, the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights from the Committee on the Judiciary, chaired by the venerable Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina, opened a series of hearings on violations of civil liberties by government authorities. In February, the Army ordered USAINTC to suspend all countersubversive and counterespionage activities. Created to curb abuses in counterintelligence, the Defense Investigative Review Council decided that all service-connected background investigations should be centralized under a new civilian body, the Defense Investigative Service (DIS). Control of the Central Index of Investigations and the National Agency Check Center was given over to DIS in October 1972 along with 1,400 personnel spaces—altogether, 90 percent of USAINTC's mission. Three military intelligence groups in CONUS and 250 field offices were closed in the process. Control of criminal investigative files was simultaneously

passed to the new US Army Criminal Investigative Command. An exception to these losses was overseas where Army counterintelligence would continue to perform Personnel Security Investigations in support of the new DIS. A colonel now commanded what was left of USAINTC.

These actions had the total effect of undoing major parts of Project SECURITY SHIELD put in place less than a decade before. But Army counterintelligence lost more than resources and economy. Some of the legislation and executive orders unfortunately went far beyond providing reasoned restraints; they also had a chilling effect that would impact operations into the next millennium. For the first time, lawyers began to play an active role in policy decisions that in the past had been based solely on security considerations.

In 1971, the newly restructured US Army Intelligence Center and School was relocated from Fort Holabird to Fort Huachuca, Arizona, as part of a master intelligence concept by the then ACSI, MG Joseph A. McChristian. However, all did not go as planned. The school at Fort Huachuca immediately ran into water restrictions that forced a scale back of McChristian's vision. A part of the curtailed plans included a large chunk of USAINTC, which was to have been reconfigured as a Counterintelligence

Direktorate within the new MI center. Meanwhile, the remnants of USAINTC at Fort Holabird could not justify keeping the post open, forcing the command in July 1973 to relocate 20 miles south to Fort Meade, Maryland, a large multipurpose post. The command's treasured "Golden Sphinx," which once sat outside USAINTC headquarters, barely made the trip through the Baltimore Harbor Tunnel without breaking apart—symbolic of the fragile condition of the command itself.

The end of USAINTC and its remaining military intelligence groups came on 1 July 1974. In its place, the Army established the US Army Intelligence Agency (USAINTA) at Fort Meade. Initially, USAINTA, a field operating agency under ACSI, controlled two major units: the 902<sup>d</sup> MI Group, relocated to Fort Meade and the 525<sup>th</sup> MI Group, recently returned from Vietnam and stationed at the Presidio of San Francisco. Dividing their support to the Army along the Mississippi River, the two groups

***"Major General Joseph McChristian had a dream. He dreamed of creating a central training school that would transform Army Intelligence units into an elite corps. That dream, the general charged yesterday, was largely dried up by the Army when it was decided to put the school in arid Fort Huachuca, Arizona. 'My concepts, my recommendations were overruled.'"***

Long Island Newsday, 11 May 1972



As it had for more than 2 decades, Army counterintelligence provided security to testing of special weapons. (INSCOM)

shared the CONUS counterintelligence mission. USAINTA also inherited from USAINTC a technical support activity providing polygraph, technical service countermeasures, and computer security assistance; the US Army Counterintelligence Support Detachment (later designated Central Security Facility), comprising the Investigative Records Repository and the Personnel Security Group; and the Administrative Survey Detachment. Finally, the Army gave USAINTA an overseas responsibility—the 500<sup>th</sup> MI Group in the process of moving from Hawaii back to Japan.

The ink had not yet dried upon USAINTA's organizational charts before another study was underway, not just to reshape Army counterintelligence but all of military intelligence. From a historical perspective, counterintelligence had undergone seven major restructurings, averaging one every 4 years since World War II; its organization had been literally in a constant state of flux. Contrast that with the other pillar of military intelligence, the US Army Security Agency, which experienced only one such major change over the same period. The difference was, that unlike ASA, which labored under the umbrella of the National Security Agency, counterintelligence enjoyed no protection from Army planners who during peacetime often tended to restructure for the sake of restructuring. Over time, such constant turmoil was bound to have a negative effect of unknown proportions on operational efficiency.

### The State of Counterintelligence

By the seventies, Army counterintelligence had shrunk to a very small piece of the military intelligence pie. Resource-wise it consisted of 5.6 percent of the funds and 5.8 of the personnel; in real terms, \$35 million and approximately 2,500 personnel—military and members of the Civilian Excepted Service Program. In contrast, the Army Security Agency, which performed signals intelligence, had some 80 percent of the manpower and even more in terms of dollars. Almost half of the counterintelligence resources were located at HQDA (ACSI) and USAINTA. Another third was in Europe: assigned to the 66<sup>th</sup> MI Group or the 650<sup>th</sup> MI Group (as the 450<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment had been redesignated) in support of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. The final pieces of any size were in support of US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) in CONUS and the Caribbean or as part of the Eighth US Army in Korea. Of all manpower spaces worldwide, 20 percent were in direct support of tactical forces.

At the mid-point in the Cold War, the mission of Army counterintelligence could be broken down into three major areas. The first was personnel security investigations (PSI) required to grant or deny a security clearance; to respond to a complaint of alleged espionage, sabotage,


etc; and to clarify if a formal investigation was required. The second major functional area involved operations directed against foreign intelligence activities. Since 1968, the ACSI leadership had taken a series of actions to revitalize the Army's most sensitive counterintelligence missions, beginning with formulation of new doctrine. By the early 1970s, these special operations were consuming 20 to 25 percent of counterintelligence's overall resources.

The third major area covered a wide range of functions involving education, assistance, and inspections. Typically, security education consisted of an orientation class on the threat of subversion. Assistance took many forms. For example, specialists evaluated security containers against various methods of entry. Inspections were used to estimate the nature and degree of the security threat confronting a command or agency. An abbreviated form of a survey was the counterintelligence inspection that addressed a unit's compliance to established security policy and guidelines. Going a step beyond a survey, counterintelligence professionals could simulate a hostile intelligence attack against an installation or organization.

### The Final Shoe

In 1974, the Chief of Staff, US Army, Fred C. Weyand, directed MG James J. Ursano, Director of Management, to lead a review of Army intelligence subsequently known as the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study (IOSS). The reasons behind IOSS were many, but they generally fell into one of several categories. Program budget decisions in 1973 had significantly curtailed military intelligence resources, making consolidation and cuts within headquarters and support elements inevitable. A second rationale stemmed from recent inspections by the Army Audit Agency and the Inspector General that pointed out deficiencies in the way the Army Security Agency did business in the arenas of materiel and force development and contingency planning. The ACSI also faced criticism for focusing too much of his energies on human intelligence/counterintelligence management at the expense of the larger military intelligence community. Underneath the surface of the review was the desire on the part of the Army's leadership to bring military intelligence in step with the rest of the service. For all too long ASA had been viewed as standing apart from the larger Army, operating from behind green doors marked "Restricted." Counterintelligence and human intelligence personnel suffered from a similar image problem—the stigma of being labeled "spooks."

In addressing the need for change in the arena of counterintelligence, the authors of IOSS drew heavily upon the doctrine of operations security (OPSEC) that had emerged from within the Department of Defense in the late sixties. Operations security was the premise that a broader approach than counterintelligence or communica-



*Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Virginia, became headquarters to the newly established USA Intelligence and Security Command. (INSCOM)*

tions security was needed to identify and counter threats from foreign intelligence agencies. A joint effort was required that simultaneously addressed military deception, physical security, communications security, and information security. What was the profit of only looking at the threat of foreign agents when the enemy's signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), and electronic-warfare attacks went unchecked? The IOSS reflected the latest terms: counter-HUMINT, counter-SIGINT, and counter-IMINT.

The IOSS went on to point out that USAINTA had developed, tested, and delivered a comprehensive OPSEC approach to commanders with sensitive missions, but such an approach had not been implemented Army-wide. Nowhere was the failure more evident than at the tactical level. The lack of OPSEC was also reflected in the allocation of resources where no correlation existed between the magnitude of the threats and the counter effort against them. Of the approximately 3,200 man-years devoted to security, 20 percent was devoted to counter-SIGINT and the remaining 80 percent to counter-HUMINT. Almost nothing was given over to counter-IMINT.

### **Bringing The Pieces Together**

As a result of IOSS, two new organizational entities were created that for the first time in the history of military intelligence brought together intelligence collection, counterintelligence, and electronic warfare. Stationed at historic Arlington Hall, Arlington Virginia, former site of ASA's headquarters, the US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) consolidated most of the functions at echelon above corps. The Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence (CEWI) Battalions were designed to support the Army at corps and below.

The US Army Intelligence and Security Command now controlled counterintelligence (CI) elements within each of the overseas military intelligence groups (66<sup>th</sup>, 470<sup>th</sup>, 500<sup>th</sup>, and the newly created 501<sup>st</sup> in Korea). The only element left out was the 650<sup>th</sup> MI Group that remained in support of SHAPE. The second counterintelligence building block was USAINTA and its various components: 525<sup>th</sup> MI Group, 902<sup>d</sup> MI Group, the 901<sup>st</sup> MI Detachment (in support of the Defense Nuclear Agency), Special Operations Detachment (involving sensitive counterintelligence operations), and the Central Security Facility (the Investi-



*As part of Operations Security, technical countermeasures specialists test communications. (INSCOM)*



*Fort Meade continued to remain as headquarters for most of the Army's counterintelligence resources. (INSCOM)*

gative Records Repository). The third and final piece to be merged consisted of a number of small elements from ASA located worldwide and responsible for the Army's counter-SIGINT mission.

Major General William I. Rolya was selected to serve as INSCOM's first commander. It was a logical choice. As ASA's last commander, he had been involved in the IOSS planning from the beginning and knew as well as anyone the vision of the Army leadership. Also having a background of a signal officer, General Rolya owed less loyalty to a specific discipline and more to the larger military intelligence community, and having come up through the ranks, Rolya was also seen as possessing the people skills so essential in bringing diverse groups together. These qualities were immediately put to the test as MG Rolya had to work with the Army staff, theater commanders, and the Intelligence Community on new, yet to be defined, terms. He also had to bring together staff heads and major subordinate commanders who up to this point in their careers had gone to different Army schools and followed

separate career paths that had given rise to an attitude of indifference to each other's contributions.

Compounding the problem, the new headquarters did not possess a collocated staff. The majority of the staff was at Arlington Hall Station, but a sizeable chunk, consisting mainly of CI/HUMINT elements, remained nearly 40 miles to the north at Fort Meade. Added to this was the lack of secure communications between the two sites. The situation continued until 1986 when Congressional authority was finally received for a consolidation at Arlington Hall. Until then, staff members found themselves daily on the road to attend meetings at the other co-headquarters.

One of INSCOM's highest priorities was providing threat data and technical advice and assistance in support of operations security. Following the drafting of an OPSEC plan by an Army command, INSCOM personnel would proceed to test the plan by simulating the HUMINT, IMINT, and SIGINT threats posed by a foreign

intelligence service. This procedure eventually evolved into the Multidiscipline Operations Security Support (MOSS) Concept. Using a tailored approach, specialists from the US Army Intelligence and Security Command were able to determine an activity's security profile and the necessary countermeasures needed to protect sensitive information. For instance, counterintelligence personnel analyzed the Army's nuclear community's vulnerabilities to hostile intelligence and provided OPSEC for a number of major weapon systems such as the research and development phase of the Ballistic Missile Defense System. With INSCOM's assistance, the Vice Chief of Staff, US Army, set out a series of priority steps in 1980 for major Army commands to undertake to enhance their operations security.

The second building block of military intelligence was the Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence (CEWI) Battalions at corps and below. Each battalion consisted of four companies. Within the Headquarters and Headquar-

ters Company, there was an OPSEC Support Section that was further broken down into a CI team, a COMSEC team, and an ELSEC (electronics security) team. By the 1980s, plans called for 15 battalions to be created, each in the support of a combat division. Unfortunately, CEWI counterintelligence resources were never utilized to their fullest potential. In 1978, the Vice Chief of Staff, US Army directed that the Readiness Training for US Army Intelligence Resources (REDTRAIN) be expanded to include counterintelligence. The 902<sup>d</sup> MI Group was given the lead and deployed mobile training teams to enhance the proficiency of tactical counterintelligence.

The 1970s marked the end of an era for military intelligence which stretched back to the end of World War II. No longer would intelligence and security stand apart from the rest of the Army. To many, the so-called "greening-of-MI" was long overdue. However, the new organizational structures themselves would present a whole new series of challenges.



*The creation of firewalls around sensitive programs led to an increased use of the polygraph. (INSCOM)*

## THE END OF THE COLD WAR

The 1980s began with a retreat from operations security to more specific goals, such as upgrading of counterespionage and renewed focus on computer security. OPSEC had stretched a limited number of resources too thin. The principal type of counter-SIGINT support requested by commanders was communications monitoring. However, the lack of qualified personnel (less than 1 percent of INSCOM resources), aging monitoring equipment, and the increased use of secure equipment were mounting reasons against further pursuing the mission.

During the early eighties, the US Army Intelligence and Security Command redefined counterintelligence doctrine, reissued manuals, upgraded new equipment and systems (especially in the area of electronic security), and enacted new measures to safeguard extremely sensitive information from foreign intelligence agencies. Among the new initiatives was the building of fire walls, which limited the number of personnel cleared for so-called "special access programs." As a second safeguard, the use of the polygraph was expanded. To upgrade the Army's polygraph program, new equipment, greater centralization, tighter quality control, and greater numbers of examiners were rushed into place. Another initiative involved the

recruitment of qualified technical personnel with the expertise to provide technical assistance in the selection of Army software systems being used in the emerging world of information security. Finally, INSCOM implemented the policy of dispatching a Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) team to evaluate facilities where sensitive Army activities were being carried out.

The counterintelligence assets of the 902<sup>d</sup> MI Group, the major player in CONUS, were restructured. Between 1984 and 1986, the 902<sup>d</sup> MI Group and its three subordinate battalions moved from a solely geographical division (Presidio of San Francisco (CA), Fort Sam Houston (TX), and Fort Meade (MD)) to one in which each battalion was responsible for a specific function (counterespionage, technical, or security). Eventually, all three battalions would be collocated with the 902<sup>d</sup> headquarters at Fort Meade.

### Operations

The decade began with the kidnapping of a US Army senior official, BG James L. Dozier, who was held captive for 6 weeks by the Italian Red Brigade. Counterintelligence personnel were involved in both the search and the debriefing phases. More importantly, the episode raised



*During the aftermath of URGENT FURY in Grenada, a stay-behind counterintelligence detachment discovered weapons hidden under a false floor at the former Cuban embassy. (INSCOM)*



*For decades, members of the 470<sup>th</sup> MI Group helped to secure the Panama Canal Zone, but in the 1980s, they became engaged throughout the region in opposing low-intensity threats. (NARA)*

terrorism as a threat that Army counterintelligence would have to address in the future. Previously, international terrorism had been an issue for the State Department, which issued guidelines for US personnel living abroad, and for

the FBI, which directed the response on the home front. A study at the time pointed out the dearth of background information on the subject. The findings concluded that gaps in coverage existed and that INSCOM should be

responsible for submitting a new plan that outlined the Army's mission and delineated the various requirements by echelon. For the first time, the Army assembled a set of basic principles to counter the potential threat from terrorism abroad.

In response to the rapid buildup of Cuban and Soviet activities in Grenada, the murder of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, and potential harm to US citizens—many of whom were students at the local medical college—the United States along with nations of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States deployed forces to the island nation on 22 October 1983.

A team of nine soldiers from INSCOM performed a stay-behind counterintelligence mission in support of the peacekeeping forces. The CI team's discovery of a large cache of weapons hidden in a building that at one time housed the Cuban Embassy in the capital city of Saint George's was a major achievement. Acting upon the tip that bags of cement had been seen being brought into the facility prior to its being abandoned by Cuban diplomats, counterintelligence personnel accompanied local police as they searched the premises. Here they uncovered a false floor in one of the closets. Inside were numerous rifles, grenade launchers, submachine guns, and pistols, plus over 500,000 rounds of ammunition.

Elsewhere in the Caribbean Basin, Army intelligence monitored the attempt of a Marxist (and Cuban-allied) government in Nicaragua to foment revolution in the small, troubled nation of El Salvador. The Army Intelligence and Security Command's unit in the theater, the 470<sup>th</sup> MI Group, was strategically located in the Panama Canal Zone to safeguard the critically important canal and US interests in the region. Counterintelligence also played an important role in providing force protection to Army combat units deployed to Honduras for various field exercises during the 1980s. The Army committed added resources to the counterdrug effort, leading the 470<sup>th</sup> MI Group to target narcotics traffickers and engage in operations that extended into the Andes Mountains of South America.

### The Decade of The Spy

Since the early seventies, the US Army had in place a small but professional element to direct its worldwide spy-catching effort. Over time, its members had become extremely adept at turning the tables in the spy-counter-spy game by luring hostile intelligence handlers into traps through the use of double agents. The real heroes of such operations were often military and civilian personnel who dutifully reported being approached by a foreign



*Hostile intelligence services worked out of the Soviet mission in New York City and posed a major threat to the security of sensitive technology. (LC)*



*Surveillance photos of Army sergeant Clyde Conrad (right) and his handler. (INSCOM)*

agent, and then agreed to assume the role of spy; an undertaking often requiring great patience and personal sacrifice on their part.

Europe was most often the battleground of spy versus counterspy being played out in the shadows of the Cold War. Counterintelligence faced an added challenge in Berlin. Located some 100 miles behind the Iron Curtain, the city was an ideal outpost for Western intelligence. Under these circumstances, it was logical that US intelligence personnel would become prime targets for possible exploitation by Soviet intelligence services which wanted to know: "What information did the United States possess?" and "Where were the Soviets themselves vulnerable?" Since 1975, the Army had operated an elite counterintelligence element—the 766<sup>th</sup> MI Detachment—as a shield against these threats in Berlin.

When referring to what motivated spies, counterintelligence personnel frequently used the acronym "MICE" (money, ideology, corruption, coercion, and ego). In the beginning of the Cold War, many of those who betrayed the United States did so for ideological reasons; at the end of the conflict, the motivations were almost solely monetary and psychological in nature. In the mid-1980s, these proved to be the hooks that the Soviets used to reel in what they thought was another prize catch. The

Soviets had become aware, possibly by means of signals intelligence, that a sergeant newly assigned to the sensitive Army site of Field Station Berlin was having trouble making car payments. Fortunately, when approached by the hostile intelligence organization, the American soldier remained loyal, relaying the nature of the contact to members of the 766<sup>th</sup> MI Detachment and volunteering to be doubled.

The operation as it played out illustrated all the little factors that spelled the difference between success and failure: patience to be willing to turn down meetings that were not on turf advantageous to the counterspies; the risk of using actual classified information so that if foreign agents did not possess diplomatic papers, they could be tried in German courts; and the coordination required with French counterparts in whose sector the sting was set. The professionalism of 766<sup>th</sup> MI Detachment personnel was demonstrated when a believable excuse had to be invented for why the sergeant missed a drop the day before. By placing a cast on one of his ankles and placing him on crutches, they furnished the perfect alibi. When the meeting did take place, the Soviets might still have completed the transaction and slipped away unnoticed if not for the good fortune and the sharp eyes of Army counterintelligence specialists. The rendezvous ended

dramatically with a petite female agent wrestling a burley KGB officer into submission. The operation netted three KGB agents, among them, Valery Kirukhin, an officer assigned to the elite First Chief Directorate.

All of Department of Defense was stunned by the arrest of a former Navy Chief Warrant Officer. John A. Walker, Jr. was arrested on 19 May 1985 at the Ramada Inn in Rockville, Maryland, following a drop of deciphered secret Soviet messages in a rural area of the Maryland suburbs of Washington, DC. For 14 years, Walker and his associates, to include two family members and a close friend, had delivered to the enemy literally millions of classified messages and the key to decipher them. The case was a wakeup call to DOD leadership that it was time to readjust priorities, take new initiatives to ensure the security of the force, and double counterintelligence efforts—all with the intention to, as the current ACSI put it, “flush-out any Walkers in our midst.”

During the 1980s, the Army had two cases of its own that rivaled that of the Walkers. The first was the Szabo/Conrad spy ring that placed US and NATO war plans in the hands of the enemy; the damage was potentially such, that had a major conflict actually broken out, Western Europe would have had no recourse other than to surrender. The case is well-documented by COL Stuart A.

Herrington's book *Traitors Among Us*. (Herrington, a career HUMINT/CI officer, served as commander of the 766<sup>th</sup> MI Detachment.) The operation was unusual in the annals of Army counterintelligence for a number of reasons. Like the Walkers, there existed several generations of spies that stretched over 16 years from 1972 to 1988, and the investigation required a significant amount of resources: the expenditure of several million dollars, and during one period, the deployment of 50 agents—all indicators of the seriousness with which the United States and NATO viewed the leaks.

In 1978, National authorities warned the Department of Defense that one of their sources had indicated that high-level war-planning documents were being transmitted to the Soviets through the Hungarian Military Intelligence Service. But the Army's initial investigation went nowhere; more information was needed to identify the source of these breaches of security.

Zoltan Szabo, whose family fled the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 and eventually migrated to the United States, entered the Army and became a decorated veteran of Vietnam; in the early 1970s, he was reassigned to the G3 staff of the 8<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division in Germany. It was here that he was first approached by Hungarian intelligence, which played on his ties to his homeland. Up until his



Berlin became a hot spot for spies and counterspies during the Cold War. Members of the US Army Field Station Berlin, which sat atop a small mountain made of the city's rubble from World War II, were targets of Soviet espionage. (INSCOM)

In the mid-1970s, the Hungarian Intelligence Service approached a chief warrant officer, a Hungarian-American, during a trip to visit his mother in Budapest. Subsequently, the soldier agreed to be managed by Army counterintelligence handlers to foster future contacts. For 18 months, Army counterintelligence managed the warrant officer's meeting with his Hungarian contact. The reassignment of the warrant officer shifted the case back to the United States. Ultimately the drama was played out in Augusta, Georgia, at the local Civil War memorial where FBI agents arrested Otto Gilbert, a Hungarian-born New Yorker, who was attempting to exchange \$4,000 in payment for classified documents provided by the warrant officer from his new assignment. Gilbert was described by those who knew him as witty and charming, but a person void of principles and politics. Years before, he had been recruited by Hungarian intelligence when he was caught in the act of smuggling.

retirement from the Army in 1979, Szabo routinely provided planning documents to his handlers, and he made arrangements to ensure the flow of documents would continue.

In 1985, counterintelligence agents received the break they had been looking for: added information to include a list of the documents and the dates they were taken. Among them was the US Army Europe Operations Plan, which detailed the Army's transition to war. This revelation also brought with it the attention and pressure from on top to move forward with the resources needed to complete the investigation. Herrington quotes the then ACSI, LTG William E. Odom, as wanting "the case tackled with reckless abandon." Given these new clues, the Army counterintelligence agents were quick to draw a profile of the likely perpetrator, and the person who fit it perfectly was one Clyde Conrad: a hard-working noncommissioned officer who had spent an unusually large portion of his career in Germany, mostly with the G3 War Plans Section of the 8<sup>th</sup> Infantry where he was known as "Mr. Plans." Investigators noted that in the late 1970s, Conrad's family seemed to have enjoyed increased prosperity—approximately the same time he had been recruited by Szabo into the business of spying.

As leading Army counterintelligence professionals mulled over their discovery of Conrad, they began for the first time to consider Szabo, who had also served with the G3 Plans at the 8<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division. Another important

piece fell into place when Army counterintelligence identified a master sergeant who early in his career had befriended Conrad and was willing to make the sacrifice necessary to be reassigned to Germany in hopes that Conrad would attempt to recruit his former comrade-in-arms. The final factor that was instrumental to the case was the establishment of a Joint Task Force out of Washington, DC, that included representatives of the Army, the FBI, the CIA, and Department of Justice.

Despite the impressive amount of evidence uncovered, such as the identification of the brothers Sandor and Imre Keresik, Swedish citizens who served as couriers of the classified information, the investigation faced its share of challenges that kept its outcome in jeopardy until the very end. The first surprise was the revelation by the *New York Times* that it was aware of the case. Fortunately, the newspaper agreed to back off the story. A second shock was word that Conrad also had spoken of an unidentified but potentially lucrative source in V Corps. This mysterious individual turned out to be a second soldier being used by the Army to lure Conrad. The case also stretched the Army's capabilities at technical surveillance. One phase involved the use of a private aircraft to monitor Conrad's travels. For various reasons, the Department of Justice also continued to demand an extremely high level of proof to ensure conviction. Finally, there was the decision of when and how to bring German authorities into the picture and, the question of what their response would be.

The end came suddenly on the morning of 23 August 1988 when German officers knocked on Conrad's door and proceeded to place him under arrest. During the ensuing trial, Conrad received a life sentence, the stiffest ever meted out by the Federal Republic of Germany for such a crime, but the courts viewed it as being the most serious act of espionage ever perpetrated against NATO.

While traveling out of country, Szabo and his wife learned of Conrad's arrest and were able to seek immediate refuge in his native Hungary. However, he later freely submitted to a detailed debriefing and named names of all he attempted to recruit over his 17-year career. Army counterintelligence apprehended other members of the spy ring, including a number of minor figures, enlisted soldiers who had for brief periods been exploited by Conrad and Szabo. Besides the loss of most-secret information, just the sheer number of soldiers involved was staggering; among them were many individuals who did not cooperate with Szabo/Conrad but at the same time failed to report the contacts to security personnel.

In 1988, Army counterintelligence first received word of still another spy of importance within the ranks when authorities apprehended a low-level East German agent in the West. In exchange for helping his family to defect, the enemy agent furnished the description of a US soldier who was involved in selling secrets. Counterintelligence



*The fall of the Berlin Wall would alter the spy/counterspy shadow war which had been in effect for almost 45 years. (NARA)*

quickly identified the individual as a warrant officer by the name of James W. Hall. Like Conrad, Hall had spent an unusually large portion of his career in Germany and had been at one time assigned to Field Station Berlin. Since the early 1960s, the US Army had maintained an operational site in West Berlin atop *Teufelsberg* or “Devil’s Mountain,” made of the city’s rubble from World War II. Its array of geodesic domes gave Field Station Berlin a Disney Land like appearance. More importantly, the station provided the West a window into East Germany. It was logical that personnel assigned to such a unit would be high on the target list of foreign intelligence services.

Army counterintelligence began an intensive technical surveillance of Hall in his new assignment at Fort Stewart, Georgia. In the process, they professionally managed a

number of crises that emerged during the investigation. Like the Conrad case, they faced a serious unintended leak; this time involving Hall’s own chain of command. Since timing was critical, Army counterintelligence arranged for the defection of an East German who had at one time been a courier for Hall’s information; upon his relocation to Georgia, he surprised Hall with a telephone call and an offer to meet. On 21 December 1988, Hall walked into the Airport Days Inn in Savannah, Georgia, with more secrets to sell. Here, he was introduced to a new KGB handler, who in reality was an FBI undercover agent. The Hall investigation also brought to light a second stunning revelation—Huseyin Yildirim, a Turk, well-known to all, including members of the intelligence community, as Meister, a mechanic-instructor at the Berlin

Command's auto shop. For many years, Yildirim had helped transport the secrets of Hall and others to East German intelligence.

### The Collapse of The Soviet Union

Fifteen years after the commitment to construct a new headquarters facility for the Army's major intelligence command, the promises of the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study were fulfilled. In July 1989, the Intelligence and Security Command relocated from Arlington Hall to Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The new building was appropriately named after MG Dennis E. Nolan, the Army's first G2 and the leader of the multidiscipline intelligence effort in support of the American Expeditionary Forces during World War I. For members of the counterintelligence community, the name Nolan held added meaning. It was General Nolan, who had initiated the call for the Corps of Intelligence Police, which played an important role in launching Army counterintelligence. It was ironic the same year of the Nolan Building's dedication would also mark the end of the Cold War.


Intelligence historian John P. Finnegan provided the following overview of the Cold War: "At the outset of the Cold War between the Free World and the Soviet Union, former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had grimly noted that 'from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an Iron Curtain has descended across the continent [of Europe].'" The Iron Curtain separating East from West eventually found its most graphic expression in the Berlin Wall, a concrete barrier erected in 1962 to stop the flow of refugees fleeing Communist East Germany. For a whole generation, the Berlin Wall symbolized totalitarianism and the apparently permanent division of Europe. In 1989, it came crashing down. With astonishing speed, the Soviet Empire—and the Soviet Union itself—followed suit...The Cold War had finally ended, not in truce or compromise, but in victory for the West."

For 45 years, Army counterintelligence specialists, both military and civilian, stood as "silent warriors" on the front lines of the Cold War. Twenty-four hours a day, 7 days a

week they remained vigilant against the threat posed by foreign intelligence services. Many a lonely night was spent fighting boredom and drowsiness while conducting surveillance or watching isolated stretches of the Iron Curtain in search of line-crossers. They often dealt with individuals who were neither friends nor foes and whose loyalty was uncertain. Although the full contribution of Army counterintelligence by its very nature is difficult to fully ascertain, there is no doubt as to the sustained professionalism demonstrated by its military and civilian members.

Finally, it is important to remember that the war of espionage was just not a game being played out. Real lives were at stake in the world of spy versus counterspy. On 23 March 1985, the US Military Liaison Mission suffered its first casualty when LTC Arthur D. Nicholson, Jr. was shot by a Soviet guard on patrol near Ludwigslust, East Germany, 100 miles northwest of Berlin. Lieutenant Colonel Nicholson, unarmed, was attempting to photograph Soviet armored vehicles. In a callous act that violated all established norms, Soviet guards restrained Nicholson's companion from rendering aid to the dying officer. It was later speculated that Warrant Officer Hall may have passed information to the Soviets, which alerted them to the US Military Liaison Mission's success in collecting targets in that specific area, and that it was this leak that could have in turn led to the unusually aggressive response on the part of the Soviets.

In the aftermath of the shooting of Nicholson, the White House permitted US counterintelligence agents to conduct a series of harassing actions against Soviet liaison representatives to hinder them in performance of their day-to-day activities, subjecting them to blanket surveillance and to numerous stops for identification checks. The world of espionage would remain a dangerous one right up to the last days of the Cold War. According to Colonel Herrington, the Soviet sources who supplied information that eventually led to identification of Conrad as a spy were themselves victims of betrayal and subsequently paid with their lives.



*"We have slain a large dragon, but we now live in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes. And in many ways, the dragon was easier to keep track of."*

CIA Director James Woolsey in the wake of  
Soviet collapse

# EPILOGUE

The end of the Cold War did not mean that Army counterintelligence immediately stood down from its long-standing obligations. For instance, it remained in support of international inspections involving Nuclear and Conventional Armed Forces Treaties. At the same time, new relationships with former Eastern Bloc nations allowed access to information that helped to shine the spotlight on here-to-fore unknown traitors within the ranks. Using these new sources, an unprecedented number of counterespionage cases were successfully brought to closure.

The collapse of the Soviet Union left the United States as the only remaining super-power, but it did not bring about a diminished role for America's armed forces. Instead, the Army quickly found itself engaged in a series of regional conflicts and operations. During Operation JUST CAUSE, US forces helped topple Panamanian narco-dictator General Manuel Noriega. During the combat operations, small teams of counterintelligence soldiers from the 470<sup>th</sup> MI Brigade provided spot reports from throughout Panama City. Using their sources, the counterintelligence personnel obtained critical information on troop dispositions and movements as well as the location of weapons caches. After the fighting ceased, counterintelligence specialists continued to help screen and process some 7,000 Panamanian soldiers, paramilitary, and civilians. Agents also identified and apprehended a number of Noriega's top aides who had gone into hiding.

Following on the heels of JUST CAUSE, Iraqi Dictator Saddam Hussein launched a surprise attack on the neighboring Emirate of Kuwait, a tiny but oil-rich territory in the Persian Gulf. The United States would lead a United Nations-backed coalition to oust Hussein's forces. Army counterintelligence's greatest contributions lay in support of Task Force FREEDOM. Being among the first to reenter liberated Kuwait City, counterintelligence soldiers provided force protection and also helped to collect significant documents to be turned over for exploitation.

Throughout the nineties, elements of the US Army continued to deploy in support of various regional peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. Whether in

Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, the Persian Gulf or East Timor, counterintelligence specialists were in country to assist in force protection.

In 1995, INSCOM lost much of its human intelligence operations and resources to the Defense Intelligence Agency's Defense HUMINT Service. This would throw counterintelligence and residual HUMINT functions into a state that they had not been in for 40 years. For the immediate, soldiers would once again be called upon to wear two hats. It would take another 10 years before authorities once again realized that a need existed for greater diversity in training and assignments.

With the coming of the Information Age, unprotected DOD networks became vulnerable to intruders who could steal secrets without being detected. Consequently, Army counterintelligence has become an important player in cyber warfare. Today, counterintelligence finds itself heavily engaged in the war against global terrorism and provides support to troops on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq and protection for America's interests and personnel around the world. To accomplish its numerous missions, counterintelligence has turned to new technologies and real-time linkage to other members of the intelligence and law enforcement communities.

Much has changed since counterintelligence was first created to serve the Nation and its Army during World War I. Important transformations have included the shifting of background investigations to the Department of Defense and the integration of counterintelligence with other intelligence disciplines and information operations. A more recent challenge has been keeping doctrine up-to-date with emerging technologies. However, in the midst of it all, military and civilians have continued to draw inspiration from their rich heritage as counterintelligence specialists. Like the Corps of Intelligence Police sergeants and the Counter Intelligence Corps agents who came before them, today's counterintelligence personnel remain equally committed to shielding the Army from the threats posed by foreign intelligence services and international terrorists.

Colonel George Trofimoff, son of immigrants, was the highest-ranking US Army officer to be convicted of spying during the Cold War. Trofimoff was the one-time chief of the US section within a joint interrogation center at Nuremberg, Germany. For nearly 20 years, beginning as far back as 1968, Trofimoff fed thousands of secret military documents to the Soviets, giving them insights on just how much the Allies knew and their sources. The need to deal with financial debts was at the root of Trofimoff's betrayal. The Soviets paid approximately \$250,000 for the secrets—a very cheap price considering the information obtained. However, it would take nearly 8 years and the testimony of a former KGB official to finally bring Trofimoff to justice.



# BIBLIOGRAPHY

The documentation of Army counterintelligence is very spotty. The primary reason is that counterintelligence deals with human sources, and a tendency exists not to leave a record trail apart from official case files. Secondly, there has never been a centralized, separate reporting system for Army counterintelligence historical records, such as annual unit reports. They were most often retired to various Federal Records Centers. Finally, the major player in Army counterintelligence was the Counter Intelligence Corps, but except for a brief period, the CIC did not have a professional historian assigned. However, during its existence the US Army Intelligence Command (USAINTC) had its own historian.

In 1947, two free-lance writers undertook a history of the CIC; many former agents cooperated by granting interviews and providing supporting documents. (Nothing was known to have come from the effort, and many of the accumulated documents were lost or misplaced, which led to a second attempt.) In 1951, MG John K. Rice, Chief of CIC, authorized the preparation of a brief history of the CIC for use by the school. The result was so well received that Rice's successor, MG Philip E. Gallagher, commissioned a 30-volume history written at the classified level. Except for privacy considerations, the history has been subsequently declassified. Lieutenant Colonel Franklin P. Jordan headed up the research-writing unit. However, over the years, the project became associated with MAJ Ann Bray, who served as editor and was with the project from start to finish. The team canvassed various Federal Records Centers throughout CONUS. They supplemented their research by interviewing numerous participants. In the end, the team claimed to have reviewed 150,000 pages of documents, covering over 300 units; interviewed 500 persons; and read 100 books and articles. The records are still in the National Archives and many remain scattered at various regional records centers. (The portion of the records that remained in the custody of the CIC/USAINTC historians is at National Archives Records Administration Annex II at College Park, Maryland, and is located under Section 319.21 UD of the NARA Guide.)

The two must reads on Army counterintelligence are *America's Secret Army* by Ian Sayer and Douglas Botting, which focuses on the CIC in World War II and post-war occupation, and *Traitors Among Us* by Stuart A. Herrington, whose first-hand account of counterintelligence successes in the late Cold War reads like a novel. Other overviews meriting attention include a two-volume work entitled *Spy Catchers of the US Army*, which was Ann Bray's effort to summarize the World War II portion of the 30-volume history on the Counter Intelligence Corps. Gary A. Trogdon wrote a dissertation, "A Decade of Catching Spies: The United States Army's Counter Intelligence Corps, 1943-1953." John P. Finnegan's *Military Intelligence* (a part of the US Army Center of Military History's lineage series) helps to put counterintelligence in the context of the larger Army intelligence. Finnegan also wrote an overview of counterintelligence from 1917 to 1947 in a paper "Enter the Sphinx." There is also Bruce W. Bidwell's multi-volume work *History of Military Intelligence Division, Department of General Staff, 1775-1941*; unfortunately, it tends to be uneven in quality. Two alumni magazines that contain valuable personal accounts are the *Golden Sphinx* (published by the National CIC Association) and *Agent Report* (National CIC Veterans). Finally, the now defunct National Counterintelligence Center (NCI) produced "A Counterintelligence Reader" edited by Frank J. Rafalko. It is largely a cut and paste history of stories on spies and counter-spies on the home front but does have a useful bibliography.

## INTRODUCTION

The information on counterintelligence in the Revolutionary War was drawn from a series of papers prepared by Edward F. Sayle. The most important of these are "George Washington: Manager of Intelligence" and "Intelligence in the War of Independence." Another related paper is "Evolution of a Military Intelligence Service during the American Revolution" written by Allan C. Ashcraft. Benjamin Tallmadge's *Memoirs of Colonel Benjamin Tallmadge* is also an important source. For the Civil War, Edwin C. Fishel's book *The Secret War for the Union* was used. In his appendixes, Fishel makes an excellent presentation on the problems of the various autobiographical stories written by former Civil War spies and spy catchers. In particular he attempts to separate fact from fiction in the writings of Allan Pinkerton, Rose O'Neal Greenhow, and Lafayette Baker. (Baker's *History of the United States Secret Service*, Pinkerton's *The Spy of the Rebellion*, and Greenhow's *My Imprisonment and the First Year of Abolition Rule at Washington*.) Materiel on military intelligence in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century is taken from *The Final Memoranda* by Ralph Van Deman; this particular edition was edited by Ralph E. Weber. In a master's thesis at Kansas State University, Marc B. Powe contributed information on "The Emergence of the War Department Intelligence Agency: 1885-1918."

## WORLD WAR I

Van Deman's account was found in *The Final Memorandum*. Lieutenant Royden Williamson prepared a short overview of the early days of the CIP, which is located at NARA II. Colonel Cabot Ward also wrote a comprehensive report dated 1919 on counterintelligence in the rear areas. Another insightful document at NARA II was the "History of the Philadelphia Branch Military Intelligence Division General Staff." An article by John P. Finnegan entitled "Army Counterintelligence in WWI" (*Military Intelligence Bulletin*, January 1988) provides an excellent overview. Other sources include Laurie and Cole's *The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1877-1945*. The story of Agent Peter De Pasqua by Thomas M. Johnson, "Death to the Americans" is contained in *Military Intelligence: Its Heroes and Legends* edited by Diane Hamm. Although of marginal value, Dennis E. Nolan prepared a draft on intelligence in World War I (to be found at the Military History Institute in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania). Samuel T. Hubbard's *Memoirs of a Staff Officer* (Library of Congress) is a more readable account of the G2, AEF. FBI Historian, John F. Fox, Jr., has an article "Bureaucratic Wrangling over Counterintelligence, 1917-18" in the CIA's *Studies in Intelligence* (Vol 49, No 1), which tells about inter-departmental struggles.

## BETWEEN THE WARS

Herbert O. Yardley's *The American Black Chamber* and David Kahn's *The Reader of Gentlemen's Mail* provide accounts of Army code-breaking in World War I and the 1920s. A helpful overview of the Army's response to domestic disturbances is Andrew J. Birtle's *US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941*. Diane Hamm's *Heroes and Legends* contains the Sakakida and Komori story as does Ann Bray's "Spy Catchers." (Soon to be released is a history by James C. McNaughton regarding the role of Asian-American soldiers that should contain the most accurate story on Sakakida and Komori.) John P. Finnegan's *Military Intelligence: A Picture History* provided a background summary for this and other chapters.

## WORLD WAR II

"History of Military Intelligence Training at Camp Ritchie, Maryland 1942-1945" is the official account of the school and provides general background information. *Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb* by Vincent C. Jones tells the official story of the Army's participation in the atomic program. The book also has a chapter dedicated to the subject of security. "Los Alamos: Beginning of an Era" by the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory Public Relations Office contains added background information. The National Counterintelligence Center's "A Counterintelligence Reader" also has a section on the Manhattan Project. For those interested in the events surrounding the White House's efforts to do away with the CIC in CONUS, *America's Secret Army* by Ian Sayer and Douglas Botting contains additional information.

Lieutenant Colonel Horace Miner prepared a small but excellent personal account of operations in North Africa and Sicily. This is among the interviews at NARA II.

An internal report that deals with the so-called "Colmar Incident" was used for information on the case involving the stolen cryptologic equipment. Over the years, various CIC agents have written about their experiences in the war; one of the best written was Ib Melchior's first hand account in *Case by Case*. "The Rhine Maiden" (*The American Weekly*, dated 8 March 1953) by Kurt Singer tells the story of the spy Sybille Delcourt.

Soon to be released is a history by James C. McNaughton regarding the role of Asian-American soldiers in the intelligence war for the Pacific. *Special Agent in the Pacific, WWII* by William Brand Simpson is another well-written account telling of his experiences in the theater and in post-war Japan. William A. Owens' *Eye-deep in Hell* tells of his dealings with the *Hukbalahap* in the Philippines. In the aftermath of World War II, the Military Intelligence Section of the US Far East Command prepared a summary report: "Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA."

The Reader's Digest compiled a book of stories that appeared in various issues; the book is entitled *Secrets and Spies*. "The Golden Sphinx" by Thomas Johnson is particularly noteworthy. Thomas Johnson was a World War I correspondent who was befriended by General Dennis E. Nolan, G2 of the AEF. Nolan introduced Johnson to the world of counterintelligence. A writer of limited abilities, Johnson wrote a number of short stories on the subject of counterintelligence and in the process accumulated various background materials and drafts. These are preserved among the Army counterintelligence records files at NARA II.

## POST WAR

Allan A Ryan, Jr. wrote *Klaus Barbie and the United States Government* that details the role of the CIC and Barbie. “A Matter of Hindsight” by Walter J. Unrath (*American Intelligence Journal*, Autumn/Winter 1992/93) is a first-hand perspective on the Barbie Affair. Ian Sayer and Douglas Botting’s *America’s Secret Army* provided added insights not available in the CIC history regarding post-war Europe.

Peter Ogloblin for the Operations Research Office at John Hopkins University prepared a study entitled “The Purge in Occupied Japan: Appendix I, The Role of SCAP Intelligence Agencies in the Purge of Japanese Undesirables.” There is an excellent presentation by LTC Gordon Flaherty at the 1951 CIC Commanders Conference on the CIC’s monitoring of Japanese repatriates returning from Soviet camps. For the Occupation of Japan, an interview of Captain Benjamin T. Obata is also an excellent source. The views of Captain Kenneth E. MacDougall on post-war Korea are captured in an interview. See NARA II for all of these documents.

## THE COLD WAR

John P. Finnegan wrote a number of articles and monographs that traced the role of the CIC during the Korean War. The last one was *The US Army in the Korean War 1950-53: Operations and Intelligence Support*. A number of operational files are among the CIC records at NARA II. “LITTLE SWITCH, BIG SWITCH, CIC Division Operations” (by CWO W.W. Brame) at the 1951 CIC Commanders Conference is a good summary. Again, see NARA II.

Robert Louis Benson and Michael Warner edited for Central Intelligence Agency the following publication: *Venona: Soviet Espionage and the American Response 1939-1957*. The 1951 CIC Commanders Conference presentations contain one by LTC David H. Huntan on “66<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment Operations.” CPT K. MacDougall prepared a draft lecture to be delivered by COL Erskine on the subject of the “Verger-Ponger Case.” These last two documents are in NARA II. Within its files, the INSCOM History Office has a number of summaries on units.

Regarding the mission of the 704<sup>th</sup> INTC Detachment in Vietnam, MAJ Dillion prepared a paper on “Operating in an Environment of Counterinsurgency.” (NARA II) *The Role of Military Intelligence 1965-1967* (part of the US Army Center of Military History’s series on Vietnam) by MG Joseph A McChristian, who served as the J2 MACV provided good insights. “Army Operational Intelligence Activities in Civil Disturbances Since 1957” by Paul J. Scheips and Karl E. Cocke is an early overview on the subject. A more significant version is one by Paul Scheips, *Domestic Disorders: 1945-1992*, which will soon be released by the Center of Military History. The annual histories of the US Army Intelligence Command contain little in the area of operational information. A copy of a letter that LTG William P. Yarborough wrote to a newspaper editor of *The Memphis Commercial Appeal* giving background information on role of Army counterintelligence on the home front was most useful. The counterintelligence records at NARA II contain numerous after action reports and decision papers regarding the Army’s response to civil disturbances of the 1960s. “Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans,” *Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities of the United States Senate*, Ninety Fourth Congress, Second Session, US Government Printing Office, No. 94-755, April 14 1976, Book II (Church Committee) provides information on the role of domestic intelligence in the 1960s. Finally, Don Oberdorfer prepared an excellent article on Sergeant Dunlap, “The Playboy Sergeant Who Spied for Russia,” which appeared in *Great Spy Stories*, edited by Allen Dulles.

There are numerous articles on the subject of The Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study, such as the one written by then BG Edmund R. Thompson, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, entitled “INSCOM: To Move More Intelligence Faster Up the Line” (October 1977 edition of the *Army Green Book*). The US Army Intelligence and Security Command’s *Journal* ran a series of articles on OPSEC (June/July 1979, August 1979, and April 1981).

Although not an official history, Herrington’s *Traitors Among Us* provides great insights into the modern world of Army counterintelligence. *INSCOM: 25<sup>th</sup> Anniversary*, which is now out-of-print, provided general descriptions of various counterintelligence efforts worldwide.

## APPENDICES

The World War II order of battle came from unit historical data cards located at the Center of Military History, who is the final arbitrator on lineage and honors. Also of assistance was Shelby Stanton’s *Order of Battle: US Army World War II*. The Korean-era group came from a station list.



*Appendix A*

**CIC ORDER OF BATTLE  
WORLD WAR II  
(1 March 1945)**

**SOUTHWEST PACIFIC**

Sixth Army (Philippines/Luzon)	306 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
6 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division	6 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
43 <sup>d</sup> Inf Division	43 <sup>d</sup> CIC Det
I Corps	201 <sup>st</sup> CIC Det
25 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division	25 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
32 <sup>d</sup> Inf Division	32 <sup>d</sup> CIC Det
33 <sup>d</sup> Inf Division	33 <sup>d</sup> CIC Det
XIV Corps	214 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
1 <sup>st</sup> Cav Division	801 <sup>st</sup> CIC Det
11 <sup>th</sup> Abn Division	11 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
37 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division	37 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
XI Corps	211 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
38 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division	38 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
40 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division	40 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det

Area Detachments (Philippines/Luzon)  
442<sup>d</sup>, 453<sup>d</sup>, 457<sup>th</sup>, 473<sup>d</sup>, 481<sup>st</sup>, 484<sup>th</sup>, 485<sup>th</sup>, 493<sup>d</sup>,  
and 999<sup>th</sup> CIC Det

Eighth Army (Philippines/Leyte)	308 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
41 <sup>st</sup> Inf Division	41 <sup>st</sup> CIC Det
24 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division	24 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
XXIV Corps	224 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
7 <sup>th</sup> Cav Division	7 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
77 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division	77 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
96 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division	96 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
X Corps	210 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
Americical Div	182 <sup>d</sup> CIC Det

Area Detachments (Philippines/Leyte)  
458<sup>th</sup>, 459<sup>th</sup>, 480<sup>th</sup>, 482<sup>d</sup>, 483<sup>d</sup>, and 486<sup>th</sup> CIC Det

Eighth Army Area Command (New Guinea)	
93 <sup>d</sup> Inf Division	93 <sup>d</sup> CIC Det
31 <sup>st</sup> Inf Division	31 <sup>st</sup> CIC Det

Area Detachments (New Guinea)  
440<sup>th</sup>, 441<sup>st</sup> (Theater HQ), 444<sup>th</sup>, 445<sup>th</sup>, 446<sup>th</sup>, 447<sup>th</sup>, 448<sup>th</sup>, 449<sup>th</sup>,  
450<sup>th</sup>, 451<sup>st</sup>, 452<sup>d</sup>, 454<sup>th</sup>, 455<sup>th</sup>, 456<sup>th</sup>, 474<sup>th</sup>, 475<sup>th</sup>, 476<sup>th</sup>,  
477<sup>th</sup>, 478<sup>th</sup>, 487<sup>th</sup>, 488<sup>th</sup>, 489<sup>th</sup>, 490<sup>th</sup>, 491<sup>st</sup>, 901<sup>st</sup>, 902<sup>d</sup>, 903<sup>d</sup>,  
904<sup>th</sup>, 951<sup>st</sup>, 952<sup>d</sup>, 953<sup>d</sup>, 954<sup>th</sup>, 955<sup>th</sup>, 956<sup>th</sup>, 958<sup>th</sup>, 960<sup>th</sup>, 961<sup>st</sup>,  
and 962<sup>d</sup> CIC Det

Area Detachments (Australia)  
443<sup>d</sup> and 444<sup>th</sup> CIC Det

**CENTRAL PACIFIC**

Tenth Army (Central Pacific)	310 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
27 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division	27 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
81 <sup>st</sup> Inf Division	81 <sup>st</sup> CIC Det

**Central Pacific Base Command (Hawaii)**

IX Corps	209 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
98 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division	98 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det

**Area Detachments (Hawaii)**

401<sup>st</sup>, 402<sup>d</sup>, 404<sup>th</sup>, 496<sup>th</sup>, 963<sup>d</sup>, and 964<sup>th</sup> CIC Det

**SOUTH PACIFIC**

**South Pacific Base Command (New Caledonia)**

433<sup>d</sup> CIC Det

**EUROPE**

Fifth Army (Northern Italy)	305 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
II Corps	202 <sup>d</sup> CIC Det
85 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division	85 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
88 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division	88 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
91 <sup>st</sup> Inf Division	91 <sup>st</sup> CIC Det
34 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division	34 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
IV Corps	204 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
1 <sup>st</sup> Armd Division	501 <sup>st</sup> CIC Det
92 <sup>d</sup> Inf Division	92 <sup>d</sup> CIC Det
10 <sup>th</sup> Mt Division	10 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det

**Area Detachments (Italy)**

425<sup>th</sup>, 426<sup>th</sup>, 428<sup>th</sup>, 430<sup>th</sup>, and 431<sup>st</sup> CIC Det

**21<sup>st</sup> Army Group (Low Countries/Germany)**

Ninth Army	309 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
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XIII Corps	213 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
79 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division	79 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
84 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division	84 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
95 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division	95 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
102 <sup>d</sup> Inf Division	102 <sup>d</sup> CIC Det
XVI Corps	216 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
8 <sup>th</sup> Armd Division	508 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
35 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division	35 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
75 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division	75 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
102 <sup>d</sup> Inf Division	102 <sup>d</sup> CIC Det
XIX Corps	219 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
2 <sup>d</sup> Armd Division	502 <sup>d</sup> CIC Det
29 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division	29 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
30 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division	30 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
83 <sup>d</sup> Inf Div	83 <sup>d</sup> CIC Det

**12<sup>th</sup> Army Group (France/Low Countries/Germany)**

66 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division	66 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
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First Army	301 <sup>st</sup> CIC Det
V Corps	205 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
7 <sup>th</sup> Armd Division	507 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
2 <sup>d</sup> Inf Division	2 <sup>d</sup> CIC Det
28 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division	28 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
69 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division	69 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
106 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division	106 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det

VII Corps	207 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det 503 <sup>d</sup> CIC Det 8 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det 80 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det 99 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det 104 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det 76 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det	86 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division 71 <sup>st</sup> Inf Division 89 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division 97 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division	86 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det 71 <sup>st</sup> CIC Det 89 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det 97 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
III Corps	203 <sup>d</sup> CIC Det 506 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det 509 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det 1 <sup>st</sup> CIC Det 9 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det 78 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det	Area Detachments (France/Low Countries)417 <sup>th</sup> , 418 <sup>th</sup> (ALSOS), 419 <sup>th</sup> , 420 <sup>th</sup> , 421 <sup>st</sup> , 423 <sup>d</sup> , 427 <sup>th</sup> , 429 <sup>th</sup> , 494 <sup>th</sup> , and 495 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det	
Third Army	303 <sup>d</sup> CIC Det 208 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det 505 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det 511 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det 4 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det 90 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det 87 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det	XXII Corps (England) XXIII Corps (England)	222 <sup>d</sup> CIC Det 223 <sup>d</sup> CIC Det
VIII Corps	212 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det 504 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det 5 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det 76 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det	Area Detachments (England) 223 <sup>d</sup> and 333 <sup>d</sup> CIC Det	
XII Corps	220 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det 510 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det 26 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det 65 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det 94 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det	Area Detachments 411 <sup>th</sup> , 412 <sup>th</sup> , and 415 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det	
XX Corps	10 <sup>th</sup> Armd Div 26 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division 65 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division 94 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division		
6 <sup>th</sup> Army Group (France/Germany)			
Seventh Army	307 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det	Area Detachments	
VI Corps	206 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det 514 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det 36 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det 42 <sup>nd</sup> CIC Det 45 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det 103 <sup>d</sup> CIC Det	405 <sup>th</sup> , 406 <sup>th</sup> , 407 <sup>th</sup> , 408 <sup>th</sup> , 409 <sup>th</sup> , 410 <sup>th</sup> , 413 <sup>th</sup> , 414 <sup>th</sup> , and 416 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det	
XV Corps	103 <sup>d</sup> CIC Det 215 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det 44 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det 100 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det		
XXI Corps	100 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det 221 <sup>st</sup> CIC Det 512 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det 63 <sup>rd</sup> CIC Det 70 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det 3 <sup>d</sup> CIC Det		
Other (Low Countries/France)			
First Allied Airborne Army			
82 <sup>d</sup> Abn Division	82 <sup>d</sup> CIC Det	Second Army (Tennessee)	302 <sup>d</sup> CIC Det
XVIII Abn Corps	218 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det	Fourth Army (Texas)	304 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
13 <sup>th</sup> Abn Division	13 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det	XXXVI Corps	468 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
17 <sup>th</sup> Abn Division	17 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det	MI Center Training Center (Fort Ritchie)	
101 <sup>st</sup> Abn Division	101 <sup>st</sup> CIC Det	492 <sup>d</sup> , 497 <sup>th</sup> , 498 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det	
Fifteenth Army	315 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det		
13 <sup>th</sup> Armd Div	513 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det		
16 <sup>th</sup> Armd Div	516 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det		
20 <sup>th</sup> Armd Div	520 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det		

## Appendix B

### LIST OF UNITS KOREAN WAR ERA (6 April 1953)

#### PACIFIC

##### KOREA

2 <sup>d</sup> Inf Division	2 <sup>d</sup> CIC Det
3 <sup>d</sup> Inf Division	3 <sup>d</sup> CIC Det
7 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division	7 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
24 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division	24 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
25 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division	25 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
40 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division	40 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
45 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division	45 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
1 <sup>st</sup> Marine Division	181 <sup>st</sup> CIC Det
1 <sup>st</sup> Cav Division	191 <sup>st</sup> CIC Det
I Corps	201 <sup>st</sup> CIC Det
IX Corps	209 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
X Corps	210 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
Eighth Army	308 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
	705 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
Korean Communications Zone	704 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det

##### HAWAII

US Army, Pacific	401 <sup>st</sup> CIC Det
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##### JAPAN

Armed Forces Far East	441 <sup>st</sup> CIC Det
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##### OKINAWA

Ryukyus Command	526 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
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#### EUROPE

##### GERMANY

1 <sup>st</sup> Inf Division	1 <sup>st</sup> CIC Det
4 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division	4 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
28 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division	28 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
43 <sup>d</sup> Inf Division	43 <sup>d</sup> CIC Det
US Army, Europe	66 <sup>th</sup> CIC Gp
V Corps	205 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
VII Corps	207 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
US Army, Europe	427 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
2 <sup>d</sup> Armd Division	520 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det

##### AUSTRIA

US Forces Austria	430 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
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##### FRANCE

Supreme HQ	
Allied Powers, Europe	450 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det

##### TRIESTE

Trieste US Troops	17 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
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#### CONUS

11 <sup>th</sup> Abn Division (Ft Campbell, KY)	11 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
31 <sup>st</sup> Inf Division (Cp Atterbury, IN)	31 <sup>st</sup> CIC Det
37 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division (Cp Polk, LA)	37 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
44 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division (Ft Lewis, WA)	44 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
47 <sup>th</sup> Inf Division (Cp Rucker, AL)	47 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
82 <sup>d</sup> Abn Division (Fort Bragg, NC)	82 <sup>d</sup> CIC Det
First Army (New York, NY)	108 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
Second Army (Ft Meade, MD)	109 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
Third Army (Ft McPherson, GA)	111 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
Fourth Army (Ft Houston, TX)	112 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
Fifth Army (Chicago, IL)	113 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
Sixth Army (Presidio of SF, CA)	115 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
Mil Dist of Washington (Washington, DC)	116 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
XVIII Corps (Ft Bragg, NC)	218 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
111 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det (Ft Jackson, SC)	316 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
1 <sup>st</sup> Armd Div (Ft Hood, TX)	501 <sup>st</sup> CIC Det
111 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det (Ft Benning, GA)	503 <sup>d</sup> CIC Det
111 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det (Ft Bragg, NC)	701 <sup>st</sup> CIC Det
301 <sup>st</sup> Log Cmd (Ft McClellan, AL)	702 <sup>d</sup> CIC Det
Second Army (Fort Meade, MD)	890 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
Special Weapons Project (Sandia Base, NM)	901 <sup>st</sup> CIC Det
Chief, CIC (Ft Holabird, MD)	902 <sup>d</sup> CIC Det

#### OTHER

US Army Alaska	467 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
Iceland Defense Force	468 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
US Army Caribbean (CZ)	470 <sup>th</sup> CIC Det
US Army Caribbean (PR)	471 <sup>st</sup> CIC Det



*Appendix C*

**KEY PERSONNEL**

**DEPUTY CHIEFS OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE**

LTG Keith B. Alexander	Jul 03 –
LTG Robert W. Noonan, Jr.	Jul 00 – Jul 03
LTG Claudia Kennedy	May 97 – Jul 00
LTG Paul E. Menoher, Jr.	Feb 95 – Feb 97
LTG Ira C. Owens	Oct 91 – Feb 95
LTG Charles B. Eichelberger	Nov 89 – Sep 91
LTG Sidney T. Weinstein	Aug 85 – Nov 88

**ASSISTANT CHIEFS OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE**

LTG William E. Odom	Nov 81 – May 85
MG Edmund R. Thompson	Aug 77 – Nov 81
MG Harold R. Aaron	Nov 73 – Aug 77
MG William E. Potts	Sep 72 – Jul 73
MG Philip B. Davidson, Jr.	May 71 – Sep 72
MG Joseph A. McChristian	Aug 68 – Apr 71
MG William P. Yarborough	Dec 66 – Jul 68
MG John J. Davis	Sep 65 – Oct 66
MG Alva R. Fitch	Oct 61 – Jan 64
MG John M. Willems	Nov 58 – Oct 61
MG Robert A. Schow	Aug 56 – Oct 58

**ASSISTANT CHIEFS OF STAFF, G2**

MG Arthur C. Trudeau	Nov 53 – Aug 55
MG Richard C. Partridge	Aug 52 – Nov 53
MG Alexander R. Bolling	Aug 50 – Aug 52
MG Stafford LeRoy Irvin*	Nov 48 – Aug 50
LTG Stephen Chamberlin*	Jun 46 – Oct 48
LTG Hoyt S. Vandenberg	Jan 46 – Jun 46
MG Clayton Bissell	Feb 44 – Jan 46
MG George V. Strong	May 42 – Feb 44
BG Raymond E. Lee	Feb 42 – May 42
BG Sherman Miles	Apr 40 – Jan 42
COL E.R. Warner McCabe	Jun 37 – Feb 40
COL Frances H. Lincoln	Nov 35 – Jun 37
BG Harry E. Knight	Feb 35 – Nov 35
BG Alfred T. Smith	Jan 31 – Jan 35
COL Stanley H. Ford	May 27 – Sep 30
COL James H. Reeves	Jul 24 – Apr 27
COL William K. Naylor	Nov 22 – Jun 24
BG Stuart Heintzelman	Sep 21 – Nov 22

**CHIEFS, MI SECTION/DIVISION**

BG Dennis E. Nolan	Sep 20 – Sep 21
BG Marlborough Churchill	Jun 18 – Aug 20
COL Ralph Van Deman	May 17 – Jun 18

**COMMANDING GENERALS, USA INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND**

MG John F. Kimmons	Aug 03 –
MG Keith B. Alexander	Jul 01 – Jul 03
MG Robert W. Noonan, Jr.	Jul 98 – Jul 00
MG John Thomas, Jr.	Aug 96 – Jul 98
BG Trent N. Thomas	Sep 94 – Aug 96
MG Paul E. Menoher, Jr.	Aug 93 – Sep 94
MG Charles F. Scanlon	Oct 90 – Aug 93
MG Stanley H. Hyman	Nov 88 – Oct 90
MG Harry E. Soyster	Jun 84 – Nov 88
MG Albert N. Stubblebine	May 81 – Jun 84
MG William I. Rolya	Jan 77 – Mar 81

**COMMANDING GENERALS, USA INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

BG James E. Freeze	Aug 77 – Oct 77
BG Edmund R. Thompson	Jul 75 – Aug 77
COL William S. Wolf	Jul 74 – Jun 75

**COMMANDING GENERALS, USA INTELLIGENCE COMMAND**

COL N. Dean Schanche	Oct 72 – Jun 74
COL James R. Waldie	Jun 72 – Sep 74
BG Orlando C. Epp	Feb 71 – Jun 72
BG Jack C. Matthews	Feb 70 – Jan 71
MG William H. Blakefield	Jun 67 – Feb 70
MG Elias C. Townsend**	Nov 65 – Jun 67
MG Charles F. Leonard, Jr.**	Jan 65 – Nov 65

**COMMANDING GENERALS, USA INTELLIGENCE CORPS COMMAND**

MG Charles F. Leonard, Jr.**	Dec 64 – Dec 64
MG Richard Collins**	Aug 63 – Nov 64
MG Garrison B. Coverdale**	Jul 62 – Jul 63

**CHIEFS, INTELLIGENCE CORPS**

MG Garrison B. Coverdale	Aug 61 – Jun 62
MG Richard G. Prather	Jan 61 – Aug 61

**CHIEFS, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CORPS**

MG Richard G. Prather	Nov 56 – Dec 60
MG Boniface Campbell	Oct 53 – Nov 56
MG George B. Barth	Aug 53 – Oct 53
MG Philip E. Gallagher	Aug 51 – Aug 51

MG John K. Rice	Jun 49 – Aug 51
BG Edwin A. Zundel	Jan 48 – Jun 49
BG George V. Keyser	Apr 47 – Jan 48
COL Meredith C. Noble	Jan 46 – Apr 47
COL Harold R. Kibler	Jul 45 – Jan 46
COL Harold R. Kibler***	May 43 –Feb 44
LTC Hugh D. Wise, Jr.	Jul 42 – May 43
LTC H.G. Sheen	Jan 42 – 30 Jun 42

**CHIEFS, CORPS OF INTELLIGENCE  
POLICE**

MAJ H.G. Sheen	Oct 41 – Dec 41
MAJ Garland Williams	Jan 41 – Aug 41

\*Official title was Director of Intelligence

\*\*Served concurrently as Chief, Intelligence Corps until corps discontinued on 1 Mar 1966

\*\*\*Office of Chief abolished



